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SYNOPSIS 
This thesis describes and explains a recent industrial 
relations phenomenon, the "Industrial attitudes of active 
white-collar civil service trade unionists." It begins by 
tracing the problem facing the civil service trade unions 
back to the institutionalized low pay of their members and 
the apparently autocratic character of their employer. 
Evidence was gathered which showed that the Government, in 
its role as employer, had over the years gradually disarmed 
the representatives of its employees seemingly through the 
exercise of its prerogative. However, when the exercise of 
prerogative took on a new meaning, for instance, making 
decisions unilaterally and enforcing pay increases which 
were unacceptable to the unions, it was seen by civil 
service trade unionists as an abuse of power. 
The thesis contains further evidence which shows how overt 
Government attitudes gradually transformed its hitherto 
intentionally docile workers into a militant workforce. It 
illustrates the process by which the Government anaesthe-
tized itself in order to overcome the growing militancy 
among its employees. It delineates a connection between 
Government practices in the area of industrial relations and 
low morale in the civil service. Analyses of data gathered 
through a wide ranging survey provide substantive grounds 
for a categorical dismissal the myth that higher grade civil 
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servants were right wing and were consequently less militant 
than lower grade civil servants, and more prone to shirk 
their unions' activities. It amply demonstrates how the 
attitude of active white-collar civil service trade 
unionists to industrial action is influenced more by their 
experience of the negotiating process and the behaviour of 
their employer, than by the structure of their personal 
circumstances. It argues that because the unions failed in 
their endeavour to win better pay and in particular, as a 
direct result of their defeat by the Government in the 1981 
pay campaign, the level of militancy had declined, thereby 
jeopardizing the effectiveness of their negotiating 
strategy. 
The thesis concludes by highlighting the distinctive outcome 
of the survey, namely, that militancy is a more significant 
aspect of trade union power than high density of membership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Low pay has always been at the centre of the problems of the 
civil service trade unions since their inception last 
century.* The concept of cash limits which recently gained 
prominence in the determination of civil service pay was 
frowned upon by the union leaders and events in the past few 
years have shown that the little credibility which the 
concept may have had has totally disappeared. Unti1 1981, 
civil service pay was governed by a National Agreement which 
incorporated the system of Pay Research. This system was 
based on the principles recommended by the Priestly Commi-
ssion (1953-55), that is, "fair comparisons" or "comparabi-
lity", by which salaries paid for civil service jobs were 
determined by reference to the rates paid for equivalent 
jobs in the private sector. Two independent research pro-
jects, commissioned by the Megaw Inquiry, came to the con-
clusion that the pay of civil servants, taken over the whole 
period from 1956 to 1980, was kept broadly in line with pay 
in the private sector. Nevertheless, the intention of the 
Government was becoming more and more transparent. It envi-
saged abandoning the system whereby pay was determined 
primarily by comparison in favour of a situation where pay 
was determined by cash limits, with market forces playing a 
significant role. For instance, the Treasury declared that 
"The Government does not consider the pay of civil servants, 
or any other group, should be determined by the needs of 
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individuals. Pay is a matter for the market place and social 
needs are the province of the social security system."2 
Market forces as the major determinant of pay was questioned 
by Kessler (1980), not least because of its inadequacy in 
determining pay "in the non-trading public sector".3 
In October 1980, the Government withdrew from the National 
Pay Agreement and suppressed the reports of the Pay Research 
Unit, having announced a 6 per cent cash limit as the main 
determinant of civi1 service pay for 1981. This action 
exacerbated the longest and most costly dispute in the civil 
service. The defeat suffered by the unions after a 21 week 
campaign of industrial action (March to July 1981), created 
a new culture among their members. The realisation that 
their employer, the Government, had the abi1ity to resist 
them indefinitely appeared to have altered their views, 
particularly regarding the efficacy of strike actions. By 
1983, the Government had successfully forced unacceptable 
pay offers on civi1 servants while their unions were 
virtually powerless to negotiate better deals. 
A survey of the attitudes of civil servants to militancy and 
to their unions, which had interested the author since the 
1981 major defeat, became crucial around 1984 when most 
union members seemed reconciled to the notion that their 
unions were ineffective. Employed as a civil servant him-
self, the author took an active interest in trade union 
10 
affairs. Having recently completed a Masters degree, he 
wished to carry out an in-depth research. His interest in 
the changing attitudes of civil servants coupled with his 
curiosity as a participant observer4, compelled him to 
search far and wide both in published works and in discuss-
ions with other practitioners of industrial relations, for 
answers to the riddles posed by repressive trade union laws, 
apathy of members and an often unreasonable employer. The 
survey became even more compelling since no research 
appeared to have been carried out, at the time, on the 
attitudes of white-collar civil service trade unionists. The 
research carried out by Fosh (1981) focused on blue-collar 
activism at branch level; it was not designed to investigate 
the attitudes of white-collar civil service trade 
unionists^. The decision to carry out this survey was taken 
before the works of Corby (1984), Arthurs (1985) and Kessler 
(1990) all of which focused on specific areas of industrial 
relations in civil service. Whereas Corby^ dealt with the 
dissonance which might affect members of the Association of 
First Division Civil Servants (FDA) because of their role as 
senior civil servants, Arthurs? focused on issues arising 
from the Government's prohibition of trade union membership 
at its General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Kessler^, 
on the other hand, studied pay determination in the civil 
service from the point of view of the Institution of Pro-
fessional Civil Servants (IPCS). The research carried out by 
Kelly (1980)9 focused on the industrial behaviour of white-
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collar civil servants, with reference to the sociological 
concept of proletarianization. Cappelli's work (1983)1(^ exa-
mined the operation of the pay research system in the wake 
of the Megaw Commission's report. It traced the development 
of comparability in the determination of civil service pay; 
but it differs from Kessler's work because it covered all 
groups of civil servants. Neither Kelly's nor Cappelli's 
work was designed to investigate the behaviour of trade 
unionists in particular. Each of these works is unique in 
its own context but significantly different from this survey 
in the fact that it was designed to cover all the unions of 
the civil service and it considered many more aspects of 
industrial relations. Circumstances explained in chapter 2, 
prevented the inclusion of the Civil and Public Services 
Association (CPSA) and IPCS. 
Emphasis on active trade unionists was prominent in the 
design of the survey. There are trade unionists who are 
members, only to the extent that they pay their union dues. 
They neither attend union meetings nor take any interest in 
their union affairs. The survey was not 1ikely to benefit 
from reliance on such a group of trade unionists. Since they 
have so little interest in trade union affairs it would be 
difficult to persuade them to sacrifice even a few minutes 
to complete a questionnaire. The reason for concentration of 
the survey on the influences on "active white-collar trade 
unionists" is that the effectiveness of the civil service 
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trade unions depends on their active members' willingness to 
participate and lead, and even more so on the maintenance of 
their morale. 
The survey therefore, investigated the industrial attitudes 
of active white-collar civil service trade unionists and 
examined their reactions to most industrial relations pres-
sures. Its purpose was to discover the factors which influ-
ence their attitudes to militancy, especially in view of the 
current trade union laws and the tough attitude of their 
employer towards them. No such survey had been carried out 
before. Although the survey was primarily intended as a work 
of pure scholarship, it was also partly intended tor-
fa) provide a basis for corroborating earlier studies in 
industrial relations; (b) reveal the union members to them-
selves and thereby awake them to the realities of having the 
Government as their employer; (c) improve the understanding 
of industrial relations in the civil service; and hopefully, 
(d) restore the credibility of the unions. 
Because there are so few written work on the attitudes of 
British white-collar civil service trade unionists, chapter 
1 begins with a review of literature dealing with some major 
aspects of industrial relations which may be pertinent to 
the subject of the investigation; contributions from the 
United States are included. Despite the differences between 
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Great Britain and the United States in terms of the 
development of their respective trade union organizations 
and industrial law, no distinction is made in this review 
between the theories originating from both countries. The 
British civil service may be unique in many ways but it is 
certainly not unique in the context of human relations. An 
assumption in the chapter that man is rational-economic, 
leads to the suggestion that white-collar trade unionists 
elsewhere, including the United States, would react in the 
same manner as the British white-collar civil service trade 
unionist. Chapter 2 describes the methodology used in the 
survey and explains the reason for the proportions of active 
and non-active unionists used to make up the sample 
population. An account of the process by which the hypo-
theses used in the thesis were developed, is given in this 
chapter. In chapter 3, the structural characteristics of the 
sample are analysed and explained. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze 
and interpret the data collected; comparisons are made 
between higher and lower grade civil servants and between 
branch officers and ordinary members. These chapters demon-
strate that whereas the tendency to rationalize strike 
decisions is greater among higher grade civil servants, the 
propensity to militant actions is nevertheless greater among 
them. The view that members in higher grades may find it 
difficult to reconcile their commitment to their job and 
their commitment to their unions (Corby 1984), is examined. 
The view that younger members are more prone to militancy 
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than older members is also examined. In chapter 6 the data 
interpreted in chapters 4 and 5 are synthesized. In addition 
to reporting the outcome of tests carried out on a variety 
of influences on attitudes and behaviours in chapters 4 and 
5, chapter 6 assesses the validity of seven particularly 
important hypotheses enunciated in chapter 2. 
Militancy is a common factor throughout all the seven 
hypotheses; it is also the most important theme of the main 
hypothesis of this thesis, namely, that "Militancy is a more 
potent factor in trade union power than high union member-
ship. " (See page 313 et seq. ) This hypothesis is therefore 
held as an empirical law unti1 proven otherwise by evidence 
of further research. 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, fulfils two objectives. 
Firstly, the survey findings and the problems facing the 
unions and their members are summarized. Secondly, some 
practical solutions are discussed; this is included prima-
rily to satisfy an obligation to the General Secretaries of 
the unions whose interest made the research possible. At 
this stage, a model of influences on the attitudes of active 
white-collar civil service trade unionists begins emerge, 
but although the ful fi Iment of such a task is beyond the 
remit of this thesis, the following diagram illustrates an 
important outcome of the survey. 
14* 
A MODEL OF INFLUENCES ON THE ATTITUDES OF ACTIVE 
WHITE-COLT.CIVIL BF.WVICE TRADE UNIONISTS 
POSITIVE 
Difficult 
Employer 
Political 
Climate 
Legislation 
National Security 
Economic Climate 
junemployment] Union 
Representation 
& Achievement 
Recession 
J PROBABLE 
Age 
Sex 
Marital Status 
Family Commitment 
Financial t i 
Mortgage 
Education 
Public Opinion 
News Media 
Working Condition 
Technological 
Change 
I N D U S T R I A L 
ATTITUDES 
15 
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES 
1. Achike, B.C., The Civil Service Unions: Their origins 
and Metamorphosis. Unpublished Monograph, 1988. 
2. Evidence given to the civil service Arbitration 
Tribunal hearing (1982). 
3. Kessler, Sid, Developments in Industrial Relations -
Past, Present and Future. The City University Business 
School Working Paper No. 14, p.7. 1980. 
4. The author was a branch secretary of the Society of 
Civil and Public Servants (SCPS), now known as the 
National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS), 
and was an accredited member of his Establishment's 
Whitley Council, representing his members on several 
Committees and Sub-committees. He resigned his position 
in order to give fuller attention to this survey. 
5. Fosh, P., The Active Trade Unionist: A study of motiva-
tion and participation at branch level. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1981. 
6. Corby, S., Civil Servant and Trade Union Member: a 
Conflict of Loyalties? in Industrial Relations Journal, 
1984, Vol. 15 No. 2. 
7. Arthurs, A., GCHQ and the Changing Face of Staff 
Relations in the Civil Service, in Industrial Relations 
Journal, 1985, Vol. 16 No. 2. 
8. Kessler, Ian, Flexibility and Comparability in Pay 
Determination for Professional Civil Servants, in 
Industrial Relations Journal, 1990, Vol. 21 No. 3. 
9. Kelly, M.P., White-Collar Proletariat: The Industrial 
Behaviour of British Civil Servants. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London 1980. 
10. Cappelli, P., Comparability and the British Civil 
Service, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
1983. Vol. XXI No. 1, pp. 33-45. 
CHAPTER 1 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON RELEVANT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
THEORIES 
In order to provide a conceptual framework within which the 
survey would be conducted it was desirable to undertake a 
synopsis of the field of industrial relations theory, focus-
ing only on those theories which relate to the subject of 
the investigation. This, together with a number of hypo-
theses derived by contrasting theories of power and conflict 
with views gathered from pilot interviews would help in 
developing a frame of reference for planning the research, 
and would facilitate interpretation of the results in an 
emerging and historical perspective. 
Existing literature on the British Civil Service apart from 
those already mentioned in the introduction, consists of a 
number of historical treatises such as Gladden (1943)1, 
(1945)2, (1967)3, Humphreys (1958)4, White (1933)5, Brown 
(1921)6, Campbell (1955)7, Parris (1973)8 and Wigham(1980)9. 
Only three of the literature sources mentioned in the intro-
duction deal directly with white-collar civi1 service trade 
unionists. All the literature reviewed in this chapter deal 
with subjects of a wider context whi ch are nonetheless 
applicable to the subject matter of the research. 
The assumption that the worker is a rational-economic man is 
implicit in the approach of most writers to the industrial 
relations theory. This assumption is also implicit in the 
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view that the reactions which are the subject of the 
theories discussed in this chapter are common to the parties 
involved in industrial relations both within the civil 
service and elsewhere. The problem of determining the right 
wage has been a basic preoccupation of trade unions. Dunlop 
(1941)lu tried to apply the economists * theory of the firm 
to the trade union. He developed a model which puts the 
trade union on the same footing with an economic institu-
tion, that is, maximizing wage/employment dimensions for its 
members. In sharp contrast to this approach, Arthur Ross 
(1948)H saw the union as a political institution working in 
an economic context. He maintained that political struggle 
within the union would mean that the leadership, in order to 
keep its position, would strive to obtain for its members 
wage increases similar to those obtained by other union 
leaders. Therefore, in determining union wage policy, what 
he termed "orbits of coercive comparison" would become 
important. Clark Kerr (1948)12 drew the two approaches 
together, arguing that a combination of politics and econo-
mics would provide a more realistic understanding. Chamber-
lain (1951)1^ went a completely different way, proposing 
that theories concerning the nature of collective bargaining 
could be reduced to three, namely, the marketing, governmen-
tal and managerial theories, which he considered to reflect 
the stages in historical development of collective bargain-
ing. He defined collective bargaining as: " (a) a means of 
contracting for the sale of labour; (b) a form of industrial 
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government and (c) a method of management." Flanders and 
Clegg (1954)14 argued that the growth of United Kingdom 
system of industrial relations has been inextricably inter-
twined with the growth of our entire social system. 
In 1958, Dunlop declared industrial relations a discipline 
in its own right, arguing that it was the study of the 
establishment and administration of rules.15 Modifications 
to this theory was put forward by Walker (1959), which 
brought industrial relations nearer to integrated theory.16 
By 1961, the influence of the process of industrialization 
on the behaviour of men and societies was already being 
studied. The work of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myersl? was 
an attempt to use comparative studies to analyze the inter-
relationships of management, labour and government as the 
world was going through waves of economic development. 
Behrend (1963)1** tried to portray how different schools of 
thought had approached industrial relations from different 
points of view but himself arrived at similar statements of 
problems that arise, for example, the need to study motiva-
tion (psychology), the power struggle between management and 
union (politics) and the importance of the institutional and 
economic background. 
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THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Three theoretical approaches to industrial relations have 
been proposed:-
(a) the Oxford approach 
(b) the Systems approach 
(c) an Industrial Sociology view. 
OXFORD v SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Flanders is probably the best known proponent of the Oxford 
approach.19 The theoretical basis of the policy recommenda-
tions of the Donovan Commission owes a lot to this approach. 
The "Oxford view" is that industrial relations is the study 
of the institutions of job regulation. It emphasizes the 
process of rule making through collective bargaining while 
the "Systems model", one of the works of Dunlop, stresses 
the role of wider influences on rule determination. In the 
Dunlop tradition, the rules of any industrial relations 
systems are seen as either procedural or substantive. An 
industrial relations system is viewed logically as an 
abstraction and is not designed simply to describe in 
factual terms the real world of time and space. Dunlop 
described the structure of a system as follows:-
. . .the theoretical framework is concerned with analys-
ing the workings of industrial relations systems which 
vary in scope from an enterprise to a sector or to a 
country as a whole. Regardless of its scope, an indus-
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trial relations system is regarded as having certain 
common properties and structures and as responding to 
specific influences... Every industrial relations system 
involves three groups of actors: (1) workers and their 
organizations, (2) managers and their organizations, 
and (3) governmental agencies concerned with the work-
place and the work community. Every industrial rela-
tions system creates a complex of rules to govern the 
workplace and work community. These rules may take a 
variety of forms in different systems: agreements, 
statutes, orders, decrees, regulations, awards, poli-
cies and practices and customs... The actors in an 
industrial relations systems are regarded as confront-
ing an environmental context at any one time. The 
environment is comprised of three interrelated con-
texts; the technology, the market or budgetary cons-
traints and the power relations and status of the 
actors...The system is bound together by an ideology or 
understandings shared by all the actors. The central 
task of a theory of industrial relations is to explain 
why particular rules are established in particular 
industrial relations systems and how they change in 
response to changes affecting the system.2u 
Part of the significance of Dunlop's "Systems model" for the 
study of industrial relations as an academic discipline, was 
its attempt to change the central focus of the subject from 
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industrial conflict and collective bargaining towards rule 
determination. In this respect, it has led to a broadening 
of the perspective of industrial relations. However, the 
model has been criticized because it suffers from two major 
defects. Firstly, it did not explain clearly that a system 
of industrial relations is not a system of rules but a 
conceptual framework in which one component element is the 
rules. Secondly, the analytical meaning given to the concept 
of "system" is not made clear. By contrast, whereas the 
"Systems model" saw economic, sociological and ideological 
variables as more important, the "Oxford school" saw poli-
tical variables as of more paramount importance. The Oxford 
approach was therefore criticized on the grounds that it was 
too narrow to provide a comprehensive framework for analys-
ing industrial relations problems. It over-emphasized the 
significance of the political process of collective bargain-
ing and gave insufficient weight to the role of the deeper 
influences in the determination of rules. 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY APPROACH 
Margerison's "Industrial Sociology Approach"2* rejects the 
special emphasis given to rule determination by the "Systems 
and Oxford models". It suggests a method of inquiry which 
attempts to develop sociological models of conflict. It 
emphasizes the importance of studying the generation and 
nature of conflict as well as conflict resolution. 
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POWER STRUGGLE: A FEATURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The notion of conflict is implicit in all three approaches 
discussed above because both job regulation and rule making 
presuppose inter-personal relationships in which conflict is 
endemic. Conflict is an outcome of power rivalry. Conse-
quently, so much effort has been put into discovering the 
nature of power and its exercise in the context of indus-
trial relations. Lukes (1974) maintained that power is an 
essentially contested concept.22 Although there can be no 
doubt about the meaning of the concept when viewed from the 
platform of a winner or a loser, power is one of those 
taken-for-granted notions which have continued to remain 
illusive. Its central role in the study of industrial rela-
tions has been acknowledged by various authors, for example, 
Craig (1973)23, Chamberlain (1951)24, Dahl (1957)25. Some 
theorists actually refuse to get involved with the analysis 
of power within the industrial relations system. Dunlop, for 
instance, argued that his concern was neither with the dis-
tribution of power within the industrial relations system, 
the relative bargaining powers among the actors, nor with 
their controls over the processes of interaction and rule 
setting. He was more interested with the distribution of 
power outside the industrial relations system.2^ These 
rejections strike at the very core of the transactions 
between the employer and the employed. When a third dimen-
sion is added, for instance, profit motive or the tax paying 
public, (as in the case of the civil service) a void emerges 
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in Dunlop's systems theory, which brings us right back to 
the ethos of Margerison's proposition. 
Rules and rule determination are essential aspects of indus-
trial relations and, since rules are not made in a vacuum 
but with the actors specifically in mind, it becomes impor-
tant that the attitudes and behaviours of the actors which 
are implicit in every conflict should also be a subject for 
investigation. 
If we accept Hyman1s view of industrial relations as "the 
study of processes of control over work relations"27 then we 
should also accept his argument that an increasing power 
struggle is an essential feature of industrial relations. 
Power here, is interpreted as the "ability of an individual 
or group to control his (their) physical and social environ-
ment", from which, "ability to influence the decisions which 
are, and are not taken by others"28 can be deduced. The 
situation between the Government and the civil service trade 
unions has from time to time assumed this form; the Govern-
ment always has the superior power. With the advent of 
"administrative action" the Government is seen to acquire 
and exercise a new form of power. As Hyman puts it:-
..the ability to overcome opposition is one sign of 
power; but a more subtle yet perhaps even more signifi-
cant form of power is the ability to preclude opposi-
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tion from even arising - simply because, for example, 
those subject to a particular type of control, do not 
question its legitimacy or can see no alternative.^9 
The Government can and does order wage offers to be imple-
mented whether they are accepted or not. When this happens, 
civil servants and their unions grumble about the inade-
quate offers only for a while. As soon as the offers are in 
the wage packet the recipients tend to echo "a bird in hand" 
kind of sentiment. Such offers have never been known to 
improve after the administrative action. 
The power path of trade unionism in the civil service 
supports Marchington's "path model"30. In this model, March-
ington suggests that workgroup power may be viewed as a 
process of several distinct but related phases, the first 
phase consisting of the "power capacity" which any workgroup 
may possess. This power capacity derives from structural 
factors relating to the dependence of other parties (in this 
case, the Government, as employer, and the public) on the 
workgroup (civil servants), for the provision of vital 
services. The next step in the path model is the phase of 
"power realisation". This is a realisation by the workgroup 
that it possesses a certain power capacity. A correct reali-
sation of low power capacity would halt the model at this 
point. However, the correct realisation of high power capa-
city can lead to the third phase of the model - "power test-
ing" , where the workgroup tests its perception of its own 
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power capacity by some form of action. The final phase of 
the model - "power outcome", is reached with the successful 
or unsuccessful result of the action. The "power capacity" 
phase for civil servants as a group occurred when they began 
to club together to lobby MPs and present their personal 
grievances.31 The "power realisation" phase came in the late 
1880s when the first permanent associations were beginning 
to form and be recognized.32 
Although a valuable addition to the literature on power in 
industrial relations, Marchington1s model as discussed above 
has certain limitations. The model was criticized for taking 
the workgroup as the appropriate level of analysis and 
applying this level of analysis in all situations. It is not 
possible to decide the appropriate level of analysis a 
priori, and indeed there may be many situations in which 
power is best understood by the study of individual workers 
or the workplace as a whole. However, the major limitation 
of the model is that it relates power to structural position 
and yet ignores the origins of that structure and the 
processes that created it. As CIegg eloquently argued from 
this perspective, power in the workplace "begins to look 
rather like an ongoing game of chess in which the pieces 
gain their power through their current position, rather than 
gaining the current position through their power to make 
moves according to the rules of the game.33 
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Edwards (1978) 3 4 made a distinction between two measures of 
power - "bargaining power", defined as "the ability of an 
individual or group to get his or its own way in the face of 
other competing objectives, and "control", defined as "the 
ability of the managers/employers' representatives to get 
their own way in the decision making process regardless of 
whether the decisions were the subject of conflict". These 
measures concentrated on the observable behaviour of the 
parties and the winning issues in the decision making 
process. When they were used to analyze data from two 
col1ieries the following results emerged: the bargaining 
power measure revealed that "although at both collieries the 
manager has greater bargaining power than the union, at the 
Midland colliery the union is more successful in bargaining 
with management than in the North."35 The control measure 
showed that management generally decided issues in both 
collieries. On the basis of her data and analysis, Edwards 
concluded "that estimates of bargaining power based on 
disputed decisions alone, while actually representing the 
relative power of participants in high conflict situations, 
would tend, in situations where overt conflict is low, to 
underestimate participants' ability to obtain their object-
ives through persuasion."36 
Edwards' approach has some rather unfortunate consequences. 
Firstly, it results in a concentration on the outcomes of 
power activity. In the industrial relations context Edwards' 
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work is superior to those economists who see power as 
directly reflected in wage rates, because she considers a 
much wider range of results or outcomes. However, this 
concentration upon outcomes results in a consequential neg-
lect of both the origins and processes of power. Secondly, 
power is seen to be reflected in the ability to "win" or 
"influence" decisions or issues. The party that is able to 
achieve its objectives on an issue is seen as "powerful" and 
it is therefore possible over a series of issues to esta-
blish the most powerful actor in a relationship. Yet such a 
view ignores the fact that the "losing" party may still have 
a substantial amount of power. For instance, the fact that 
civil service unions have often failed to win in negotia-
tions does not necessarily make the unions totally power-
less. On the contrary, their change of strategy from one 
round of negotiation to another indicates a residue of 
power, the origins of which are from both the membership and 
the negotiation experience of the union leaders. 
This approach is therefore rather ineffectual in that it 
does not distinguish between relative and absolute power or 
between an issue where a party only just manages to "win" 
and one where a party wins easily. Thus, while Edwards' work 
succeeds in mapping out the "winning" of decisions, it fails 
to explain the origins of power which make such "winning" 
possible. Such a distinction is analogous to the distinction 
between "influence" and "authority", which has been an on-
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going discussion among organization theorists. 
INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY 
Peabody (1964)37 remarks that there have been three approa-
ches to the conceptualization of authority and influence. 
Some authors have tended to equate them; some tended to 
equate power with influence and assert that authority is a 
special case of power; and others see authority and influ-
ence as distinctly different dimensions. Building on the 
work of Barnard (1938)38, Simon (1953)39 sees authority as 
the right to make decisions that affect the activities of 
others in the organization. The superior frames and trans-
mits decisions with the expectation that, because they are 
normatively supported by organizational rules, the decisions 
will be accepted by subordinates. Accepting the right of the 
superior to make such decisions, subordinates feel obliged 
to comply with the decisions. This view is echoed in Sala-
man's work.40 
The unique aspect of authority is that subordinates accept 
without question and are willing to (a) suspend any 
intellectual or moral judgements about the appropriateness 
of the superior's directives, or (b) act as if they sub-
scribe to the judgement of the superior even if, in fact, 
they personally find the directive distasteful, irrational, 
or morally suspect. As Bierstedt (1950)41 notes, authority 
implies involuntary submission. An individual has authority 
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when he or she can obtain unquestioning obedience from sub-
ordinates. The superior/subordinate relation implied in this 
concept of power goes against the true spirit of Whitleyism. 
Yet the actions of the Government in implementing wages that 
have not been accepted or ratified by the unions has a smack 
of absolute power - "authority". In contrast, influence 
implies that subordinates do not suspend their critical 
faculties or willingness to act on the basis of their own 
inclinations. Parsons (1956) throws another light on the 
issue: "Power we may define as the realistic capacity of a 
system-unit to actualize its interest within the context of 
system-interaction and in this sense exert the influence on 
processes in the system".42 Bierstedt portrays power as 
force or ability to apply sanctions.43 His contention was 
that it is a potential and not to be confused with the 
actual use of force, that is, the application of sanctions. 
Furthermore, power is distinguished from influence in that 
power is inherently coercive and implies involuntary submi-
ssion. Dahl (1957)44 fuses the "potential" and "use" dimen-
sions of power and also equates power with influence. From 
Dahl's point of view, power is exercised whenever one party 
affects the behaviour of another, combining what Bierstedt 
calls force and influence. Moreover, Dahl's conception 
implies that an unused potential is not power, because power 
implies successful use of the potential. This point in unte-
nable in industrial relations. It is rather similar to a 
contention that there is no power in a live-wire simply 
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because it is dormant or because it is not touching a living 
body. For instance, we do not look at the Government as a 
powerful actor only when it takes one of the multitudes of 
actions which signify power, so that in the absence of such 
an action it is judged not powerful. It is powerful whether 
the action is taken or not, as long as it is capable of 
taking and getting away with such an action. 
TRUST AND CONTROL 
Purcell's typology of "trust" in a bargaining situation 
makes a significant contribution to the "power" debate. He 
distinguishes between high and low trust in an environment 
where f ormal i sat ion is high or low. According to Purcel 1, 
where there is low trust in an environment of high formali-
sation the pattern of industrial relations is termed Antago-
nist ic Constitutionalism. He describes this pattern as 
follows:-
Here the agreed procedures and institutions are used as 
a means of expressing the distrust and aggression which 
exists. Each party will often complain about the 
conduct of the other or the failure to abide by 
promises. Informal conduct between the parties is at a 
minimum and there is heavy reliance on formal 
procedures, especially for dispute and grievance 
handling. Numerous claims are pursued through the 
procedure by the union. Management tends to adopt an 
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inflexible and bureaucratic stance in grievance nego-
tiations, both in terms of the interpretation of exist-
ing agreements and statutes and in delaying negotia-
tions until formal approval has been gained within the 
management hierarchy.^5 
On the other hand, high trust in an environment of high 
formalisation produces Cooperative Consti tut i onali sm. 
Purcell describes this pattern as follows:-
In this pattern high trust and cooperation between the 
parties takes place within the framework of comprehen-
sive agreements, usually focussed on JNC meetings. A 
particular effort is made to abide by the constitution, 
which is seen to establish mutual rights and obliga-
tions which should not be breached.4^ 
Adaptive Cooperation is said to result from high trust and 
low formalisation, and is described as follows:-
The dominant characteristic in this pattern is high 
t rust and cooperat i on between negot i ators, whi ch 
extends to institutional trust but is embodied in the 
personal relationship between a few key people on 
either side, supported by their advisers. There are 
few, if any, formal written agreements, especially of a 
procedural nature, or, if there are, they are largely 
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ignored, replaced by the informal, adaptive relation-
ship between the negotiators.47 
A combination of low trust and low formalisation produces 
Uninhibited Antagonism: this is described as follows:-
Industrial relations are conducted in an ad hoc, 
conflict-based manner, with bargaining advantages 
frequently exploited by either side when circumstances 
permit. The relationship is marked by mutual suspicion 
and distrust. The behaviour of one party is often seen 
by the other as irrational and unpredictable.48 
Relationship between the Government and the civil service 
un ions may f1uctuate between "uninhibi ted antagoni sm" and 
"antagonistic constitutionalism", depending on the existing 
degree of formalisation. This vicious circle sometimes 
assumes the appearance of what Fox (1974) termed the "Conti-
nuous-Challenge Pattern". Fox describes this pattern as 
follows:-
Here we find the work group refusing to legitimize 
management's claim to assert and pursue objectives 
The group may, of course, be forced to submit but i t 
continues to withhold legitimacy; fighting guerrilla 
skirmishes wherever possible, seeking ways to undermine 
management's position and aspiring to mobilise enough 
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power for an effective challenge... No equilibrium 
relationship develops; only periods of uneasy truce as 
each side licks its wounds and watches the enemy for 
signs of a weak spot in its defences.49 
Fox further suggests a pattern of "Sophisticated Paterna-
lism" . He suggests that thi s occurs only rarely but is 
clearly possible and can develop from either "cooperative 
constitutionalism" or "adaptive cooperation". ..."management 
finds itself with a passive and largely inert unionised 
labour force which throws up little or no assertive 
leadership of its own".50 Management is left free to pursue 
its own poli c i es wi thout chal1enge, even though i t goes 
through the charade of negotiating with the union. 
Indeed the practices of the Government on the negotiating 
table sometimes leave the union negotiators wondering 
whether they had been discussing the same subject with the 
other side. The speed with which the Government swings round 
and super-impose the discussion with its own pre-determined 
decision bamboozles the unions into a tentative acceptance, 
with the full knowledge that the decision is usually 
irreversible. 
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Mann (1970) examined this nature of acceptance and drew a 
distinction between two types:-
Pragmatic acceptance: where the individual complies 
because he perceives no realistic alternative, and 
Normative acceptance: where the individual internalises 
the moral expectations of the ruling class and views 
his own inferior position as legitimate.51 
When this happens, procedures are relegated to an insigni-
ficant position and chances of a peaceful settlement of 
disputes are severely restricted. As Kevin Hawkins 
observed:-
..procedures impose restraints on the use of power. 
They may be entirely voluntary in the sense that they 
are established by the parties themselves without any 
kind of external compulsion, or they may be influenced 
by the general view of what is, and what is not, good 
practice. Fundamentally, however, they reflect an 
agreement by both sides to be bound by a code of 
"Queensberry rules" in their day-to-day relation-
ships. 52 
There are many other theoretical treatments revealing even 
further complexit ies, for instance, Wrong (1968)53 § Blau 
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(1964) 5 4, Etzioni (1964) 5 5, French and Raven (1959) 5 6, 
Thibant and Kelley (1959) 57, some of which will come up 
again for discussion later in the analyses. 
CONFLICT 
As mentioned above, one of the outcomes of the exercise of 
power is conflict and conflict begets strikes. It is tempt-
ing to group these two phenomena together and casually 
explain one away while delving deeply into the other. The 
point of view held by Kornhauser and his colleagues is that 
"strike is the principal overt manifestation of conflict".58 
There is a general agreement that conflict, per se, is not a 
bad thing.59 In fact, a conference on business ethic held in 
Windsor Castle (1971) concluded: "Conflict is an essential 
part of growth, truth, justice and the development of good 
human relationships, but it is neutral. It can be good or 
bad, creative or destructive. Creative conflict towards a 
common end, from which all benefit, is a good and necessary 
factor in the industrial situation."60 This view that 
conflict can serve a useful purpose is contrary to the view 
of the human relations school which focused on personal and 
organization costs of conflict.61 A wide definition of 
conf1ict by Thomas (1976) tends to support the implication 
of the human relations movement that conflict should be 
avoided or eliminated. Thomas tentatively defined conflict 
as "the process which begins when one party perceives that 
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the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some 
concern of his."62 He used this definition as a basis for 
developing his model of dyadic conflict. Analysing the beha-
viours of the opposing parties in a conflict he delineated a 
number of positive effects of conflict. The view that "under 
conditions of low tension people may welcome or seek out the 
novelty of divergent opinions, the challenge of competition 
and at times, the excitement of overt hostility", has some 
sociological basis and the extension of that logic to the 
inclusion of other positive advantages of conflict, for 
instance, the contention that "the confrontation of diver-
gent views often produces ideas of superior-quality", since 
they tend to be based on different evidence, different con-
siderations, different insight, different frames of refe-
rence" , brings it into the realm of industrial relations. 
Thomas further claims that "aggressive behaviour in conflict 
situations is not necessarily irrational or destructive". 
Corroborated in the works of Litterer (1966)^3f March and 
Simon (1958)64 and Van Doom (1966)65, this contention con-
siders a different perspective of conflict without dismiss-
ing the original point of view. 
The shift of emphasis from the elimination of conflict to 
the management of conflict echoed in Thomas's work is sub-
jective, as he himself admits, since all conflicts cannot be 
constructive or beneficial (Janis and Katz: 1959)66. His 
"Process" and "Structural" models of conf1ict however con-
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stitute a significant contribution in the literature of con-
flict. The elaborate treatment given to the anatomy of con-
flict echoes much of the work of Pondy (1966)67, (1967)68, 
Walton (1969)69 and Walton and Mckersie (1965)70. 
Both models are more applicable in interpersonal situations 
but may be applicable in employer/employee relations. The 
word "dyadic" suggests two individuals or two groups; it 
does not necessarily qualify the interests of the indivi-
duals or groups. For instance, a Sales manager and a Produc-
tion manager would normally work to one accord; they are not 
necessarily in opposition to each other in the sense appli-
cable to employer/employee situation. This fringe of con-
flict in which the interests of the actors are polarized is 
depicted by Thomas as an •"either/or conceptualization of a 
conf1ict issue".71 Blake et al. (1964)72 refer to it as a 
"win-lose" situation. "Here", continues Thomas, "conflict of 
interest is total: the only outcomes seen are total satis-
faction and total frustration, and each party's satisfaction 
is seen as occurring at the expense of the other", a 
displacement of "ophelimity" in Pareto's language. 
Edwards and Scullion introduced the concept of non-directed 
conflict to explore the significance of actions which are 
not overtly conflictual, the implication being that the 
particular way individuals view their action is central to 
the determination of the degree of conflict. An individual's 
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absenteeism, for instance, may be perceived by that 
individual as an expression of conflict. In other words, 
action speaks louder than voice. The individual's action may 
say more about his attitude to work than he himself is 
prepared to admit.73 
There is a general agreement that industrial conflict is a 
reality which can never be avoided. Chamberlain argues that 
any attempt to eliminate conflict by co-operation is doomed 
to failure. Even where both parties recognize their inter-
dependence and work to one accord in order to achieve a 
mutually desired objective, disagreements over the appor-
tionment of income/profit is almost inevitable. "The special 
interest which a union has in the continuity and profita-
bility of the business firm with which it is associated is a 
basis for both conflict and co-operation with management. 
Co-operation in its most fundamental sense of working toge-
ther, is essential to the satisfaction of the elemental 
organizational goal which both recognize. Yet this simple 
fact, which has often been stated, does not eliminate con-
flict over the apportionment of the benefits and disadvan-
tages derived from this co-operative functioning, benefits 
and advantages which flow from the character of participa-
tion in the functional process as well as from money 
receipts" (Chamberlain:1954)?4. The same sentiment is exp-
ressed by Hyman, although more forcefully: "Yet the popular 
identification of industrial relations with conflict is not 
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wholly due to the sensationalism of the media. In part it 
reflects a straightforward recognition of the fact that 
sophisticated academic discussion often obscures: that work 
relations (within capitalism) are an inevitable source of 
dispute. The interests of employees are in large measure 
opposed to those of employers: hence both parties seek to 
wield power and mobilise resources in order to ensure the 
predominance of their own interests. The strategies they 
adopt inevitably clash, and conflict is the obvious out-
come" (Hyman:1975)75. Kessler (1980) corroborates these 
views more objectively: " I believe that there are 
certain basic industrial relations problems which are always 
with us: they are not new problems: they have existed in the 
past: they exist in the present, and they will exist in the 
future. What is true is that the acuteness of some of the 
problems may vary over time, and what may be new is changes 
in social attitudes and expectations and the awareness of 
greater power on the part of the workpeople to try to 
achieve their objectives".7^ The Civil Service unions have 
their objectives. Attempts by the Government to negate these 
objectives necessitate a reappraisal of their power base and 
an endeavour to maintain their countervailing force. 
STRIKE 
The strike is said to be the most obvious manifestation of 
industrial conflict. Kelly and Nicholson (1980)77 did a 
study of the dimensions of strike processes with particular 
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reference to industrial relations climate. They drew dis-
tinctions between trigger issues and demand; strike content 
and context; and transitional and final strike outcomes. 
They classified existing literature on the subject into four 
main approaches: the theoretical approach, as exemplified in 
work of Anderson (1967)78, Dahrendorf (1959)79, Eldridge 
(1973)80, Kerr (1954)81, (1969)82; analyses of historical 
and statistical data gathered on the incidence of conflict. 
for example, Kerr and Siegel (1954)83, Ross and Hartman 
(1960)84, Shorter and Tilly (1974)85; case study approach, 
for example, Gouldner (1954)86, Karsh (1958)87, Lane and 
Roberts (1971)88; and the empirical approach. They examined 
the hypothesis that there is a link between job dissatisfac-
tion and grievances over wages and conditions: Birchall 
(1975)89, Hackman and Lawler(1971)90 and Kornhauser(1954)91. 
After considering the work of Nicholson, Chadwick-Jones and 
Brown, Kelly and Nicholson concluded that there is no suffi-
cient evidence to firmly establish this link although some 
thought was given to a possible link between industrial 
conflict and alienating work. In proposing their social-
psychological model of strikes, they examined and identified 
the social processes leading to strikes and explained the 
variations in the outcomes of these processes. 
More recently, the work of Kessler (1980)92 covered several 
significant points on collective bargaining, pay determina-
tion and the role of the Government in industrial relations. 
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His recipe for better industrial relations in the future 
specifically excludes overt Government intervention; but as 
the Government is a major employer this is perhaps too much 
to hope for. Since it is used to having its own way with its 
employees the Government would probably find it difficult 
not to extend its autocratic tendencies to the rest of the 
working population. The constant reference to making an 
example of civi1 servants for the rest of the working commu-
nity bears this out. 
The Government's inordinate quest for power is euphemisti-
cally translated as "realism" by Salaman (1980)93:-
The Conservative Government has sought to project an 
image of a "new realism" in industrial relations in the 
1980s: trade union power subject to greater legal 
regulation; an acceptance of economic "reality" in wage 
bargaining; and management able to re-exert its prero-
gative to implement the necessary changes within the 
organisation to become more competitive. 
It is also "realism" that this seizure of power triggered 
off large scale industrial relations confrontations even 
within the confines of the Government's testing ground - the 
civil service. 
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The work of Goldthorpe and Lockwood(1963)y4 also ought to be 
mentioned in the context of power match between the Govern-
ment and the civil service unions. Having examined the 
phenomenon of "working-class affluence" Goldthorpe and Lock-
wood concluded that despite the prevalent spirit of conser-
vatism whereby working-class families are sometimes assimi-
lated to the middle-class, the gap between the two classes 
remains as wide as ever before. The work of Kelly(1980)95 
supports Goldthorpe and Lockwoods1 conclusion in confirming 
that there is little basis for the thesis of embouroeoise-
men t . The Government does exercise its power to keep civil 
servants "proletariat" by subduing their unions despite the 
civil servants' habit of considering themselves middle-
class. This habit in many ways makes the Government's task 
easier but the unions' lack of power is not only a constant 
reminder that the gap exists but most importantly it is a 
confirmation that the emt?ouraeoisement thesis is not appli-
cable. The work of Bain (1971)96, Clegg (1975)97, and David 
Winchester (1983)98, highlight the ever increasing power of 
the Government particularly in connection with its own 
employees. 
The theories of power reviewed in this chapter are all 
relevant to the design and outcome of this survey. In a 
simple employer-employee relationship the share of power 
between the two sides is not only feasible but necessary in 
the interest of good industrial relations. The complex rela-
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tionship between the Government and its employees leaves no 
room for such a share of power. The concept of "good 
employer" which may have contributed to the introduction of 
Whitleyism in the civil service appears to have been suffo-
cated by the quest of the Government for absolute power. It 
is possible that the civil service unions and their members 
are unaware of this fact simply because the Whitley system 
is still used in the service; reference to "good employer" 
is no more than lip service. The design of the survey high-
lights the seizure of power by the Government and the survey 
results confirm the fact. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THE SURVEY 
Participant Observation 
It was decided to use both participant observation and 
survey methods in this investigation in order to obtain the 
required data. The reason for this decision was based on the 
fact that there is no one correct method for doing a 
sociological research. In reality there are several methods 
which can be used in combination for obtaining information 
from the social world.1 This position questions the assump-
tion that there is a normative methodology prescribed by 
sociological textbooks without any consideration of the 
"idiosyncrasy" of the researcher and the "circumstances" in 
which the research is carried out.2 The subject of the inv-
estigation "Industrial attitudes of active white-collar 
civil service trade unionists", is a complex issue which 
needs the use of the qualitative method in order to obtain 
an adequate understanding of the problem. 
Participant observation is one of the principal research 
techniques used in this survey because it enables the 
researcher to obtain a better insight into social reality, 
since the observer participates in the activities of those 
under invest i gat i on. The author was qui te aware of the 
criticisms levelled against qualitative approaches. Such 
criticisms claim that participant observation lacks reliabi-
lity in contrast to the methods used in natural sciences 
which are believed to be more reliable because if other 
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researchers used the same methods of investigation on the 
same material they would produce the same results. Moreover, 
it is argued that by replicating an experiment it is 
possible to check errors in observation and measurement. 
However, it can be argued that social sciences will never 
achieve the standard of reliability attained in the natural 
sciences.3 Thus, despite these criticisms, participant 
observation gives the researcher the opportunity to directly 
observe the social world. Although observations are some-
times unsystematic and results are rarely quantified, never-
theless, participant observation provides useful insights. 
The dual role of the author as an active civil service trade 
unionist and a scholar helped to structure his observations 
and systematically put them together as reliable data. The 
general idea behind this thesis and especially the seven 
hypotheses enunciated below stemmed from his dual role. 
The Survey Method 
The problems involved in surveys and the criticisms levelled 
against quantitative approaches in social investigation are 
well known. It has been claimed, for instance, that these 
techniques often employ questionnaires which contain a pre-
determined set of questions which the respondent is reques-
ted to answer, involving in this way the idea that the 
researcher has already decided what is important. This leads 
to the imposition by the researcher of his own assumptions 
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about the nature of the social world on the respondents. 
Despite the heavy criticism of positivism, there are some 
obvious advantages in survey techniques. For example, that 
precise relationships between social phenomena can only be 
established when the social world is expressed in numerical 
forms. It is also true that only when data are quantified by 
means of reliable measuring instruments can results of 
different studies be directly compared. It has been argued 
by the supporters of positivism that without quantification, 
sociology would remain at the level of impressionistic and 
unsupported insight and it would be impossible to replicate 
studies in order to establish relationships and support 
generalizations. This research technique was used in this 
investigation in order to be more systematic in the inquiry 
and achieve more systematic results. 
The Pilot Survey 
A pilot survey was carried out before the final questionn-
aire was developed. Some of the questions included in this 
pilot exercise were made up after discussions with fellow-
officers. Others derived directly from comments made by dis-
illusioned members who grumbled about paying their union 
dues for nothing. The hypotheses enunciated below were 
developed in a similar manner. The author simply made a note 
of his observations during committee, branch or Whitley 
meetings, discussed these observations with colleagues 
afterwards, then tentatively proposed a hypothesis which he 
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ratified after referring to views expressed in the pilot 
questionnaire. (See Appendix 1) . So, views gathered from 
the pilot survey helped to formulate the hypotheses and to 
minimize mistakes in the wording and arrangement of the main 
quest ionnai re. 
THE HYPOTHESES 
The notion that civil service trade unionists are under dual 
pressure, one from the Government as their employer and the 
other from oppressive anti-trade union laws4, is bound to 
influence their attitude to militancy. On the other hand, 
because they are mostly in the low income group, relative to 
the rest of the working population, and because they have 
been defeated in a previous power contest with their 
employer, the idea that their present frame of mind would be 
dominated by militancy seems far fetched. As explained 
above, the following hypotheses were derived partly from 
views gathered through the pilot survey and partly from 
views gathered after intensive debates with colleagues, on 
topics such as strikes and commitments, conflict, power, 
influence and authority. Although theories related to these 
topics were reviewed in chapter 1, the hypotheses do not 
refute but corroborate some of them. 
1. High personal commitments produce anti-militant attitude 
among union members. 
When members put their personal commitments above every-
thing else in their hierarchy of priorities they would 
tend to yield more readily to offers made in a wage bar-
gaining by their employer. In other words their resis-
tance curve would tend towards 0 as the employer's con-
cession curve tends towards 0, having discovered his 
employees' reaction curve. 
Assuming a trade-off between the employer's power5 to 
impose a wage and the trade union's power to resist, 
anti-militant tendencies among union members would shift 
the employer's resistance curve towards 00. 
The level of militancy among the active civil service 
trade unionists had declined to such a point that it 
threatened the effectiveness of their unions' negotiating 
strategy. 
Militancy is a more potent factor in trade union power^ 
than high membership. 
Within the civil service the higher the grade of work 
being done the greater is the pressure on the individual 
to leave his union activities behind. 
Unorganised conflict is more manifest when the union 
exhibits anti-militant tendencies. 
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THE MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE 
The main questionnaire was designed in groups of related 
questions, retrospective of the above hypotheses in order to 
facilitate data collection and analyses. (See Appendix la). 
The problem of selecting a representative sample of respon-
dents was addressed by examining the population of civil 
servants in the UK and Northern Ireland and systematically 
eliminating those who did not fit the envisaged category. 
Defining the category as "active white-collar civil service 
trade unionists" automatically eliminated industrial civil 
servants, non-industrial civil servants who did not belong 
to a union and those who did belong to a union but only in-
sofar as they paid their union dues. This made it easier to 
focus attention on those non-industrial civil servants who 
were union members and were interested in the affairs of 
their unions. A further distinction was made within this 
category - those who were interested enough to take part in 
the organization of the union's local activities, such as 
committee members and local office holders, and those who 
were interested but perhaps only enough to attend meetings 
occasionally. The reason for this option is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
The next problem was that of selecting a sample which was 
representative not only of the various groups within the 
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unions but also of different parts of the country. The 
following table illustrates the initial attempt to select a 
balanced sample in which all the civil service unions from 
all parts of the British Isles were adequately represented:-
TABLE 1 
PLAN FOR DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES NATIONWIDE 
UNION NUMBER OF 
BRANCHES 
PER UNION 
NUMBER OF 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
PER BRANCH 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
PER UNION 
CPSA 25 30 750 
SCPS* 25 30 750 
IPCS 25 30 750 
CSU* 25 30 750 
POA 25 30 750 
IRSF 25 30 750 
FDA 25 30 750 
TOTAL 175 30 5,250 
*These two unions concluded a merger and became The National 
Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS) in 1989. 
It was anticipated that the UK would be divided into five 
areas for the purpose of distributing the questionnaires. 
Seven unions were originally envisaged, each of which was to 
nominate five branches from each of the five areas and each 
of the nominated branches was to circulate 30 questionn-
aires. Altogether, 30 questionnaires were to be distributed 
in each of 175 branches, making a distribution total of 
5,250. However, a number of changes occurred after further 
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interviews with the General Secretaries. With the exception 
of the Institution of Professionals, Managers and Special-
ists (IPMS), then known as the Institution of Professional 
Civil Servants (IPCS), all the unions welcomed the investi-
gation and expressed a willingness to help. The lack of co-
operation from the IPMS slightly altered the original plan. 
All the unions had agreed to circulate the questionnaires at 
their own expense, as part of their assistance with the 
investigation. The feasibility of handling the huge amount 
of data which was likely to be generated was overlooked at 
that stage. 
As a result of the IPMS refusal the total number of quest-
ionnaires was reduced to 5,000. Also, the size and density 
of the remaining unions, now including the Northern Ireland 
Public Services Association (NIPSA), came into the consider-
ation. A new distribution structure, which reflected the 
size of membership, emerged. Each participating union was 
allocated a percentage proportionate to the ratio of its 
membership in the total population. The following table 
illustrates the revised distribution strategy:-
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TABLE 2 
ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 
UNION ESTIMATED PERCENTAGES NUMBER OF 
MEMBERSHIP ALLOCATED QUESTIONNAIRES 
(,000) % DISTRIBUTED 
CPSA 144 39 1,950 
SCPS 88 24 1,200 
CSU 32 9 450 
POA 24 7 350 
IRSF 56 15 750 
FDA 8 2 100 
NIPSA 3 4 200 
TOTALS 355 100 5,000 
Five thousand questionnaires were delivered to the union 
headquarters according to the above criteria, for onward 
distribution. The response was quite impressive; about 3,000 
replies were received. However, after collating over half of 
the returns it was apparent that the questionnaires alloca-
ted to CPSA were conspicuously missing. Enquiries from the 
CPSA headquarters revealed that the questionnaires were not 
distributed as promised. Although the research had prog-
ressed for over seven months there was no sign of CPSA 
willingness to distribute the questionnaires. They had 
tacitly withdrawn their promised co-operation. Since all the 
grades represented by IPMS and CPSA were adequately covered 
by the remaining unions, their participation was no longer 
necessary. 
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Due to lack of resources, the large amount of data finally 
collected became too difficult to handle. A new set of 
criteria for selecting a reasonably practical sample from 
the total number of questionnaires returned, was evolved. 
That task was addressed as follows:-
1. All questionnaires which were partially completed or 
returned with parts missing, were filtered out. 
2. The remainder, well over 2,000, was sorted out first into 
the respective unions, then within each union, they were 
sorted into eleven regions, Northern Ireland being speci-
fied as the eleventh region. 
3. A percentage allocated to each union according to the 
size of its membership was used to calculate its pro-
portion of the sample. 
4. This proportion was then randomly selected from stage 2 
above. 
The following table illustrates how the final 500 respon-
dents were selected:-
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TABLE 2a 
THE FINAL SAMPLE 
UNION % R E G I 0 N S TOTAL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11* 
SCPS 39 46 31 19 5 11 11 20 20 12 20 195 
IRSF 25 30 20 12 3 7 7 13 13 8 12 125 
CSU 14 17 11 7 2 4 4 7 7 4 7 70 
POA 11 13 9 5 2 3 3 6 6 3 5 55 
FDA 4 5 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 20 
NIPSA 7 35 35 
TOTAL 100 111 74 45 13 26 26 48 48 28 46 35 500 
•Northern Ireland. 
Before a decision was taken about who to include in the 
sample the survey was focused on trade union members in 
general. However, a slight shift of emphasis occurred when 
the pilot survey revealed that well over two thirds of the 
respondents who completed and returned their questionnaires 
were active members, that is, those who held local offices. 
Since this trend was repeated in the main survey a ratio of 
3:1 had to be maintained in the final sample selection in 
order to emphasize the focus of the investigation on active 
trade unionists and to facilitate a comparison between 
officers and ordinary members. 
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DATA ANALYSES 
All data are analysed by a consistent use of tables. 
Analyses are carried out strictly in the same sequence as 
the questionnaire arrangement. Tables are used in order to 
facilitate comparisons. Comparisons are made between two 
variables, for example, between lower and higher grades, or 
between ordinary members and local officers. Where applic-
able, a third and in some places, a fourth variable features 
in a comparison, for example, when age, marital status and 
financial commitments are the main variables in analysing 
decisions to take a strike action. Statistical calculations 
are kept as simple as possible. These consist mainly of 
ar i t hme t i c mean (x) . Each data ana lysis is foil owed by an 
interpretation. Where necessary, chi-square tests are 
carried out on some results in order to verify interpreta-
tions. Chi-square calculations and results are shown in 
appendix 2, 3 and 4. 
HYPOTHESES TESTING 
A due process of verifying the hypotheses has been adhered 
to by collecting observations and classifying, analysing and 
interpreting them. The observations are factual. Where the 
facts support a hypothesis then the hypothesis is true. 
Furthermore, the general rule7 of adding observations until 
all possibilities of error have been exhausted, or until a 
point is reached where the addition of more facts does not 
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add to the probable truth of the hypothesis, forms the basis 
of the process. Observations which are corroborated many 
times over in chapters 4 and 5 are used to prove or disprove 
the hypotheses. This procedure is underpined by four prin-
cipal criteria of truth recommended by logicians:-
1. The principle of contradiction: the same attribute 
cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the 
same subject, or, the same subject cannot have two 
contradictory attributes.8 
2. The principle of identity: conceptions which agree can 
be affirmed of the same subject at the same time. This 
principle complements the former.y 
3. The principle of the middle being excluded: either a 
given judgement must be true or false; there is no 
middle ground.10 
4. The principle of sufficient reason: whatever exists or 
is true must have a sufficient reason why the thing or 
proposition should be as it is, and not otherwise.11 
The principles or laws derived from the above hypotheses can 
only be "empirical", for their veracity does not go beyond 
the data, authentic observations, from where they owe their 
origin. In the absence of results of other investigations in 
the same field with which they can be compared it is safer 
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to regard them only as empirical laws. 
A systematic verification of the hypotheses is undertaken in 
the following sequence:-
1. statement of the hypothesis 
2. interpretation and assumptions 
3. corroborative evidence 
4. statement of veracity. 
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TABLE 2b 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY AGE AND GENDER 
SEX AGE GROUP TOTAL 
UNDER 21 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 & OVER 
MALE 2 76 161 69 44 352 
FEMALE 1 42 55 32 18 148 
TOTAL(z) 3 118 216 101 62 500 
CHAPTER 3 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE POPULATION 
Selecting the final sample of 500 out of about 3,000 respon-
dents who returned their questionnaires was not an easy 
task. As the primary objective of the selection was to 
obtain a bias-free sample in which all participating unions 
from the British Isles were proportionately represented no 
attention was paid at that stage to age, gender or personal 
attributes. These characteristics are explained and analysed 
in this chapter. 
Table 2b shows the age distribution of respondents. The 
number of male and female respondents eventually selected 
was purely random and not by design. 
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Next, an attempt was made to link qualifications with 
respondents' grades. These initial analyses will be linked 
with questions dealing with strike action and acceptance of 
offers made by the Government in order to determine the 
level of militancy along the hierarchy. 
TABLE 2c 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY QUALIFICATION AND GRADE 
QUALIFICA-
TIONS 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
I II III IV V VI VII TOTALS 
None 22 17 10 5 7 1 4 66 
1-5 "O.L." 
GCE 16 42 12 43 28 2 33 176 
6 or More 
"O.L." GCE 5 22 9 34 24 2 33 129 
"A" Levels - 2 - 9 5 1 5 22 
HNC/HND 1 5 4 6 2 2 4 24 
Law Degrees - - - 1 - - 1 2 
Other 
Degrees 1 7 - 14 5 _ 24 51 
Diplomas & 
Postgrads. 1 1 1 7 1 4 15 
Masters & 
PhD - - 1 2 - 2 10 15 
Totals 46 96 37 121 72 10 118 500 
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The sample population was made up of 300 respondents in the 
lower grades and 200 respondents in the higher grades. 13 
per cent of the total population had no qualifications; 18 
per cent of these were nevertheless in the higher grades. 
The majority of respondents had qualifications ranging from 
one to over six Ordinary Level General Certificate of Educa-
tion. At least 61 per cent were qualified up to Ordinary 
Level standard and 4 per cent had Advanced Level qualifica-
tions . 16.6 per cent were graduates, 0.4 per cent had Law 
degrees and 3 per cent had a Masters degree or a PhD. The 
sample therefore comprised respondents with a wide range of 
educational background. 
It is necessary at this stage to observe how the different 
wage groups were financially committed because reference 
will be made later to the degree of commitment when correla-
tion between grades and propensity to strike is established. 
The tables below link wage groups with commitments of both 
male and female respondents:-
68 
TABLE 3 m 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(a) Rent and other monthly commitments 
Rent & no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 1 - 1 -
51 - £100 11 3 5 3 
101 - £150 18 1 13 4 
151 - £200 18 1 8 9 
201 - £250 5 2 - 3 
251 - £300 1 - - 1 
301 - £350 - - - -
351 & over - - - -
Totals 54 7 27 20 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 3fii) 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(b) Mortgage and other monthly commitments 
Mortgage & no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 - _ -
51 - £100 12 - 8 4 
101 - £150 90 5 34 51 
151 - £200 76 4 33 39 
201 - £250 41 1 16 24 
251 - £300 16 - 4 12 
301 - £350 4 - 2 2 
351 & over 15 - 2 13 
Totals 254 10 99 145 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 3f iii1 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(c) Owner* and other monthly commitments 
No 
Mortgage 
& no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 - - - -
51 - £100 8 - 5 3 
101 - £150 17 - 8 9 
151 - £200 7 1 4 2 
201 - £250 5 - 3 2 
251 - £300 3 - 1 2 
301 - £350 - - - -
351 & over 1 - - 1 
Totals 41 1 21 19 
* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 3fiv) 
GROUP 
£(pw) (d) None* and other commitments 
monthly Source of 
Income 
None* & no & others 
others under 
£100 
& others 
over 
£100 
a+b+ 
c+d 
One More 
than 
one 
Under £51 - - - 1 1 -
51 - £100 _ - 31 9 22 
101 - £150 - - - 125 60 65 
151 - £200 1 - 1 - 102 48 54 
201 - £250 2 - - 2 53 21 32 
251 - £300 - - 20 9 11 
301 - £350 - - - 4 2 2 
351 & over _ - 16 5 11 
Totals 3 - 1 2 352 155 197 
* A situation 
pays no rent 
the job, eg. 
where an individual lives with 
or where free accommodation is 
, Prison Officers 
relations 
provided 
and 
with 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS 
WAGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
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TABLE 4fil 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(a) Rent and other monthly commitments 
Rent & no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 1 1 -
51 - £100 10 8 2 
101 - £150 9 6 3 
151 - £200 2 - 2 
201 - £250 - - -
251 - £300 - - -
301 - £350 - - -
351 & over - - -
Totals 22 15 7 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS 
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TAPLE 4(1*) 
Mortgage & no others & others & others 
under £100 over £100 
Under £51 1 - 1 -
51 - £100 21 4 11 6 
101 - £150 53 3 21 29 
151 - £200 24 2 11 11 
201 - £250 7 - - 7 
251 - £300 1 - 1 -
301 - £350 1 1 - -
351 & over 1 - - 1 
Totals 109 10 45 54 
WAGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
GROUP ' 
£(pw) (t>) Mortgage and other monthly commitments 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 4(iiU 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(c) Owner* and other monthly commitments 
No 
Mortgage 
& no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 - - - -
51 - £100 5 1 3 1 
.101 - £150 8 - 4 4 
151 - £200 3 1 1 1 
201 - £250 1 1 - -
251 - £300 - - - -
301 - £350 - - - -
351 & over - - - -
Totals 17 3 8 6 
* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage. 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 4(iv) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS 
None* & no & others & others a+b+ One More 
others under over c+d than 
£100 £100 one 
Under £51 - - 2 1 1 
51 - £100 - 36 14 22 
101 - £150 - 70 24 46 
151 - £200 - 29 10 19 
201 - £250 - 8 1 7 
251 - £300 - 1 - 1 
301 - £350 - 1 - 1 
351 & over - 1 1 -
Totals - 148 51 97 
A situation where an individual lives with relations and 
pays no rent or where free accommodation is provided with 
the job, eg.. Prison Officers. 
WAGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
GROUP 
£(pw) (d) None* and other monthly Source of 
commitments Income 
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TABLE 4 a m 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY 
Rent & no others & others & others 
under £100 over £100 
Under £51 2 - 2 -
51 - £100 21 3 13 5 
101 - £150 27 1 19 7 
151 - £200 20 1 8 11 
201 - £250 5 2 - 3 
251 - £300 1 - - 1 
301 - £350 - - - -
351 & over - - - -
Totals 76 7 42 27 
WAGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
GROUP 
£(pw) (a) Rent and other monthly commitments 
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TABLE 4afii^ 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(b) Mortgage and other monthly commitments 
Mortgage & no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 1 - 1 -
51 - £100 33 4 19 10 
101 - £150 143 8 55 80 
151 - £200 100 6 44 50 
201 - £250 48 1 16 31 
251 - £300 17 - 5 12 
301 - £350 5 1 2 2 
351 & over 16 - 2 14 
Totals 109 10 45 54 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY 
TABLE 4a(iii) 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(c) Owner* and other monthly commi tments 
No 
Mortgage 
& no others & others 
under £100 
& others 
over £100 
Under £51 - - - -
51 - £100 13 1 8 4 
101 - £150 25 - 12 13 
151 - £200 10 2 5 3 
201 - £250 6 1 3 2 
251 - £300 3 - 1 2 
301 - £350 - - - -
351 & over 1 - - 1 
Totals 58 4 29 25 
* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage. 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY 
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TABLE 4afiv1 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY 
WAGE 
GROUP 
£(pw) 
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS 
(d) None* and other 
commitments 
monthly Source of 
Income 
None* S i no £ t others 
others under 
£100 
S i others 
over 
£100 
a+b+ 
c+d 
One More 
than 
one 
Under £51 - - - 3 2 1 
51 - £100 - - - 67 23 44 
101 - £150 - - - 195 84 111 
151 - £200 1 1 - 131 58 73 
201 - £250 2 - 2 61 22 39 
251 - £300 - - - 21 9 12 
301 - £350 - _ - 5 2 3 
351 & over - - - 17 6 11 
Totals 3 1 2 500 206 294 
* A situation where an individual lives with relations and 
pays no rent or where free accommodation is provided with 
the job, eg., Prison Officers. 
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TABLE 41? 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND WOMEN ALONG THE WAGE GROUPS 
WAGE MEN WOMEN 
GROUP 
Number of men % Number of Women % 
£(pw) from 352 sample from 148 sample 
Under £51 1 .28 2 1.4 
51 - £100 31 8.8 36 24.3 
101 - £150 125 35.5 70 47.2 
151 - £200 102 28.9 29 19.5 
201 - £250 53 15.1 8 5.4 
251 - £300 20 5.6 1 0.7 
301 - £350 4 1.1 1 0.7 
351 & Over 16 4.5 1 0.7 
Total 352 148 
TABLE 4c 
SOURCES OF INCOME 
ONE MORE THAN ONE 
Men 44% 56% 
Women 34% 66% 
Most of the respondents, men and women, were in the £51-£200 
per week wage group. However, more women were in the lower 
wage group and more men were in the higher wage group. This 
probably accounts for the reason why more women had more 
than one source of income. 
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All possible variables which characterize a trade unionist 
have been carefully considered and included in the sample. 
The survey was designed not only to observe the attitudes of 
the typical trade unionist but more importantly to highlight 
the influences on the attitudes of the typical trade union 
activist. The main characteristic of the survey is therefore 
the distinction drawn between a typical trade unionist and a 
typical trade union activist, the former being an ordinary 
union member and the latter being a local officer. It is 
important to remember that these two people are motivated 
differently, according to their respective frames of refer-
ence. Age, sex, educational attainment, income and financial 
commitment may well contribute to the influences on their 
attitudes but what makes one more active than the other 
probably has nothing to do with these variables. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE INDUSTRIAL ATTITUDES OF SAMPLE POPULATION 
WHY CIVIL SERVANTS JOIN THEIR UNIONS 
In strict adherence to the questionnaire arrangement, the 
next group of questions to be analysed, questions 5 and 6, 
relate to the industrial attitudes of the respondents. An 
important aspect of the respondents' characteristics which 
was not analysed in chapter 3 is the fact that they were all 
trade union members. The subject of this investigation, 
namely, their attitudes, derives from this fact. This 
chapter therefore, appropriately begins with an endeavour to 
elicit their views about trade union membership. 
An attempt was made in question 5b to assess the reason why 
individuals joined their respective unions. When asked why 
they joined their unions nearly all the respondents inter-
viewed1 and who subsequently completed a questionnaire 
stated that they had never stopped to think about it before. 
Indeed, the question gave them food for thought and replies 
on the questionnaire varied widely, some making more sense 
than others. To facilitate analysis, nine most repeated and 
key category of reasons were identified, under which all the 
replies were classified, as follows:-
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WHY DID YOU JOIN YOUR UNION 
REASON REPLY % 
1. Because I believe in trade unionism 26. 4 
2. I was encouraged to join on recruitment by 
the Department/Employer. Transferred after 
promotion. Everyone should be a member of an 14. 4 
3. Protection against employers' exploitation. 
It is in the interest of the employee.... 2. 6 
4. Solidarity. Unity is strength. It is my 
responsibility to contribute to an 
organization that represents my interest.... 5. 4 
5. I was persuaded to join by my branch union 
7. 6 
6. To safeguard my industrial rights. Protection 
of interests, better working conditions, better 
pay and security, all these require strong 
union with maximum membership.... 31. 0 
7. To exercise my democratic right. It is done 
thing. Everybody was doing it... 5. 6 
8. To secure the benefits that accrue to members 
both on personal and general matters. A chance 
to make your voice heard... 4. 4 
9. I don't know. No particular reason... 1. 4 
10. No answer.... 1. 2 
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The above replies were analysed according to quali f ication 
and grade as follows:-
TABLE 5 
WHY INDIVIDUALS JOINED THEIR UNIONS: 
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION 
R Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N S 
A N GCE GCE GCE HNC/ LLB/ FIRST DIP MASTERS TOTAL 
S 0 I .Q . I "O" "A" HND LLM DEGREE LO & 
0 N 1 6 BSC. , MA PHD 
N E TO OR BA. , 
5 MORE etc 
1 22 50 25 2 2 18 6 7 132 
2 6 29 25 2 1 - 3 3 3 72 
3 2 4 2 1 2 - 2 - - 13 
4 5 5 11 2 2 1 1 - 27 
5 4 16 9 1 2 - 6 - 38 
6 23 54 41 8 10 - 9 5 5 155 
7 1 8 7 2 3 1 6 - - 28 
8 1 7 7 4 - - 3 - - 22 
9 - 3 - - 1 - 3 - - 7 
10 2 - 2 - 1 - - 1 - 6* 
Total 66 176 129 22 24 2 51 15 15 500 
* Respondents who did not answer question 5b but answered 
question 5c. 
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TABLE 5a 
WHY INDIVIDUALS JOINED THEIR UNIONS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1 9 16 10 40 24 2 31 132 
2 7 10 5 23 6 1 20 72 
3 - 1 - 5 2 1 4 13 
4 3 6 1 8 3 1 5 27 
5 3 9 2 7 7 1 9 38 
6 17 41 13 27 20 4 33 155 
7 1 4 4 7 6 - 6 28 
8 3 7 - 3 3 - 6 22 
9 - 2 2 - - - 3 7 
10 3 - - 1 1 - 1 6* 
TOTALS 46 96 37 121 72 10 118 500 
*Respondents who did not answer question 5b but answered 
question 5c. 
The most popular reason elicited was No.6 - safeguarding 
industrial rights and protection of interests etc. 31 per 
cent of the population sample said they joined their unions 
in order to secure better working conditions and better pay. 
88 per cent of these were from less qualified groups. Only 
12 per cent were graduates or respondents with higher 
qualifications. Reason No.l - belief in trade unionism - was 
the next most popular, with 26.4 per cent of the sample. 
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Again, about 77 per cent of these were in the less qualified 
groups. Grade or status appeared to have no significant 
influence on the reasons given. For instance, reason No.l 
was given by 25 per cent of respondents in the lower grades 
and 28.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades. The 
minor differences cancel out as comparisons are made between 
one reason and the next. Those who said they joined their 
union for no particular reason were distributed almost 
evenly between the two groups. The next table analyses 
replies to the question: "How important to you is your 
belonging to your union?" 
TABLE 6 
IMPORTANCE OF BELONGING TO A UNION 
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION 
R Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N S 
P N GCE GCE GCE HNC/ LLB/ FIRST DIP MASTERS TOTAL 
L 0 "0" "0" "A" HND LLM DEGREE L0 & 
I N 1 6 BSC. , MA PHD 
E E TO OR BA. , 
S 5 MORE etc 
Very* 40 109 85 19 12 - 32 11 9 317 
Quite* 13 35 32 1 3 - 12 3 2 101 
Moder-
ately* 9 21 9 1 4 1 1 1 4 51 
Not 
Ve ry* 2 10 3 1 5 1 6 - - 28 
No Opi-
nion 2 1 — - — — — - - 3 
Totals 66 176 129 22 24 2 51 15 15 500 
* Important 
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In the above analysis most respondents, regardless of their 
qualifications, considered belonging to their unions to be 
very or quite important. Only a small minority across the 
educational groups said it was moderately or not very impor-
tant. Ironically, both respondents with Law degrees were 
among those few. In some circumstances therefore, educat-
ional attainment would seem to have little or no effect on 
people's attitude toward belonging to a union. In other cir-
cumstances however, such attitudes may be entirely governed 
by professionalism. For instance, medical doctors may regard 
belonging to their associations necessary. 
TABLE 6a 
IMPORTANCE OF BELONGING TO A UNION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
TJTQ LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Very* 20 57 31 83 51 6 69 317 
Quite* 15 23 1 20 14 1 27 101 
Moder-
ately* 5 12 3 11 4 1 15 51 
Not 
Very* 5 3 1 7 3 2 7 28 
No Opi-
nion 1 1 1 - - - - 3 
Totals 46 96 37 121 72 10 118 500 
*Important 
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As with educational qualification attitudes towards belong-
ing to a union were the same throughout the grades. Grade 
had no significant influence. 
What members expect from their unions would sometimes differ 
from what they actually get, and this difference may affect 
their attitude towards their membership. However, it is not 
unusual for individuals to maintain their membership despite 
a signi ficant variance between their expectation aJid the 
eventual outcome. For instance, in the question "In your 
opinion, does your union satisfy your expectation in terms 
of the reason you have given for joining?", not every resp-
ondent answered "yes". In fact, a good number of respondents 
answered "no" and still retained their membership. The 
result was as follows:-
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
No reply.. 
338 (67.6%) 
128 (25.6%) 
.25 (5.0%) 
..9 (1.8%) 
Those who answered "yes" may have benefitted from the advan-
tages of union membership at some time and it was not neces-
sary to explore their reasons any further. Similarly, as it 
would seem that those who answered "Don' t know" and those 
who did not reply had neither benefitted nor suffered signi-
ficant disappointment from their union it was not necessary 
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to explore their attitude any further. It was interesting 
however, to examine the reasons given by those who answered 
"no", and to observe the spread of these reasons along the 
grades. The reasons were classified into nine categories as 
follows:-
CATEGORIES REASONS 
1. The union does not carry enough weight to infl-
uence management and the Government on key 
issues, eg., pay, new technology etc. 
2. The Executive Committee is too distant from its 
members - I do not feel I am being fully repre-
sented by a union which has now been taken over 
by extreme left wing activists. 
3. The union is more interested in the Administra-
tion grades - Officers are there to further 
their own causes - The union sometimes gets 
involved in issues unrelated to conditions 
of service. 
4. The union is too right wing, too willing to 
settle disputes - softly, softly approach; too 
political in its attitude. 
5. The union's inability to instil an "esprit de 
corps" in its negotiations. 
6. Civil servants are apathetic and complacent; 
the unions are therefore too weak to fight an 
employer who is also the Government. 
7. The union's inability "to face up to the prob-
lems" of dealing with a difficult Government. 
8. The Government does not give decent deals to 
unions. 
9. Those who answered "no" to the question but did 
not give any reason. 
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These reasons were analysed by grade and educational qualif-
ication as follows:-
TABLE 7 
REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE UNION: 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS 
(CATEGORY) 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS I II III IV V VI VII 
1 4 11 1 1 5 - 3 25 
2 1 1 1 4 - - 2 9 
3 1 3 1 3 2 3 12 25 
4 - 1 2 2 1 - 2 8 
5 - 1 - - - - 1 2 
6 4 7 1 7 9 1 9 38 
7 1 2 1 6 3 - 1 14 
8 - - - - 1 1 2 
9 - 2 1 1 - - 1 5 
TOTALS 11 28 8 24 21 4 32 128 
========== ====== ==== ======= ====== ========= = = = = ===== ========= 
The most popular reason given was No.6 - the weakness of the 
civil service unions; both the lower and higher grades were 
split 50/50 on this reason. Reason Nos.1 and 3 were equally 
popular but reason No.l echoes No. 6 in a different way. 
Whereas No.6 blames the unions' weakness, that is, lack of 
power in Blau's (1964)2 sense, on the complacency and apathy 
of civil servants, No. 1 appears to emphasize the unions1 
lack of power, that is, power in Kaplan's (1964)3 sense, 
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thus implying lack of internal control. No. 3 suggests that 
the unions' weakness was linked with the fact that officers 
were there to further their own interests and were therefore 
often powerless to challenge the management. It is interest-
ing that 68 per cent of respondents who held this view were 
in the higher grades. 
TABLE 7a 
REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE UNION: 
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION 
R Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N S 
A N GCE GCE GCE HNC/ LLB/ FIRST DIP MASTERS TOTAL 
S 0 "0" "0" "A" HND LLM DEGREE LO & 
0 N 1 6 BSC , MA PHD 
N E TO OR BA. , 
S 5 MORE etc 
1 6 9 6 - 1 - 3 - - 25 
2 2 1 3 - 1 1 - 1 - 9 
3 2 7 7 2 1 - 1 3 2 25 
4 - 5 - - 2 - - 1 8 
5 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2 
6 1 16 13 4 1 - 1 1 1 38 
7 3 5 4 1 - - - 1 - 14 
8 - - - 1 - - - 1 - 2 
9 1 - 2 1 - - 1 - - 5 
TOTAL 16 43 36 9 6 1 6 7 4 128 
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Only 19 per cent of respondents who stated reasons for diss-
atisfaction were in the higher education groups (HNC/HND 
upwards), compared with 81 per cent in the lower education 
groups (GCE "A" downwards). The 19 per cent constitutes 22 
per cent of the higher education population sample. This 
lower percentage may be interpreted to mean that the higher 
the level of education the more members would be capable of 
understanding the difficulties of the unions. An "a 
fortiori" case for this interpretation is that the reasons 
stated were concrete and none of them can be dismissed as 
non-existent. 
An opportunity to give more thought to the question analysed 
above and the answers evoked was prompted in the next 
question in order to elicit views which may have been 
restricted in the previous replies. The first part of the 
question "Have the problems and outcome of the pay negotia-
tions of the last five years affected your reason for 
remaining a member of your union?" produced the following 
replies:-
Yes 146 29.2% 
No 341 68.2% 
Don't know....8 1.6% 
No reply 5 1.0% 
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The second part of the question, (6b) - "In what way?", was 
meant for respondents who answered "yes" in the previous 
question. This question was answered by 93 per cent of those 
respondents. The following categories of views were elici-
ted:-
CATEGORY VIEWS 
1 As the union has greatly helped to improve my 
pay and conditions of service, continued mem-
bership is necessary to make future improve-
ments possible. 
2 The crassness of the employer and its cruelty 
make union membership even more crucial in 
order to build a much stronger union. 
3 I grow more and more disappointed in my fellow 
members and more and more convinced that the 
union is divorcing itself from the real world. 
4 I am now a more committed member and I would 
not want to be among the one or two that are 
non-members. 
5 My union achieved pay settlement rationally. 
They come up with the right answers. 
6 Reasonable achievement regarding wages demand 
but less regard for the lower paid. 
7 Anything we have obtained has been obtained 
with the union muscle, without which we would 
have got even less. 
8 Despite failure of the unions, it is only 
through membership of a union that one can 
directly influence employer/employee 
industrial relations. 
9 As the Government does not pay any attention 
to a wage claim put by the unions, the unions' 
power has become so weak that it is not 
effective as a wage negotiator. 
10 Non-reply. 
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These views were analysed in terms of grades as follows:-
TABLE 8 
REASONS FOR CONTINUING MEMBERSHIP* 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
VIEWS 
(CATEGORY) 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1 1 1 - 2 - 4 8 
2 4 8 4 6 6 9 37 
3 - - 1 1 2 2 6 
4 2 2 1 4 4 8 21 
5 1 2 2 1 - 1 7 
6 1 1 - 2 1 1 6 
7 6 9 4 7 4 4 34 
8 1 3 1 2 3 1 11 
9 - 6 3 3 1 1 14 
10 N 0 N -- R E P L Y (2)** 
TOTALS 16 32 16 28 21 31 144 
*"Yes" respondents only. **Not included in the totals. 
The two most expressed views were categories 2 and 7; 26 per 
cent and 24 per cent respectively. Category 4 followed with 
15 per cent. The realization that civil servants were 
dealing with a very difficult, faceless and often unreason-
able employer was echoed in most of the views but even more 
so in categories 2 and 7. The resolve to be a more committed 
95 
member in category 4 was more pronounced in the higher 
grades. 
These views were also examined in terms of educational 
attainment:-
TABLE 8a 
REASONS FOR CONTINUING MEMBERSHIP-
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION 
V Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N S 
E N GCE GCE GCE HNC/ LLB/ FIRST DIP MASTERS TOTAL 
W 0 " 0 " "O" "A" HND LLM DEGREE LO & 
s N 1 6 BSC. , MA PHD 
E TO OR BA. , 
5 MORE etc 
1 - 3 3 - - - 1 1 - 8 
2 1 16 11 5 1 - 3 - - 37 
3 1 2 1 - - - 2 - - 6 
4 4 4 11 1 - - - 1 - 21 
5 1 1 1 - - - 1 2 1 7 
6 2 2 1 - - - - 1 - 6 
7 13 11 4 1 1 - 3 - 1 34 
8 2 2 3 1 - - 3 - - 11 
9 2 4 5 1 2 - - - - 14 
10 N 0 N - R E P L Y ( 2 ) * * 
TOTAL 26 45 40 9 4 - 13 5 2 144 
= = = ==. == = = = === = = = = = === = = ====== =====: ======= === = = = = = = = = = ======= 
*"Yes" respondents only. **Not included in the totals. 
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A relatively lower percentage of respondents who continued 
their membership despite their dissatisfaction were in the 
hi gher educat ion groups (HNC/HND upwards) - 17 per cent 
compared with 83 per cent in the lower education groups (GCE 
"A" downwards). This corroborates earlier result analysed on 
table 7a, where only 22 per cent of respondents in the 
higher education groups (24/107x100) stated reasons for 
dissatisfaction with their unions. Again, in the present 
analysis, 22 per cent of respondents in the higher educat-
ion groups stated reasons for continued membership despite 
personal dissatisfaction. Therefore, it can be generalized 
that education is a factor in the degree to which members 
find fault with their unions. The same generalization may 
apparently be made about continued membership; one naturally 
follows from the other. As in the case of dissatisfaction it 
may be inferred that all things being equal members would 
have reasons to continue their membership despite dissatis-
faction with their unions but dissatisfaction is less 
expressed the higher the educational level of the member. 
The next group of questions, (questions 7-12) deal with 
union activities and the extent of participation. The 
distribution of local officers and ordinary members in the 
sample along the grades is shown in the following table:-
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TABLE 9 
I II III IV TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
Local Officers 20 58 32 98 208 69.3 
Ordinary Members 26 38 5 23 92 30.7 
Total Sample 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
TABLE 9a 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS fOFFICERS AND ORDINARY MEMBERS 1 : 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
RESPON- HIGHER GRADES 
V VI VII TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
Local Officers 47 6 77 130 65.0 
Ordinary Members 25 4 41 70 35.0 
Total Sample 72 10 118 200 100.0 
================== ====== = = = = = = : ======= ============: — 
AGGREGATES 
Local Officers 338 (67.6%) 
Ordinary Members 162 (32.4%) 
As it was initially assumed that the higher up the grades 
the fewer would be the number of members who were interested 
in union activities the difficulty of finding sufficient 
number of local officer respondents in the higher grades was 
anticipated. However, this assumption was unfounded since 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS (OFFICERS AND ORDINARY MEMBERS 1: 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
RESPON- LOWER GRADES 
DENTS 
9B 
the number of completed questionnaires received particularly 
from the FDA and from members of other unions in the higher 
grades turned out to be excellent. Additional comments made 
on their questionnaires reflected their interests not only 
in trade union issues but surprisingly in the survey itself. 
The relevance of question 8 "position held by officers" was 
significant when the sample was intended to be made up of 
union officers only. Its importance diminished when the 
sample structure changed. The comparison envisaged was no 
longer among officers but between officers and ordinary 
members. Question 8 was left out of the analysis on this 
account. In question 9 however, it was necessary to observe 
how the pay campaign in the years 1981, 1982 and 1983 
affected the stability of the membership as well as measure 
the degree of support from members in those periods. Because 
of the confidential nature of this information questions 9, 
10 and 11 were restricted to branch secretaries only. The 
following observations were made:-
TABLE 10 
THE IMPACT OF THE PAY CAMPAIGN (1981-831 ON MEMBERSHIP 
Members Recruited Members Lost (resignations) 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
203 136 187 286 92 96 
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The above data were interpreted as follows:-
TABLE 11 
NET MEMBERSHIP GAINS AND LOSSES 
YEAR GAINS LOSSES 
1981 - 83 
1982 44 -
1983 91 -
Total 135 83 
This represents a net gain of 52 members over the period in 
the branches sampled. 
The assumption that the age of a branch and the (workplace) 
geographical distribution of its members would each reflect 
the amount of support which the branch actually gets when it 
takes industrial action was tested by correlating replies to 
question 9(iii) with that of question 10 and comparing the 
results with the result of correlating the replies to the 
same question (9iii) with the replies to question 11. 
Question 9(iii) "How much support did your members give", 
elicited the following replies:-
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TABLE 12 
DEGREE OF 
SUPPORT 
B R A N C H E S 
1981 1982 1983 
A lot 66 28 29 
Poor 40 75 70 
None 3 4 10 
It is evident from these results that support drastically 
diminished after 1981. The Council of Civil Service Unions 
(CCSU) had mounted a strong campaign for what was termed "a 
fair living wage" for civi1 servants in 1981. Despite the 
well organized strategy and the massive support from non-
striking members to maintain a prolonged selective strike 
the Government managed to sustain its stance till the end. 
The unions' claim of moral victory in the fact that the 
strike inflicted massive financial loses on the Treasury, 
seemed an illusion. The above results are indicative of the 
fact that the CCSU membership did not recover from the 
defeat of 1981. The poor support of the membership in the 
1982 and 1983 campaigns was a regrettable aftermath. The 
following tables show how support was affected by age of 
branch and workplace geographical distribution of members:-
PAY CAMPAIGN (SELECTIVE STRIKE) 
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TABLE 13 
YEAR SUPPORT AGE OF BRANCH (Years) 
Under 5 5-10 11-20 Over 20 
1 
q 
A lot 9 6 25 26 
8 
i 
Poor 6 6 11 17 
j. None - - 1 2 
1 
q 
A lot 2 1 11 14 
8 
o 
Poor 13 11 24 27 
None - - 1 3 
1 
q 
A lot 3 1 10 15 
8 Poor 11 9 23 27 
•j None 1 2 4 3 
DEGREE 
TABLE 13a 
OF SUPPORT: ANALYSES BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
YEAR SUPPORT BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTIONS! les) 
Within 1 Under 5 Under 10 Over 10 
1 
q 
A lot 12 3 7 44 
8 
i 
Poor 14 2 3 20 
X None 2 - - 1 
1 
9 
8 
A lot 9 2 2 15 
Poor 17 3 8 46 
None 2 - - 2 
1 
q 
A lot 10 2 2 15 
8 
rt 
Poor 17 2 6 44 
j None 2 1 2 5 
DEGREE OF SUPPORT: ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH 
1 
Although the above tables indicate greater support from 
older branches it is quite feasible if not absolutely true 
that branches which have been in existence for over ten 
years in the civil service unions out-number those which are 
under 10 years old. The possibility of such a disparity 
affecting the results in the above table should not be over-
looked. Nevertheless, it is equally plausible to infer from 
the above analysis that older branches are more active than 
new ones. However, the analysis by workplace geographical 
distribution shows a significant difference between the 
amount of support from branches where members are scattered 
in areas over 10 miles and those where members are scattered 
in areas under 10 miles. A possible explanation of this, 
apart from chance, is that where members would have to 
travel distances over 10 miles in order to participate in 
union activities, local arrangements usually mean that 
instead of one meeting place there would be many meeting 
places within the branch. This facility ensures maximum 
participation in a branch where the large area covered is 
relative to the number of members represented. For the same 
reason, participation appears to be better in a branch where 
area covered is within one mile than in a branch where area 
covered is under 5 miles and under 10 miles respectively. 
Members may be reluctant to travel over one mile in order to 
participate. 
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MEETING ATTENDANCE 
The complex problem of verifying who attended what meeting 
during the years 1981-1984 was dealt with in question 12. 
Emphasis was placed on two types of meetings, that is, the 
AGM and the Mandating Meeting (usually held before the 
annual conference). The third type of meeting was unspeci-
fied although "Pay Meetings" (meetings called to discuss pay 
offers) were mentioned by some respondents. The initial 
analysis distinguished between respondents who had attended 
only one type of meeting and did not attend the other two. 
Next, those who had attended two meetings were distinguished 
from those who had attended all three meetings. The follow-
ing tables illustrate:-
TABLE 14 
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1981/821 
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS 
MEETINGS LOCAL 
OFFICERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
(N=338) 
ORDINARY 
MEMBERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
<N=162) 
AGM 21 6.2 6 3.7 
Mandate 1 0.3 1 0.6 
Pay 8 2.3 3 1.9 
AGM & 
Mandate 29 8.6 3 1.9 
AGM St Pay 3 0.9 1 0.6 
Mandate 
& Pay 4 1.2 1 . 0.6 
All 
Meetings 221 65.4 13 8.0 
Totals 287 84.9 28 17.3 
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TABLE 14a 
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1982/831 
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS 
MEETINGS LOCAL 
OFFICERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
(N=338) 
ORDINARY 
MEMBERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
(N=162) 
AGM 20 5.9 5 3.1 
Mandate 7 2.1 1 0.6 
Pay 8 2.3 3 1.9 
AGM & 
Mandate 34 10.0 5 3.1 
AGM & Pay 5 1.5 1 0.6 
Mandate 
& Pay 4 1.2 1 0.6 
All 
Meetings 222 65.7 14 8.6 
Totals 300 
1 CO II 
1 CO II 
1 CO II 
30 18.5 
TABLE 14b 
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1983/841 ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS 
MEETINGS LOCAL 
OFFICERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
(N=338) 
ORDINARY 
MEMBERS 
% OF SAMPLE 
(N=162) 
AGM 13 3.8 10 6.2 
Mandate 6 1.8 - -
Pay 7 2.1 5 3.1 
AGM & 
Mandate 41 12.1 3 1.9 
AGM & Pay 6 1.8 1 0.6 
Mandate 
& Pay 5 1.5 1 0.6 
All 
Meetings 234 69.2 17 10.4 
Totals 312 92.3 37 22.8 
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From the above analysis, the average attendance over the 
three years is as follows:-
84.9 + 88.8 +92.3 
Local Officer: = 88.7% 
3 
compared with 
Ordinary Members: 17.3 + 18.5 + 22.8 
= 1 9 . 5 % 
3 
In both groups, attendance increased gradually from year to 
year. However, local officers were more regular at meetings 
than ordinary members. The result indicates the possibility 
of a branch meeting being attended by branch committee 
members only, and sometimes with very few ordinary members 
present. Evidently, fewer members attended meetings and by 
far the greatest majority of members who attended all meet-
ings were branch officers. 
The frequency of attendance by respondents of various grades 
is analysed in the following tables:-
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TABLE 14c 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/821 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES 
MEETINGS I 
N=46 
II 
N=96 
III 
N=37 
IV 
N=121 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=300 
AGM 3 4 3 8 18 6.0 
Mandate - 1 - - 1 0.3 
Pay 2 2 1 2 7 2.3 
AGM & 
Mandate 1 8 2 7 18 6.0 
AGM & Pay 2 1 - 1 4 1.3 
Mandate 
& Pay - 1 1 1 3 1.0 
All 
Meetings 9 37 22 68 136 45.4 
Totals 17 54 29 87 187 62.3 
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TABLE 14d 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/821 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
HIGHER GRADES 
MEETINGS V 
N=72 
VI 
N=10 
VII 
N=118 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=200 
AGM 3 - 6 9 4.5 
Mandate 1 - - 1 0.5 
Pay - 1 3 4 2.0 
AGM & 
Mandate 6 - 8 14 7.0 
AGM & Pay - - - - -
Mandate 
& Pay 1 - 1 2 1.0 
All 
Meetings 37 3 58 98 49.0 
Totals 48 4 76 128 64.0 
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TABLE 14e 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/831 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES 
MEETINGS I 
N=46 
II 
N=96 
III 
N=37 
IV 
N=121 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=300 
AGM 4 7 3 4 18 6.0 
Mandate - 2 2 1 5 1.7 
Pay 3 1 1 1 6 2.0 
AGM & 
Mandate 2 9 2 10 23 7.6 
AGM & Pay 1 1 - 3 5 1.7 
Mandate 
& Pay - 2 - 1 3 1.0 
All 
Meetings 9 42 22 68 141 47.0 
Totals 19 64 30 88 201 67.0 
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TABLE I4f 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83) 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
HIGHER GRADES 
MEETINGS V 
N=72 
VI 
N=10 
VII 
N=118 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=200 
AGM 3 - 4 7 3.5 
Mandate 2 - 1 3 1.5 
Pay 1 1 3 5 2.5 
AGM & 
Mandate 6 - 10 16 8.0 
AGM St Pay - - 1 1 0.5 
Mandate 
& Pay - 1 1 2 1.0 
All 
Meetings 37 3 55 95 47.5 
Totals 49 5 75 129 64.5 
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TABLE 14a 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84) 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES 
MEETINGS I 
N=46 
II 
N=96 
III 
N=37 
IV 
N=121 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=300 
AGM 6 7 3 2 18 6.0 
Mandate - - 1 1 2 0.7 
Pay 2 2 - 3 7 2.3 
AGM & 
Mandate 4 9 3 11 27 9.0 
AGM & Pay 2 1 - 2 5 1.7 
Mandate 
& Pay - 2 1 1 4 1.3 
All 
Meetings 10 43 22 74 149 49.7 
Totals 24 64 30 94 212 70.7 
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TABLE 14h 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84) 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
HIGHER GRADES 
MEETINGS V 
N=72 
VI VII 
N=10 N=118 
TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
N=200 
AGM 1 - 4 5 2.5 
Mandate 2 - 2 4 2.0 
Pay - 1 4 5 2.5 
AGM & 
Mandate 7 1 9 17 8.5 
AGM & Pay 1 - 1 2 1.0 
Mandate 
& Pay - 1 1 2 1.0 
All 
Meetings 38 3 61 102 51.0 
Totals 49 6 82 137 68.5 
As explained above, three types of meetings were listed 
individually in the questionnaire and respondents were asked 
to indicate the meetings they had attended. This made the 
questionnaire simpler than having to include all possible 
combinations of the meetings as in the analysis above. A 
pattern of attendance was mapped from the analysis of the 
combinations. Since the resulting figures are mutually 
exclusive, in other words, figures representing attendance 
at one meeting are not included in the other categories, the 
"totals" in tables 14-14h are free from double counting, and 
represent the total attendance at all meetings including 
attendance at one and two meetings. 
112 
There is no significant difference in the above pattern 
between the attendance of the lower and the higher grade 
respondents. Taking the aggregate of the three types of 
attendance, that is, one meeting, two meetings and all 
meetings, over the three periods, the lower grades' attend-
ance was 9.1, 10.2 and 47.4 per cent respectively, compared 
with 7.2, 9.3, and 49.2 per cent respectively. The siight 
differences indicate that fewer higher grade respondents 
attended one or two meetings and fewer lower grade respon-
dents attended all meetings. However, the differences were 
not significant to warrant a generalization that one group 
attended more meetings than the other. The evidence is not 
strong enough. 
In order to observe the effect of geographical (workplace) 
distribution of members, and the age of branch on attend-
ance, the above results were further analysed in the light 
of questions 10 and 11 which were designed for branch 
secretaries only. 
113 
TABLE 15 
MEETING ATTENDANCE f1981/82) 
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH 
MEETINGS 
AGE OF BRANCH (Years) 
Under 5 5-10 11-20 Over 20 
AGM 3 1 1 5 
Mandate - - 1 -
Pay - 1 1 1 
AGM & Mandate 1 2 2 4 
AGM & Pay - - - 1 
Mandate & Pay - - 1 -
All Meetings 19 8 33 39 
Totals 23 12 39 50 
TABLE 15a 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83) 
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH 
MEETINGS 
AGE OF BRANCH (Years) 
Under 5 5-10 11-20 Over 20 
AGM 2 2 - 5 
Mandate - - 2 -
Pay _ 1 1 -
AGM & Mandate 1 3 3 4 
AGM & Pay 1 - - 1 
Mandate & Pay - -
All Meetings 19 8 34 41 
Totals 23 14 40 51 
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TABLE 15b 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/841 
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH 
MEETINGS 
AGE OF BRANCH (Years) 
Under 5 5-10 11-20 Over 20 
AGM 1 1 1 4 
Mandate - - 3 -
Pay - 1 1 -
AGM & Mandate 2 3 2 7 
AGM & Pay - - - 1 
Mandate & Pay - -
All Meetings 23 9 32 41 
Totals 26 14 39 53 
TABLE 16 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/82) 
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
MEETINGS 
BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles) 
Within 1 Under 5 Under 10 Over 10 
AGM 4 6 
Mandate 1 
Pay 2 1 
AGM & Mandate 1 1 1 6 
AGM & Pay 1 
Mandate & Pay 1 
All Meetings 22 7 10 62 
Totals 29 9 12 76 
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TABL.E. 16a 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83) 
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
MEETINGS 
BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles) 
Within 1 Under 5 Under 10 Over 10 
AGM 5 - - 4 
Mandate - - - 2 
Pay 1 - - 1 
AGM & Mandate 1 1 2 7 
AGM & Pay - 1 - 1 
Mandate & Pay - -
All Meetings 23 7 11 63 
Totals 30 9 13 78 
TABLE 16b 
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84) 
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
MEETINGS 
BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles) 
Within 1 Under 5 Under 10 Over 10 
AGM 2 - - 5 
Mandate 3 
Pay 1 - - 1 
AGM & Mandate 3 1 2 8 
AGM & Pay 1 
Mandate & Pay - -
All Meetings 24 7 11 65 
Totals 30 9 13 82 
116 
The tables established a similar pattern over the three 
years. Local officers who attended selected meetings only 
were very few. This was no surprise since the sample comp-
rised branch secretaries only. It would have been unusual 
for the result to be the other way round, that is, for 
branch secretaries to attend predominantly selected meetings 
only; for this would mean that most branch secretaries 
simply did not attend meetings. It is therefore safe to 
infer that occasions when selected meetings were attended 
were instances when a branch secretary was indisposed and 
was unable to attend the other meetings. 
However, looking at the table more closely, age of a branch 
and geographical distribution of members within the branch 
showed no observable effect on attendance. Fluctuation in 
the figures representing attendance in the branches as dist-
inguished by age and distance was proportionate to the 
number which represented each group in the sample. For 
example, the number which represented attendance in branches 
under 5 years old was proportionate to the total number of 
branches which fell under that group. Similarly, the number 
which represented attendance in branches where membership 
was scattered over an area of 10 miles was proportionate to 
the number of branches which fell under that group. There-
fore, there was no evidence that the age of a branch or the 
geographical distribution of its members had any effect on 
attendance. 
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In table 14 it was shown that on average, only about 19.5 
per cent of ordinary members attended meetings, compared 
with about 88.7 per cent of local officers. Because fewer 
ordinary members attended meetings the next question was an 
attempt to elicit the reasons for non-attendance. The 
following reasons gathered from pilot interviews, were 
proposed. Respondents were asked to tick those which closely 
matched theirs:-
Ouestion 12b 
"If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main 
reasons for doing so: tick no more than three boxes for each 
you have missed" 
Reasons 
1. They don't achieve anything. 
2. not interested in subject of meeting. 
3. meetings tend to be long and boring. 
4. was not told meeting was being held. 
5. domestic reasons. 
6. leave/official duty. 
7. difficult to travel to/held at difficult time. 
8. individual cannot influence decisions. 
9. pressure of work. 
10. no meeting was held. 
11. other (a miscellany of reasons). 
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The replies were analysed by grades in the following tables: 
TABLE 17 
REASONS FOR MISSING THE AGM 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
1 - 1 - 1 0.4 
2 - - - - - -
3 - 3 - - 3 1.0 
4 1 - - - 1 0.4 
5 6 4 - 6 16 5.3 
6 - 1 3 - 4 1.3 
7 1 1 1 2 5 1.7 
8 - - - - - -
9 - 3 - 1 4 1.3 
10 - - 1 - 1 0.3 
11 - - _ 1 1 0.3 
Totals 8 13 5 10 36 12.0 
Abstentions 38 83 32 111 264 88.0 
Sample(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
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TABLE 17a 
REASONS FOR MISSING THE AGM 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
V VI VII 
0.5 
4 1 1 2 1.0 
5 3 - 4 7 3.5 
6 - - 4 4 2.0 
7 1 - 1 2 1.0 
8 - - - - -
9 - - 2 2 1.0 
10 - - 1 1 0.5 
11 1 1 1 3 1.5 
Totals 7 1 14 22 11.0 
Abstentions 65 9 104 178 89.0 
Sample(N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
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TABLE 17b 
REASONS FOR MISSING THE MANDATE MEETINGS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
1 - 1 - 1 2 0.7 
2 - - - - - -
3 - 2 - 1 3 1.0 
4 - - - 1 1 0.3 
5 5 5 1 5 16 5.3 
6 - 1 2 2 5 1.7 
7 2 3 1 4 10 3.3 
8 - - - - - -
9 1 5 - 2 8 2.7 
10 2 - 3 4 9 3.0 
11 - 1 - 1 2 0.7 
Totals 10 18 7 21 56 18.7 
Abstentions 36 78 30 100 244 81.3 
Sample(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
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TABLE 17c 
REASONS FOR MISSING THE MANDATE MEETINGS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1 - - - - -
2 - - 2 2 1.0 
3 1 - - 1 0.5 
4 1 - - 1 0.5 
5 - - 5 5 2.5 
6 - - 2 2 1.0 
7 1 - 1 2 1.0 
8 - - - - -
9 1 - 3 4 2.0 
10 - 3 3 1.5 
11 1 1 1 3 1.5 
Totals 5 1 17 23 11.5 
Abstentions 67 9 • 101 177 88.5 
Sample(N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
122 
TABLE 17d 
REASONS FOR MISSING SPECIAL MEETINGS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
1 - 1 - - 1 0.3 
2 - - - - - -
3 1 - - - 1 0.3 
4 - - - 1 1 0.3 
5 4 2 1 5 12* 4.0 
6 - 1 1 3 5 1.7 
7 2 1 1 1 5 1.7 
8 - - - - - -
9 - 2 1 2 5 1.7 
10 - - - 1 1 0.3 
11 - - - - - -
Totals 7 7 4 13 31 10.3 
Abstentions 39 89 33 108 269 89.7 
Sample(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
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TABLE 17e 
REASONS FOR MISSING SPECIAL MEETINGS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1 - - - - -
2 - - - - -
3 1 - 1 2 1.0 
4 - - - - -
5 3 - 4 7 3.5 
6 1 - 3 4 2.0 
7 - - 1 1 0.5 
8 - - - - -
9 1 - 3 4 2.0 
10 - - 3 3 1.5 
11 1 1 1 3 1.5 
Totals 7 1 16 24 12.0 
Abstentions 65 9 • 102 176 88.0 
Sample(N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
The paucity of replies to question 12b would seem to suggest 
that the majority of respondents who ignored it did so 
because they had attended all the meetings. However, judging 
from the number of replies to question 12a, "Which meetings 
did you attend?", the large number of respondents who 
omitted that question or failed to specify the meetings they 
attended and were deemed to have missed the meetings, would 
1 
support the inference that those who did not state the 
reasons for their absence, nevertheless missed the meetings. 
TABLE 17f 
REASONS FOR MISSING MEETINGS 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
R AGM MANDATE SPECIAL ALL MEETINGS 
E A GRADES T % GRADES T % GRADES T % GRADES T 
e r\ r> rj r\ o \J \j \j \J O L H T F L H T F L H T F L H T 
N O I A O I A O I A O I A 
S W G L S W G L S W G L S W G L 
E H S A E H S A E H S A E H S 
R E M R E M R E M R E 
R P R P R P R 
L L L 
E E E 
1 1 - 1 0.2 2 - 2 0.4 1 - 1 0.2 4 - 4 
2 2 2 0.4 2 2 
3 3 1 4 0.8 3 1 4 0.8 1 2 3 0.6 7 4 11 
4 1 2 3 0.6 1 1 2 0.4 1 - 1 0.2 3 3 6 
5 16 7 23 4.6 16 5 21 4.2 12 7 19 3.8 44* 19* 63* 
6 4 4 8 1.6 5 2 7 1.4 5 4 9 1.8 14 10 24 
7 5 2 7 1.7 10 2 12 2.4 5 1 6 1.2 20 5 25 
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9 4 2 6 1.2 8 4 12 2.4 5 4 9 1.8 17 10 27 
10 1 1 2 0.4 9 3 12 f2.4 1 3 4 0.8 11 7 18 
11 1 3 4 0.8 2 3 5 1.0 - 3 3 0.6 3 9 12 
TOT ** + ** ** 
AL 36 22 58 11.6 56 23 79 15.8 31 24 55 11. 0 - - -— = ^  = = = = === = = = = = ==== = = = = = === == = ===== = — = — = = = === = ==== = =z = = === = = 
The above analyses show that the most popular reason for 
absences was No.5 - Domestic reasons. The pattern observable 
established conclusively that the lower grades had a greater 
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tendency to miss meetings for domestic reasons. 69.8 per 
cent, (44/63x100*) of those who cited domestic reasons were 
in the lower grades group, compared with 30.2 per cent 
(19/63x100*) in the higher grades group. 
On average, the mandate meeting seems to have the highest 
absence rate. 15.8** per cent of the reasons given were for 
absences from mandate meeting, compared with 11.6** per cent 
and 11. 0** per cent for the AGM and the Special meetings 
respectively. At least 15 per cent (12/79xl00+) of those who 
missed the mandate meeting said they did so because none was 
held. Since all delegates to the Annual Conference are 
usually mandated from their branches the only feasible 
explanation for this unusual phenomenon is that those 
branches did not send delegates to the Annual Conference. 
Another aspect of absence from meetings is leaving before 
the meeting is over. This aspect was dealt with in question 
12c. Respondents were asked to state their reasons if they 
had left before the end of a meeting in the years 1981/82, 
1982/83 and 1983/84. Because some respondents were unable to 
recall accurately what they did during all three periods it 
was decided to focus on one period (1983/84) for the purpose 
of the analyses. Respondents were asked to identify their 
own reasons from the following:-
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TABLE 18 
REASONS FOR LEAVING BEFORE THE END OF A MEETING 
REASON Number Of 
Respondents 
% 
(N=35) 
1. I had to go back to work 9 25.7 
2. I had to attend to my private business 21 60.0 
3. I got bored 3 8.6 
4. Other 2 5.7 
TABLE 18a 
REASONS FOR LEAVING BEFORE THE END OF A MEETING 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASONS 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
T O i T & T C 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1 1 2 3 - - - 3 9 
2 2 5 - 5 5 - 4 21 
3 1 1 - 1 - - - 3 
4 - - - - 2 - - 2 
TOTALS 4 8 3 6 7 - 7 35 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 72 10 118 500 
Only 7 per cent of the sample (35x100/500) gave reasons why 
they left early. The rest either did not attend any meetings 
or did not leave early. Here again, the analysis does not 
indicate any observable difference in attitudes among the 
grades but the notion that union meetings are boring is 
examined. 8 per cent of the respondents left early because 
they were bored. Boredom at union meetings depends more 
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often on the interests of members present. A member who sits 
through discussion of topics on which he has no views and no 
contribution is more likely to be bored in the course of the 
discussion. Contribution presupposes views and views 
presuppose interest. The 60 per cent who left in order to 
attend to their private business chose to do so because they 
were not interested in the discussions taking place. If they 
were, they would have made alternative arrangement for their 
business commitments rather than miss the discussions. 
On the other hand, those who leave early in order to attend 
to their private business stand in danger of being accused 
of abusing facility time, whereas they may not be doing so. 
The rules of facility time vary between departments but they 
share a common principle. Facility time is usually granted 
to coincide with, and often overlap lunch or other statutory 
brakes. Members whose prior lunch time private appointments 
clash with union meetings but do no wish to miss either may 
decide to attend their meetings but leave early in order to 
accommodate their own appointments. 
The 26 per cent who left early in order to go back to work 
were not necessarily all members in the higher grades as 
might be expected. This observation will form a premise in 
the sequence of syllogisms when testing the hypotheses. 
t 
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DEGREE OF MILITANCY 
The depth of militancy among members was examined in the 
next question (13). The 1981 pay negotiation was a particu-
larly difficult one. The Council of Civil Service Unions 
(CCSU) adopted a strategy of "selective strike" whereby 
instead of a total shut down of the entire civi1 service, 
labour was withdrawn from a number of areas, a few at a 
time, calculated to be of some strategic importance from the 
point of view of the campaign. These areas were considered 
to be vital to the revenue of the Central Government. 
Branches not selected for the strike were urged to make 
financial contributions towards the strike fund. In the 
first part of this question, respondents were asked to state 
what stage of the campaign they were prepared to accept the 
offer proposed by the Treasury. The result was as follows:-
TABLE 19 
STAGES AT WHICH TREASURY OFFER WAS ACCEPTED 
STAGE NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS 
% 
(N=460) 
1. Before the selective strike 45 9.8 
2. After two weeks of the strike 7 1.5 
3. Half way through the strike 49 10.7 
4. Offer was never acceptable to me 359 78.0 
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TABLE 19a 
STAGES AT WHICH TREASURY OFFER WAS ACCEPTED 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
STAGES TOTALS I II III IV V VI VII 
1 4 8 5 13 2 - 13 45 
2 (q) 2 2 1 2 - - - 7 
3 1 9 1 12 7 3 16 49 
4(r) 24 69 26 90 61 5 84 359 
TOTALS(s) 31 88 33 117 70 8 113 460 
Before interpreting the above data it should noted that the 
Treasury resorted to a "post-negotiation executive action"^ 
by implementing their offer even though it had been turned 
down by the CCSU in accordance with the result of the ballot 
of the membership. The survey indicates that whereas about 
10 per cent of the respondents would have accepted the offer 
without the need to strike and another 12 per cent actually 
succumbed after the strike had begun, by far the greatest 
majority (78 per cent) rejected the offer and would probably 
have been prepared to carry on the strike action. 
The above data indicate an overall high degree of militancy. 
Also indicated is a higher degree of militancy among members 
in the higher grades. The empirical calculations are as 
1 
follows:-
Respondents who opted for stages 1 to 3 (q) were considered 
to be non-mi 1itant or less mi 1itant than respondents who 
opted for stage 4 (r). Taking the total number of respon-
dents in each grade as (s) and calculating the percentage of 
respondents who opted for stage 4 (r/sxlOO) in each case, 
then calculating the arithmetic mean of the lower grades and 
that of the higher grades, a mean difference is obtained as 
follows:-
TABLE 19b 
MEAN fx) OF LOWER GRADES 
GRADES I II III IV X 
Percentages (r/sxlOO) 77 78 78 77 77.5 
TABLE 19c 
MEAN (x\ OF HIGHER GRADES 
GRADES V VI VII X 
Percentages (r/sxlOO ) 87 63 74 74.6 
L _ H 
Mean difference = — (x) - — (x) = 77.5-74.6 = 2,9% N N 
This difference is much less than can be accounted for by 
the higher ratio of lower grade members to higher grade 
members in the sample. The overall population sample is made 
up of 60 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and 40 
per cent of respondents in the higher grades, a difference 
of 20 per cent.5 This difference is narrowed down in the 
number of respondents who actually answered the question, 
58.5 per cent lower grades and 41.5 per cent higher grades. 
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a difference of 17 per cent, which is further reduced to 2.9 
per cent in the above analyses. An interpretation of this 
decrease is a higher level of militancy among the higher 
grades. 
The second part of the question (13b) was an attempt to 
corroborate the empirical findings in the first part with 
more evidence. After several weeks of sustained selective 
strike a ballot of the membership on the Treasury offer was 
taken. Respondents were asked to indicate how they voted. 
The following results emerged:-
TABLE 20 
BALLOT ON TREASURY OFFER 
VOTE NUMBER OF % 
RESPONDENTS (N=467) 
Accept 155 33.2 
Reject 288 61.7 
Abstain 24 5.1 
TABLE 20a 
BALLOT ON TREASURY OFFER:ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
VOTES TOTALS I II III IV V VI VII 
Accept(t) 15 29 12 37 15 3 44 155 
Reject(u) 14 55 20 80 56 2 61 288 
Abstain 4 5 2 1 - 2 10 24 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Totals(v) 33 89 34 118 71 7 115 467 
1 
Using the same pattern of calculation as above, this time 
with emphasis on respondents who rejected the offer, a mean 
difference between the lower grades and the higher grades is 
obtained as follows:-
TABLE 20b 
MEAN fxl OF LOWER GRADES f Re-Ject Offer) 
GRADES I II III IV x 
Percentages (u/vxlOO) 42.4 61.8 58.8 67.8 57.7 
TABLE 20c 
MEAN fx) OF HIGHER GRADESfReject Offer) 
GRADES V VI VII 3T 
Percentages (u/vxlOO) 78.9 28.6 53.0 53.5 
L _ H 
Mean difference = — (x) - — (x) = 57.7-53.5 = 4.2% 
N N 
The "mean" (x) of respondents who answered this part of the 
question is 58.4 per cent& (lower grades) and 41.3 per cent7 
(higher grades), a difference of 17.1 per cent. 
Here again, the difference in the "means" of respondents who 
rejected the offer in the lower grades and those in the 
higher grades (4.2 per cent) is much smaller, and corrobo-
rates the result obtained in the first part: a higher degree 
of militancy among the higher grades. 
The next question (14) examines the reason for each ballot 
decision with a view to tracing the pattern which was begin-
ing to emerge regarding attitude to militancy. Answers to 
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this question are germane to the rationale of the survey. 
The remaining parts of the questionnaire were designed to 
corroborate or refute the answers to the question in order 
to facilitate tests of the hypotheses, a vital aspect of the 
survey conclusion. The reasons for each of the options given 
in table 20 are analysed in the next three tables. 
TABLE 21 
DECISION TO ACCEPT THE OFFER 
IMPORTANT N 
REASON FOR DECISION O TOTALS 
V Q MO N INF 
E U DE O LU 
R I RA T EN 
Y T TE VE CE 
E LY RY The offer was good enough 9 4 2 - 15 
Escalation of the dispute 
would be futile 89 9 3 - 101 
I could not afford further 
loss of earnings 28 2 - - 30 
I do not agree with strikes 8 - - - 8 
Lack of support from the 
rest of the membership 1 - - - 1 
TOTALS 135 15 5 - 155 
87 per cent of those who decided to accept the offer 
believed the reason for their decision to be very important. 
Only 13 per cent perceived their reasons as quite or moder-
ately important. The most popular reason was that "escala-
ion of the dispute would be futile". Over 60 per cent of 
1 
those who voted acceptance had lost faith in the efficacy of 
the strike. About 19 per cent gave up because their losses 
were beginning to bite. Those who felt the offer was good 
enough were under 10 per cent and those who did not believe 
in strikes were only 5 per cent. Those whose decision to 
accept was influenced by lack of support for the strike were 
under 1 per cent. 
TABLE 22 
DECISION TO REJECT THE OFFER 
IMPORTANT N 
REASON FOR DECISION O TOTALS 
V Q MO N INF 
E U DE O LU 
R I RA T EN 
Y T TE VE CE 
E LY RY Felt offer meant still 
lower living standards 162 14 3 - - 179 
A little more resistance 
would have forced a 
concession 75 8 1 84 
Belief in the CCSU's 
ability to succeed 9 2 - - - 11 
Political opposition to 
Government policy 12 - - - - 12 
TOTALS 258 24 4 - - 286 
Over 90 per cent of those who voted for rejection thought 
the reason for their decision to be very important. Under 9 
per cent felt their reasons were less important. Well over 
62 per cent said the offer meant stil1 lower living stand-
ards for civil servants. 29 per cent were optimistic enough 
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to believe that more resistance would have forced a conce-
ssion. Very few respondents (4 per cent) believed in the 
abi 1 ity of the CCSU to succeed and were prepared to back 
their belief by rejecting the Treasury offer. Turning down 
the offer as a gesture of "political opposition to govern-
ment policy" was neither anticipated nor thought of as a 
feasible answer in the survey. Over 4 per cent gave this as 
the reason for their decision. A few respondents abstained 
from the ballot for the following reasons:-
TABLE 23 
DECISION TO ABSTAIN FROM BALLOT 
IMPORTANT 
REASON FOR DECISION V 0 MO N 
E U DE O 
R I RA T 
Y T TE VE 
E LY RY 
N 
0 
INF 
LU 
EN 
CE 
TOTALS 
I felt the offer would not 
improve anyway 14 1 - - - 15 
I was fed up with the CCSU 4 - - - - 4 
I was fed up with the 
employer 2 - - - - 2 
I could not care less - - - - - -
TOTALS 20 1 - - - 21 
Nearly all respondents who abstained from the ballot beli-
eved their reasons to be very important; 71 per cent felt 
the offer would not improve whatever the result of the 
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ballot was; 19 per cent said they were fed up with the CCSU, 
and about ten per cent said they were fed up with the emplo-
yer. The 71 per cent who felt the offer would not improve 
were quite right, for as stated above, the Government imple-
mented it despite the fact that it was rejected. 
The reaction of respondents to the series of half day 
strikes was elicited in the next question (15). Every civil 
service trade unionist was involved in the pay campaign, 
some more directly than others. The half day strikes gave 
all members of the CCSU an opportunity to be directly invol-
ved. There were mixed feelings about the action even among 
those who freely contributed to the strike fund regularly. 
Question 15 asked respondents to state their reactions to 
the series of half day official all out strikes during the 
period. In analysing the question, particular care was taken 
to observe the correlation between respondents' reactions 
and their age group, grade and economic circumstances. The 
questionnaire proposed the following list of reactions from 
which respondents were asked to choose:-
1. Agreed and took action (x) 
2. Agreed but did not take action. 
3. Disagreed but took action...(y) 
4. Disagreed and took no action. 
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TABLE 24 
REACTIONS TO HALF-DAY STRIKE 
AGE ELEMENT 
REACT-
ION 
No. 
AGE GROUP TOTAL 
UNDER 21 
(i) 
21-30 
(3) 
31-40 
(k) 
41-50 
(1) 
51 & OVER 
(m) 
1. ( X ) - 75 142 59 31 307 
2. - 1 8 13 4 26 
3. (y) - 25 45 12 14 96 
4. - 4 13 9 8 34 
TOTALS (z) - 105 208 93 57 463 
An overall 87 per cent of the respondents came out even 
though 21 per cent disagreed with the action. Only 13 per 
cent ignored the strike. However, it would appear that about 
6 per cent of these were in favour of it despite their in-
ability to come out. The effect of age on the propensity to 
strike was examined as follows:-
(x) which represents those who agreed and took action, plus 
(y) which represents those who disagreed but took action, 
calculated as a percentage of the total sample of those in 
each age group (z) who answered the question: 
x + y 
x 100 
z 
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TABLE 
THE EFFECT 
24a 
OF AGE 
FORMULA AGE GROUP (%) 
x + y 
x 100 
z 
(i) (3) (k) (1) (m) 
- 95.2 89.9 76.3 78.9 
(j+k) 
Averages:-
2 
(1+m) 
2 
92.6 - 77.6 = 15% 
This calculation shows that age group (j), 21-30, is the 
most militant. It also shows that trade unionists are more 
militant up to the age of 40 and less so from age 41 and 
above. 15 per cent indicates the degree by which militancy 
is higher in the age groups up to 40. 
TABLE 25 
REACTIONS TO HALF DAY STRIKE 
INFLUENCE OF STATUS 
REACTION 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
l.(x) 22 57 18 76 49 4 81 307 
2. 2 5 9 6 - 1 3 26 
3.(y) 5 16 2 31 20 1 21 96 
4. 4 8 5 6 2 1 8 34 
TOTALS(z) 33 86 34 119 71 7 113 463 
Concentrating on respondents who took action, whether they 
agreed with the strike or not, that is, reactions 1 and 3, 
the percentage for each grade is calculated as follows:-
x + y 
x 100 
z 
1 
TABLE 25a 
INFLUENCE OF STATUS - PERCENTAGES 
LOWER GRADES (L) HIGHER GRADES(H) 
I II III IV V VI VII 
81.8% 84.9% 58.8% 89.9% 97 .2% 71.4% 90.3% 
L 315.4 
The mean of lower grades (x) = = = 78.9% 
n 4 
H 258.9 
The mean of higher grades(x*) = = = 86.3% 
n 3 
Again, this indicates a higher degree of militancy among the 
higher grades. 
TABLE 26 
EFFECT OF FINANCIAL COMMITMENT (DWELLING) 
REACTION 
No. 
WHAT IS PAID FOR ACCOMMODATION 
TOTALS MORTGAGE RENT OWNER* NONE** 
1. 44 235 28 - 307 
2. 2 16 8 - 26 
3. 16 70 8 2 96 
4. 3 25 6 - 34 
TOTALS 65 346 50 2 463 
*Owner, after paying off the mortgage 
**Leaving with parents of where accommodation is provided 
with the job. 
89 per cent of respondents who answered this question were 
either mortgage or rent payers and only 11 per tent were 
outright owners of their houses or did not have to pay for 
their accommodation. 89 per cent of those who had rent or 
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mortgage commitments came out on strike and only 11 per cent 
did not. On the other hand, 73 per cent of those who had no 
rent or mortgage commitments came out and 27 per cent did 
not. Therefore, rent and mortgage commitments had negative 
influence on decision to strike. 
TABLE 27 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: SINGLE PERSONS 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 
REACTION TOTALS 
No. CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc* NONE 
1. 2 2 74 1 - - 77 78 
2. - - 2 - - - 2 2 
3. - - 23 - - - 23 23 
4. - - 9 1 - - 8 9 
TOTALS 2 2 108 2 - - 110 112 
The table above is summarized as follows:-
TABLE 27a 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: SINGLE PERSONS 
REACTIONS 
CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc. NONE 
Took action % 100* 100* - 89.8 50 90.0 
No action % 0 0 10.2 50 10.1 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = - = = = =:=:=: = =; = = = = =: = = = = 
*There were only two people in each of the categories and 
they all took action. 
The sample of 112 respondents analysed above consisted of 6 
single parents. Two of these each had 1 child under 18, two 
had two children under 18 and two had 1 child over eighteen. 
The rest were single persons without children. The first 
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observation here is that out of the six single parents only 
one disagreed with the strike and took no action. The other 
five agreed and took action. It would therefore seem that 
family responsibility had little or no influence on deci-
sions about strike. Although no generalization can yet be 
made from this until results from other categories and 
samples have been examined it is significant that only one 
out of six single parents with children did not come out. 
Secondly, it should be observed that reasons for the 
reactions had nothing to do with family commitment. Thirdly, 
over 90 per cent of the single persons took action, a posi-
tive reaction, although it would not have altered the above 
findings if they all reacted negatively by ignoring the 
strike. It would only reinforce it. 
TABLE 27b 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: MARRIED PERSONS 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 
REACTION TOTALS 
No. CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc. NONE 
1. 52 45 14 86 18 6 2 171 197 
2. 2 4 1 14 3 1 1 16 21 
3. 17 18 4 24 2 3 - 58 63 
4. 3 7 2 8 3 - - 17 20 
TOTALS 74 74 21 132 26 10 3 262 . 301 
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Above table is summarized as follows:-
TABLE 27c 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: MARRIED PERRONS 
REACTIONS 
CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc. NONE 
Took action % 93.2 85.1 85.7 83.3 76.9 90 66.7 87.4 
No action % 6.8 14.9 14.3 16.7 23.1 10 33.3 12.6 
Every member of this population sample is married. Taking 
each group separately, that is, those with one, two, three 
and no children, the percentage of those who took action was 
in each case much larger than those who did not. Here again, 
the earlier findings are corroborated - family commitment 
did not have a significant effect on decisions to strike. 
This refutes the popular notion that financial commitment is 
a factor in the propensity to strike, in other words, that 
people's attitude towards strike is determined by their 
level of financial commitment. These findings neither sup-
port nor contradict Edwards' (1979) findings that high 
wages provide the means to support a strike.** However, they 
do confirm that in the case of active civil service trade 
unionists, moral principles play a greater part in decisions 
to take a strike action. A useful distinction ought to be 
made at this point between three types of union membership, 
in order to facilitate interpretation of these results. The 
three types of membership are governed by attitude and iden-
tification. The attitude aspect is universal. It governs all 
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the three types of membership - ordinary members, active 
members and local office holders - in the same degree. But 
the extent to which identification governs the types of 
membership would vary according to the degree of individual 
involvement. For instance, the degree to which one identi-
fies himself as a member intensifies when he decides to 
became more actively involved and, when this involvement is 
transformed into taking on a local officer responsibility, 
identification, a fortiori, is at its peak. 
The sample population of this survey excluded those ordinary 
members whose degree of identification was low. They may 
have possessed the right attitude in joining their unions 
but with their low identification profile their indifference 
to matters relating to their organization perforce segrega-
ted them as unreliable for the survey. Those respondents 
whose questionnaires were returned uncompleted or with only 
a few answers and were therefore weeded out before the final 
sample was selected, fitted into this category. The impossi-
bility of interpreting blank questionnaires made the inclu-
sion of such pusillanimous members impractical. The result 
of the survey is therefore representative of those who genu-
inely, by virtue of their conscious affiliations and invol-
vement with their unions, possessed values about which valid 
interpretations and generalizations can be made. 
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The next table is an analysis of the reactions of divorced 
or separated members. The candid replies elicited from these 
and most of the respondents made objective comparisons 
possible. 
TABLE 27d 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: PIVORCED/SEPARATED PERSONS 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 
REACTION TOTALS 
No. CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc. NONE 
1. 3 4 - 25 2 - - 30 32 
2. - 1 - 1 1 - - 1 2 
3. 3 - - 7 1 - 2 7 10 
4. 1 - 1 3 - - 1 4 5 
TOTALS 7 5 1 36 4 — 3 42 49 
Above table is summarized as follows:-
TABLE 27e 
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: DIVORCED/SEPARATED PERSONS 
REACTIONS 
CHILDREN UNDER 18 CHILDREN OVER 18 
1 2 3etc. NONE 1 2 3etc. NONE 
Took action % 85.7 80 0 88.9 75 66.7 88.1 
No action % 14.3 20 100* 11.1 25 33.3 11.9 
=========== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = : = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
*Only one person fitted the category and he/she did not 
strike. 
There was only one divorced person with three or more child-
ren under 18 in the sample and he/she did not take action. 
Since there were not enough respondents in the category the 
100 per cent indicated in the above summary is not 
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significant. However, it could be interpreted to mean that 
divorced/sepatated persons who have three or more children 
under 18 have very low to 0 propensity to strike. As this is 
a chance occurrence, a generalization from it would not be 
valid. However, the overal1 picture is that among divorced/ 
separated persons family commitment has very little effect 
on decision to strike. The following table would facilitate 
generalization on the issue of the influence of family 
commitment on decision to take strike action:-
TABLE 2 7 f 
INFLUENCE OF FAMILY COMMITMENT ON DECISION TO STRIKE 
SINGLE MARRIED DIVORCED/ 
SEPARATED 
FAMILY 
COMMITMENT (A)% (B)% (A)% (B)% (A)% (B)% 
C U ONE 100.0 0 93.2 6.8 85.7 14.3 
H N 
I D TWO 100.0 0 85.1 14,9 80.0 20.0 
L E 
D R THREE 
R OR MORE - - 85.7 14.3 0 100.0 
E 1 
N 8 NONE 89.8 10.2 83.3 16.7 88.9 11.1 C O ONE 50.0 50.0 76.9 23.1 75.0 25.0 
H V 
I E TWO - - 90.0 10.0 
L R 
D THREE 
R OR MORE - - 66.7 33.3 66.7 33.3 
E 1 
N 8 NONE 90.9 10.1 87.4 12.6 88.1 11.9 MEANS(x) 86.0 14.0 83.5 16.5 69.2 30.8 
(A)=Took action; (B)=Took no action. 
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The following interpretations are feasible from the above 
summary:-
1. There was no significant difference between the react-
ions of single and married persons with or without chil-
dren- The varied degree of family commitments from none 
to three or more children under or over 18, had very 
little effect on their decision to strike. 
2. Divorced/separated persons with children over 18 reacted 
differently. They seem to have lower propensity to 
strike, whereas those of them who had children under 18 
reacted exactly in the same manner as the rest. 
3. All three groups, single, married and divorced without 
children, reacted in the same manner. They had no family 
commitments and displayed a high propensity to strike. 
By comparison, those with commitments, that is, one, two 
and three or more children under 18, displayed the same 
level of propensity. The influence of family commitments 
is therefore slight except in the case of married and 
divorced persons with three or more children over 18, 
where the lower strike propensity may be linked with the 
heavier family commitments. 
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Question 16 (a-d) probed deeper to find out how respondents 
took their ballot decisions. The reasons elicited are 
analysed in the following tables. In question 16a respon-
dents who agreed with the half-day strikes and took action 
were asked to identify their reasons from the following:-
1. To maintain union solidarity. 
2. Loyalty to my branch. 
3. I must play my part. 
4. I believe in our cause (right to a living wage). 
5. Other... 
TABLE 28a 
AGREED AND TOOK ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1. 10 24 10 37 29 1 33 144 
2. - 4 - - 1 - 4 9 
3. 2 3 1 8 2 1 12 29 
4. 10 26 7 31 17 2 33 126 
5. - - - - - - 1 1 
TOTALS 22 57 18 76 49 4 83 309 
— 173 — — 136 — 
The above results are interpreted from a point of view 
different from previous analyses by grade. The number of 
respondents representing the lower grades in the main popu-
lation sample was 300 and 200 represented the higher grades. 
According to the above figures, 58 per cent (173/300x100) of 
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the lower grades agreed with the strike and took action, 
compared with 68 per cent (136/200x100) of the higher 
grades. The higher grades appeared to be more militant. Once 
again this corroborates earlier findings. 
Those respondents who agreed with the half-day strikes but 
did not take part were asked to give their reasons. The 
following reasons were listed and analysed:-
1. One day/half-day strikes would not influence the final 
outcome. 
2. Most members in my branch did not come out. 
3. I could not afford the loss of pay. 
4. To avoid disciplinary action of my employer. 
5. My post does not allow strikes. 
6. Not required to strike. 
TABLE 28b 
AGREED BUT DID NOT TAKE ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1. - 1 3 3 - - 7 
2. 1 - 1 4 - 2 8 
3. 1 - - - - - 1 
4. - 2 2 - 1 - 5 
5. - 2 1 1 - - 4 
6. - - 2 - - - 2 
TOTALS 2 5 9 8 1 2 27 
— 24 — — 3 — 
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Quite clearly, respondents who agreed with the strike but 
failed to come out were in the minority: 8 per cent of the 
lower grades as against 1.5 per cent of the higher grades. 
The fact that a greater proportion of these were in the 
lower grades, as shown in the above analysis, reinforces 
previous results - degree of militancy was lower in the 
lower grades and higher in the higher grades. Not everybody 
who agreed with the strike came out and obviously there were 
respondents who came out without necessarily agreeing with 
the action. The reasons given for this reaction are listed 
below and analysed in the next table:-
1. To maintain union solidarity. 
2. Loyalty to my branch. 
3. I was under pressure to conform. 
4. Other... 
TABLE 28c 
DISAGREED BUT TOOK ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS I II III IV V VI VII 
1. 4 13 1 26 18 1 19 82 
2. 2 2 1 3 2 - 1 11 
3. - 1 - 1 - - 3 5 
4. - - - 1 - - - 1 
TOTALS 6 16 2 31 20 1 23 99 
— 55 — — 44 — 
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Interpreting the above data using previous formula, that is, 
respondents who came out 
x 1 0 o , 
population sample 
produces the following results:-
55 
Lower grades: x 100 = 18.3% 
300 
44 
Higher grades x 100 = 22.0% 
200 
Again, the higher grades are shown to be more militant. 
Reasons given by respondents who disagreed and took no 
action are listed and analysed below:-
1. Claims were not justifiable in the economic circum-
stances . 
2. I do not believe in strikes. 
3. The Government would not have given in. 
4. My work would suffer. 
TABLE 28d 
DISAGREED AND TOOK NO ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS I II III IV V VI VII 
1 . - 3 - 2 - 1 3 9 
2. 2 5 3 2 1 4 17 
3. 1 - 1 - 1 1 4 
4. - - 1 - - - 1 
TOTALS 3 8 5 4 2 1 8 31 
— 20 — — 11 — 
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Using the same formula, the data indicates the same pattern 
as above. The percentage of lower grades who disagreed and 
took no action - 20/300 x 100 = 6.6% is higher that the per-
centage of higher grades - 11/200 x 100 =5.5%, again confir-
ming lower propensity to strike among lower grades. It is 
interesting to note that only five respondents refused to 
take strike action on account of their work. Four of these 
agreed with the action but did not come out because their 
posts did not allow "strikes". The fifth person disagreed 
with the action and did not come out because his work would 
suffer. All five surprisingly were in the lower grades. If 
anyone would opt out of a strike on account of his work it 
is more likely to be someone higher up in the hierarchy who 
had allowed himself to be overwhelmed by what Festinger 
(1957) termed "cognitive dissonance".9 The results indicate 
that this is not so. 
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The pay campaign in the years 1979-83 were particularly 
difficult. On each occasion the campaign began with great 
enthusiasm which mellowed as the employer continued to main-
tain resistance. The employer's resistance in 1981 appeared 
to have shaped the future attitudes of many union members 
towards strikes. The notion that taking a strike action 
against the Government was a waste of time had become firmly 
fixed in the minds of many. How widespread or real was this 
notion? Question 17 exploits the experience of 1981 and asks 
for respondents' views on an all-out indefinite strike. The 
question was hypothetical in so far as this category of 
industrial action was contemplated but not invoked. What was 
envisaged here was the possibility of monitoring any atti-
tude change which might have taken place as a direct result 
of the disappointment suffered in 1981. To the question "If 
an all out indefinite strike were called by the CCSU and 
endorsed by your union in support of pay claim for 1981, 
1982 or 1983 what wou 1 d you have done?" , the f o 11 owing 
alternative replies were proposed:-
1. Stay out indefinitely. 
2. Come out for a week or two then return to work. 
3. Ignore the strike call. 
153 
Once again, the analysis of the result is linked with grades 
in order to ascertain the consistency of the replies with 
other findings:-
TABLE 29a 
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1981/82 
REACTIONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
_1. 11 52 16 80 159 53.0 
2. 10 20 4 14 48 16.0 
3. 10 17 13 21 61 20.3 
TOTALS 31 89 33 115 268 89.3 
ABSTENTIONS 15 7 4 6 32 10.7 
SAMPLE(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
REACTION TO ALL-OUT 
TABLE 
STRIKE 
29h 
(HYPOTHETICAL! 1981/82 
REACTIONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1. 53 2 57 112 56.0 
2. 12 2 18 32 16.0 
3. 7 4 37 48 24.0 
TOTALS 72 8 112 192 96.0 
ABSTENTIONS - 2 6 8 4.0 
SAMPLE (N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
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TABLE 29c 
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1982/83 
REACTIONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
_1. 11 42 12 60 125 41.7 
2. 11 28 7 26 72 24.0 
3. 11 20 13 27 71 23.6 
TOTALS 33 90 32 113 268 89.3 
ABSTENTIONS 13 6 5 8 32 10.7 
SAMPLE(N=) 46 96 
= = = 
37 121 300 100.0 
REACTION TO 
TAB-LE. 
ALL-OUT STRIKE 
29d 
(HYPOTHETICAL) 1982/83 
REACTIONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1. 47 2 43 92 46.0 
2. 15 1 20 36 18.0 
3. 10 5 48 63 31.5 
TOTALS 72 8 111 191 95.5 
ABSTENTIONS - 2 7 9 4.5 
SAMPLE (N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
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TABLE 29e 
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE fHYPOTHETICAL) 1983/84 
REACTIONS LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
_1. 14 43 14 63 134 44.7 
2. 10 28 5 22 65 21.6 
3. 13 21 13 30 77 25.7 
TOTALS 37 92 32 115 276 92.0 
ABSTENTIONS 9 4 5 6 24 8.0 
SAMPLE(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 
REACTION TO ALL-OUT 
TABLE 
STRIKE 
29f 
(HYPOTHETICAL) 1983/84 
REACTIONS HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1. 46 2 42 90 45.0 
2. 15 - 18 33 16.5 
3. 11 6 53 70 35.0 
TOTALS 72 8 113 193 96.5 
ABSTENTIONS - 2 5 7 3.5 
SAMPLE (N=) 72 10 118 200 100.0 
1 
The results indicate a gradual increase in the number of 
respondents who said they would ignore the strike call in 
the three years:-
TABLE 29a 
YEAR LOWER GRADE HIGHER GRADE 
1981/82 20.3 24.5 
1982/83 23.6 31.5 
1983/84 25.7 35.0 
The number of respondents who said they would stay out 
indefinitely declined:-
TABLE 29h 
YEAR LOWER GRADE HIGHER GRADE X 
1981/82 53.0 56.0 54. 5 
1982/83 41.7 46.0 43. 9 
1983/84 44.7 45.0 44. 9 
Between 1981/82 and 1982/83 there was an increase in the 
number of respondents who were not quite sure whether to 
stay out indefinitely or ignore the strike call. The figure 
dropped in 1983/84. 
TABLE 29X 
YEAR LOWER GRADE HIGHER GRADE 
1981/82 16.0 16.0 
1982/83 24.0 18.0 
1983/84 21.6 16.5 
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Thus, the effect of the 1980/81 pay disappointment was quite 
palpable. The number of respondents who would strike dec-
lined over the three years, 47.8 per cent compared with 80.6 
per cent who actually struck in 1980/81. However, the effect 
was not decisive in so far as there was a good number of 
respondents who would still come out nevertheless. 
The results also show that the tendency to rationalize a 
strike decision is greater now. The following analyses show 
that although there had been a significant change in 
attitude towards strikes, the change was more palpable among 
the higher grades. 
TABLE 291 
PROPENSITY TO STRIKE 
TABLES LOWER GRADES % OF HIGHER GRADES % OF 
SUMMARIZED I II III IV - SAMPLE (N=300) V VI VII 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
28a +28c 
(Totals 
only) 
28 73 20 
(x1) 
107 76* 69 5 
(*2) 
106 90** 
(Y) 12 46 14 
(x3) 
68 46*** 63 2 
(x4 
47 
) 
56**** 
30 34 
(Y)= Respondents who said they would stay out indefinitely 
in tables 29a, 29c and 29e divide by 3 and in tables 
29b, 29d and 20f divide by 3, in each grade. 
xl *2 x3 
* = x 100; ** = x 100; *** = x 100; 
300 200 300 
x4 
**** = x 100 
200 
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Propensity to strike had dropped among the lower grades by 
30 per cent and by 34 per cent among the higher grades. 
Interest was next focused on respondents who felt they would 
have ignored the hypothetical strike. In question 18, resp-
ondents were asked to indicate the strength of their reason 
if they had opted to ignore the hypothetical strike. It was 
hoped that replies to this question would corroborate the 
findings about the effect of the failures of the 1980/81 pay 
campaign. The following reply options were suggested:-
1. I do not believe in strikes. 
2. I cannot afford to go on strike. 
3. Strike would conflict with my job. 
4. I do not believe in the unions' cause. 
5. Members would not support the strike. 
The analyses were based on income, commitment, grades, trade 
union position held and educational qualification:-
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TABLE 30a 
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE 
ANALYSIS BY INCOME GROUP 
INCOME GROUPS [(£) Wages Per Week] TO 
REASON TA 
No. Under 51- 101- 151- 201- 251- 301- 351- LS 51 100 150 200 250 300 350 etc. 
1. - 4 8 9 5 2 1 2 31 
2. 1 5 11 10 9 - 1 3 40 
3. - - 2 5 4 3 - 4 18 
4. - - 2 1 1 - - 2 6 
5. - 7 20 18 7 4 1 2 59 
TOTALS 1 16 43 43 26 9 3 13 154 
SAMPLE(N= ) 3 67 195 131 61 21 5 17 500 
% of (N) 33. 3 23. 9 22. 1 32.8 42. 6 42.9 60. 0 76. 5 -
The number of respondents who would rather ignore the strike 
call, (iii) of question 17 were as follows:-
1981 109 
1982 134 
1983 147 
(FIGURES FROM TABLES 29A-F, REASON NO.3) 
This gives a total of 390 over the three years and a mean 
(x=130), as against 154 in the above table, showing a 
difference of 24. This may be accounted for by the number 
of respondents who had ticked box (i) or box (ii) in 
question 17 and yet answered question 18, which was meant 
only for respondents who had ticked box (iii). 
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From the above calculations, the percentage of respondents 
who would ignore the strike in each wage group ran almost 
parallel to the level of income. The analysis indicates that 
propensity to strike diminished more up the top end of the 
wage ladder. This result reinforces previous findings of the 
comparison by grades, (cf. Tables 29a-f), and questions 
Edwards' (1979) contention that "higher earnings permit 
workers to employ various means of withdrawal from work.."10 
It is doubtful that Edwards' suggestion would be applicable 
to higher grade civil servants amongst whom propensity to 
strike is shown in this survey to have diminished. Arguably, 
their higher earnings, in retrospect, might have been a 
contributory factor in the fact that their groups were shown 
to be more mi litant. But because they are currently more 
apprehensive of strike and its outcome, their rational 
approach makes this a thing of the past; for it would seem 
that mi 1itancy amongst civi1 servants in general had become 
latent. 
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TABLE 30b 
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE ANALYSIS BY COMMITMENTS 
REA 1 with 2 with 3 with 4 with TOT 
SON TALS 
No. a b c a b c a b c a b c 
1. - 2 - 1 10 10 - 5 3 - - - 31 
2. - 2 4 - 14 20 ----- - 40 
3. - -- 229-13--1 18 
4. 11--13----- - 6 
5. - 824 21 20 -21--1 59 
TOTALS 1 13 67 48 62 -87--2 154 
GROUP 
TOTALS - 20 - - 117 - - 15 - - 2 - 154 
GROUP 
SAMPLE - 76 - - 363 - - 58 - - 3 -
% of 
SAMPLE 26.3 32.2 25.9 66.6 
1= Rent; 2= Mortgage; 3= Owner after paying off mortgage; 
4= Free accommodation; a= No other commitments; 
b= commitments under £100; c= commitments over £100. 
In the above table, those who said they would ignore the 
strike call were analysed in terms of their reasons and 
commitments. The analysis show that the group with the 
highest ratio of abstention (from the strike action) was 
apparently group 4, that is, those who did not have to pay 
for their accommodation. Two out of three respondents said 
they would ignore the strike but they both had other finan-
cial commitments over £100 per month and were in the £201-
£250 per week wage group (see Table 3(iv)). Their reasons. 
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"strike would conflict with my job" and "sufficient members 
would not support the strike" would have to be accepted as 
genuine as it would be unlikely that with a "take-home" pay 
of over £1,000 per month, their reasons would be financial. 
On the other hand, it is possible that their commitments 
were so high that they could not afford a strike, but they 
would not admit it. However, no generalization can be made 
from their attitudes because the sample population of that 
group was too small. 
The next group with a high abstention ratio was those who 
paid mortgages. 32 per cent of that group said they would 
ignore the strike. Their reasons were:-
1. I do not believe in strikes 18% 
2. I cannot afford to go on strike 29% 
3. Strikes would conflict with my job 11% 
4. I do not believe in the unions' cause 3% 
5. Sufficient members would not support the strike...39% 
The fact that about 53 per cent of this group had finan-
cial commitments over £100 per month and 41 per cent had 
other commitments under £100 per month obscures their 
various reasons. Their mortgages and financial commitments 
appear more likely to have influenced their decision. By 
contrast, it is significant that a smaller proportion of 
those who paid neither mortgages nor rent and had little or 
no financial commitments said they would ignore the strike. 
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TABLE 30c 
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTALS 
I II III IV V VI VII 
1. 2 7 5 5 2 1 9 31 
2. 5 5 - 9 1 2 18 40 
3. - 3 5 4 1 - 5 18 
4. 1 - - 2 - - 3 6 
5. 5 8 4 13 7 2 20 59 
TOTALS 13 23 14 33 11 5 55 154 
Calculating the percentages of the lower grades and higher 
grades for each reason, the following results emerge:-
TABLE 30d 
REASONS LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % TOTAL % 
1. 19 61.3 12 38.7 
2. 19 47.5 21 52.5 
3. 12 66.7 6 33.3 
4. 3 50.0 3 5O.0 
5. 30 50.8 29 49.2 
A larger percentage of respondents in the higher grades said 
they could not afford to go on strike - 52.5 per cent 
compared with 47.5 per cent of respondents in the lower 
grades. This occurrence may be explained by the possibility 
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that those respondents in the higher grades might have had 
much heavier commitments. The most significant result is 
reason No.3; 66.7 per cent of those who stated that a strike 
would conflict with their jobs were in the lower grades as 
against 33.3 per cent in the higher grades. This result 
reinforces the earlier result analysed in table 28d where it 
was shown that the respondent who did not take strike action 
was in the lower grades group. The number of respondents who 
said that sufficient members would not support the strike 
was almost evenly distributed between the two groups. 
TABLE 30e 
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE 
ANALYSIS BY TU MEMBERSHIP STATUS 
OFFICERS ORDINARY MEMBERS 
No. Number of Resps. %* Number of Resps. %** 
1. 17 5.0 14 8.6 
2. 22 6.5 18 11.1 
3. 12 3.6 6 3.7 
4. 4 1.2 2 1.2 
5. 37 10.9 22 13.6 
TOTALS 92 27.2 62 38.2 
* % of sample (n=338) ** % of sample (n=162) 
27.2 per cent of the branch officers sampled said they would 
ignore the strike, compared with 38.2 per cent of the 
ordinary members. It should be noted that the reasons given 
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for ignoring the strike were shared by both groups. Although 
this result does show that officers were more militant than 
ordinary members further proof will be sought later before a 
generalization can be made. 
Overtime ban was another weapon in the unions' armoury and 
indeed the civil service unions had a tacit policy against 
overtime working. It was strongly contended that work done 
during overtime should be made available to people on the 
dole queue especially in times of high unemployment. The 
introduction of a nationwide overtime ban during the selec-
tive strike was therefore an understandable reinforcement of 
the unions' militant effort. The inclusion of a question to 
ascertain the level of support given to this seemingly minor 
sacrifice was necessary in order to corroborate earlier 
findings about militancy as well as provide concrete evi-
dence for generalization. 
Question 19 asked what respondents did when the CCSU called 
a ban of overtime for an indefinite period. Most of the 
respondents who did not answer the question stated that 
overtime was not available in their departments. Analysis of 
the replies was based on wage groups, grades and membership 
status. The following options were suggested for replies:-
1. Boycott overtime while the ban lasted. 
2. Boycott overtime for a short while. 
3. Ignore the ban altogether. 
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TABLE 31 
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN 
ANALYSIS BY WAGE GROUPS 
REACTION 
No. 
INCOME GROUPS [(£) Wages Per Week] TO 
Under 
51 
51-
100 
101-
150 
151-
200 
201-
250 
251-
300 
301-
350 
351-
etc. 
LS 
1. 1 47 151 90 41 16 2 3 351 
2. 1 1 7 8 2 - - - 19 
3. 1 3 14 16 9 1 3 6 53 
TOTALS 3 51 172 114 52 17 5 9 423 
RWIQ* - 16 23 17 9 4 - 8 77 
SAMPLE 3 67 195 131 61 21 5 17 500 
3 as % of 
SAMPLE 33.3 4.5 7.2 12.2 14.8 4.8 60.0 35.3 
Mean (x) Lower pay group = 14. 4 Higher pay group = 33.4 
*RWIQ = Respondents who did not answer the question. 
Because most of the respondents worked overtime (about 15 
per cent did not) the ban was an effective weapon. 83 per 
cent supported it while it lasted; about 5 per cent suppor-
ted it for a short while and 12 per cent ignored it altoge-
ther. Well over 66 per cent of respondents in the wage group 
(£351 and over) per week, ignored the ban. This high percen-
tage was probably due to the fact that respondents in the 
top salaries grades took time off in lieu of overtime pay. 
The seemingly lack of support was peculiar to the group 
earning £351 and above; it did not necessarily reflect the 
reactions of all respondents in the higher grades. However, 
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on the assumption that wages up to £250 per week on the 
table represent lower wages group and that those who ignored 
the ban simply continued working overtime, the larger 3T of 
the higher wages group would suggest that this group was 
less mi 1i tant; thus corroborating earlier findings (cf. 
table 30a et seg.). 
TABLE 31a 
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
No. I II III IV V VI VII 
1. 24 77 27 87 58 2 76 351 
2. 1 4 1 7 3 1 2 19 
3. 4 5 2 14 8 4 16 53 
TOTALS 29 86 30 108 69 7 94 423 
RWIQ* 17 10 7 13 3 3 24 77 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 72 10 118 500 
3 as % 
SAMPLE 
of 
8.6 5.2 5.4 11.6 11.1 40.0 13.6 
Mean (x) Lower pay group = 7.7 Higher pay group = 21.6 
*RWIQ = Respondents who did not answer the question. 
The above analysis shows that fewer respondents in the lower 
grades ignored the overtime ban and more respondents in that 
category ignored the question altogether. But more respond-
ents in the higher grades ignored the ban and fewer respond-
ents in that category ignored the question. 
1 
A number of interpretations are possible:-
(a) Those who ignored the question had no overtime facility 
in their departments and never worked overtime. 
(b) The question was misunderstood and therefore was not 
answered. 
(c) Some of those who replied that they ignored the ban 
gave that reply because overtime was not available in 
their departments. 
These results corroborate the results of the previous 
analysis, that is, a larger mean (x) for respondents in the 
higher salaries grades. Most people who work overtime do so 
in order to supplement their income, in other words, in 
order to make ends meet. Despite the importance of overtime 
to their income 90 per cent of respondents in the lower 
grades and 84 per cent in the higher grades supported the 
ban. If on the strength of this result respondents in the 
lower grades appeared to be more militant than respondents 
in the higher grades it was probably because overtime was 
usually worked more frequently in the lower grades. There-
fore, this analysis provides no conclusive evidence that one 
group is more or less militant than the other. 
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TABLE 31b 
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN 
ANALYSIS BY TU MEMBERSHIP STATUS 
R F A Q f I N 
OFFICERS ORDINARY MEMBERS 
No. Number of Resps %* Number of Resps %** 
1. 253 74 .8 98 60.5 
2. 11 3 .3 8 4.9 
3. 25 7 .4 28 17.3 
TOTALS 289 85 .5 134 82.7 
ABSTENTIONS 49 14 .5 28 17.3 
DEGREE OF SUPPORT"1" 253+11 
X 
289 
100 =91 
98 + 8 
.3% x 
134 
100=79.1% 
DEGREE OF NON- 25 28 
SUPPORT* x 100= 8.7% x 100= 20.9% 
289 134 
* % of sample (n=338) ** % of sample (n=162) 
+ Abstentions were not included in these calculations 
because it was not known whether the respondents supported 
the ban or not. 
The ban was very well supported. The above table indicates a 
higher degree of support from branch officers. This was 
consistent with the official policy of the unions regarding 
overtime working. The officers were seen to practise what 
they preached. The result does prove that branch officers 
were more militant than ordinary members on this issue. It 
also proves that the degree of militancy is more relative 
than absolute. For any individual, the degree of militancy 
is a factor of that person's conviction. An individual would 
be more or less militant depending on how strongly he feels 
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about a particular issue. Before the overtime ban was 
invoked branch officers had spearheaded a national rejection 
of overtime in order to release work for the unemployed. The 
ban was therefore widely supported both by branch officers 
and other members because it was orchestrated. 
THE USE OF ARBITRATION 
The attitude of members towards reference of pay to arbitra-
tion seems to have been influenced by government "vetoes" on 
arbitration decisions over the years. In what way were the 
changes of attitude reflected on the various grades and 
educational strata? Question 20 tries to elicit views on the 
value of arbitration on civil service pay bargaining. In the 
first part of the question respondents were asked to 
indicate their views; the reasons for their views were 
gathered in the second part. Their views on the value of 
resort to arbitration were ranked for analysis as follows:-
1. Very valuable 
2. Quite valuable 
3. Some value 
4. Little value 
5. No value 
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TABLE 32a 
THE VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
RANGE OF 
VALUES 
LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
_1. 21 37 11 38 107 35.6 
2. 9 18 9 22 58 19.3 
3. 8 23 3 22 56 18.6 
4. 3 6 7 26 42 14.0 
5. 2 8 6 12 28 9.3 
TOTALS 43 92 36 120 291 -
SAMPLE(N=) 46 96 37 121 300 
= = 
100.0 
TABLE 32b 
THE VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
RANGE OF 
VALUES 
HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1 . 20 3 44 67 33.5 
2. 16 3 25 44 22.0 
3. 17 3 24 44 22.0 
4. 13 - 12 25 12.5 
5. 4 - 9 13 6.5 
TOTALS 70 9 114 193 -
SAMPLE (N=) 72 
====== 
10 118 200 
== 
100.0 
The above analyses indicates a trade-off between the number 
of respondents who felt arbitration was "very " valuable and 
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those who felt it was "quite" valuable: 35.6 per cent of the 
lower grades felt arbitration was very valuable as against 
33.5 of the higher grades, a difference of 2.1 per cent ; 
whereas 19.3 per cent of the lower grades felt it was quite 
valuable, compared with 22 per cent of the higher grades, a 
difference of 2.7 per cent. If those who felt arbitration 
was "very" valuable were considered together with those who 
felt it was "quite" valuable, the differences attenuate. 
Similarly, a trade-off occurs between respondents who felt 
arbitration had "some" value and those who felt it had 
little value. 18.6 per cent of the lower grades felt it had 
"some" value, compared with 22 per cent of the higher 
grades, a difference of 3.4 per cent; whereas 14 per cent of 
the lower grades felt it had "little" value, as against 12.5 
per cent of the higher grades, a difference of 1.5 per cent. 
Taking the two values (little and no value) together, the 
differences again attenuate, although not in the same degree 
as the previous two groups. More respondents in the lower 
grades felt arbitration had little or no value. This is 
consistent with the overall views expressed. There was more 
trust in the efficacy of arbitration among respondents in 
the higher grades. 
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TABLE 32c 
VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
RANGE OF 
VALUES 
LOWER EDUCATION GROUP T 
O 
T 
A 
L 
% OF 
SAM 
PLE 
(n=383) 
None GCE -0' Levels "A" Levels 
1 - 5 6 or More 
1. 24 69 48 5 146 38.1 
2. 22 27 22 7 78 20.4 
3. 6 40 28 2 76 19.8 
4. 3 24 20 6 53 13.8 
5. 7 14 8 1 30 7.8 
TOTALS 62 174 126 21 383 -
SAMPLE 66 176 129 22 393 _ 
TABLE 32d 
VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
RANGE OF 
VALUES 
HIGHER EDUCATION GROUP T % OF 
SAM 
PLE 
(n=101) 
HND/ 
HNC 
LLB/ 
LLM 
BA/ 
BSC 
etc 
POSTGRAD 
DIPLOMA 
etc 
MASTER/ 
PhD 
\J 
T 
A 
L 
1. 4 1 11 8 4 28 27.7 
2. 4 1 10 4 5 24 23.8 
3. 8 - 13 1 2 24 23.8 
4. 2 - 9 1 2 14 13.9 
5. 3 - 6 1 1 11 10.9 
TOTALS 21 2 49 15 14 101 -
SAMPLE 24 2 51 15 15 107 
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There were more respondents in the lower qualification 
groups than in the higher qualifications groups, 393, 
compared with 107. Consequently, the number of respondents 
who felt arbitration was very valuable and quite valuable 
was much larger in the former groups, 224, compared with 52 
in the latter groups. This is not necessarily contrary to 
the findings of the previous analysis by grades since higher 
qualifications in the sample do not necessarily mean higher 
grades. Just over a quarter of the respondents in the higher 
grades were graduates, and over 92 per cent of non-graduates 
in that group had qualifications well below "A" level, (cf. 
table 2). 58.5 per cent of respondents in the lower educa-
tion group strongly believe in arbitration, compared with 
51.5 per cent in the higher education group. 
The picture is slightly different with respondents who felt 
arbitration had "some" or "little" value. This group had 
less faith in arbitration and a slightly larger percentage 
of these respondents were in the higher education groups, 
37.6, compared with 34.2. Similarly, in the group which felt 
arbitration had " 1ittle" or "no" value, a slightly larger 
percentage of the respondents were in the higher education 
groups, 24.8, compared with 22.2. Again, this is consistent 
with the results of earlier analysis by grades. 
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TABLE 32e 
VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY TRADE UNIONS 
UNIONS 
VALUES OF ARBITRATION 
G H 
A B C D E 
SCPS 52 41 46 36 18 193 2 195 
IRSF 46 24 23 16 9 118 7 125 
FDA 12 3 3 1 1 20 - 20 
CSU 33 14 12 5 3 67 3 70 
NIPSA 14 9 8 3 1 35 - 35 
POA 17 11 8 6 9 51 4 55 
TOTALS 174 102 100 67 41 484 16 500 
% OF 
SAMPLE 34.8 20.4 20.0 13.4 8.2 - 3.2 -
A=Very valuable; B=Quite valuable; C=Some 
D=Little value; E=No value; F=Totals; G= 
H=Population sample. 
value; 
Abstentions; 
The above analysis indicates that 55.2 per cent of the 
sample felt arbitration was either "very" or "quite" valua-
ble. The following table illustrates how the views of each 
union were distributed along the values:-
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TABLE 32f 
VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
VIEWS OF THE UNIONS 
VALUES OF ARBITRATION (% OF SAMPLE) 
UNIONS A B C D E G 
SCPS 26.7 21.0 23.6 18.5 9.2 1.0 
IRSF 36.8 19.2 18.4 12.8 7.2 5.6 
FDA 60.0 15.0 15.0 5.0 5.0 -
CSU 47.1 20.0 17.1 7.1 4.3 4.3 
NIPSA 40.0 25.7 22.9 8.6 2.9 -
POA 30.9 20.0 14.5 10.9 16.4 7.3 
A=Very valuable; B=Quite valuable; C=Some value; 
D=Little value; E=No value; G=Abstentions; 
These figures are percentages of sample taken from each of 
the unions. They indicate that belief in resort to arbitra-
tion was highest among FDA members and lowest among SCPS 
members. 
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REASONS FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
A further probe was necessary to elicit reasons for the 
views expressed above. The reasons elicited were grouped as 
follows:-
TABLE 33 
REASONS FOR VIEWS ON ARBITRATION 
GROUP No. REASONS VIEWS 
1. Arbitration shows our union and members to be 
sensible people who see strikes as a last, not 
first resort. 
SOME 
VALUE 
2. It is important as an outside (independent) 
view and it can result in greater commitment 
for members. 
VERY 
VALU-
ABLE 
3. It is a logical step especially when the QUITE 
findings are binding on both sides. VALUABLE 
4. It is better than nothing...It highlights the 
Government's intransigent attitude and hope-
fully, gains public support... Even if the 
findings are not honoured now, they can be 
used in future and the publicity value is 
beneficial. 
QUITE 
VALU-
ABLE 
5. It has no value if the Government refuses to 
be bound by its decision and it is no substi-
tute for a strong union. 
LITTLE 
VALUE 
6. Arbitration without preconditions can replace 
any need for a strike action when a ballot for 
a strike would be negative anyway. 
SOME 
VALUE 
7. It is never either independent or fair... 
It does not judge issues on merit...It seeks 
compromise loaded in favour of the Treasury. 
NO 
VALUE 
8. It is a cop-out and rarely produces any result NO 
favourable to workers.... It is a complete waste VALUE 
of time. 
9. It would provide a more balanced and fairer VERY 
means of establishing civil service pay... VALUABLE 
It is essential for stability and solidarity. 
It is our only hope. 
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This range of views is analysed in the tables below accord-
ing to grades and unions:-
TABLE 33a 
REASONS OF VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
Reason 
No. 
LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
1. - 4 - 5 9 3.0 
2. 2 2 1 3 8 2.7 
3. 6 13 3 5 27 9.0 
4. - 4 3 10 17 5.7 
5. 7 25 17 54 103 34.3 
6. 3 5 - 8 16 5.3 
7. - 1 - 5 6 2.0 
8. 1 2 1 3 7 2.3 
9. 1 7 3 7 18 6.0 
TOTALS 20 63 28 ' 100 211* 70.3 
SAMPLE(N= = ) 46 96 37 121 300* 100.0 
*The gap 
did not 
between 
answer 
these figures 
the question. 
accounts for respondents who 
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TABLE 33b 
REASONS FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
REASON 
No. 
HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
1. 3 - 3 6 3.0 
2. 1 - 4 5 2.5 
3. 6 1 14 21 10.5 
4. 3 1 12 16 8.0 
5. 33 2 46 81 40.5 
6. 1 1 10 12 6.0 
7. 5 - 2 7 3.5 
8. 1 - 4 5 2.5 
9. 5 - 5 10 5.0 
TOTALS 58 5 100 163* 81.5 
SAMPLE (N = ) 72 10 118 200* 100.0 
*The gap 
did not 
between 
answer 
these figures 
the question. 
accounts for respondents who 
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The reasons are arranged in their "rank" order of popularity 
be1ow:-
TABLE 33c 
AGGREGATES RANK ORDER 
REASON 
No. 
LOWER + HIGHER 
GRADES GRADES 
(x) RANK REASON No. 
1. 6.0 3.0 1 5 
2. 5.2 2.6 2 3 
3. 19.5 9.8 3 4 
4. 13.7 6.9 4 6 
5. 74.8 37.4 5 9 
6. 11.3 5.7 6 1 
7. 5.5 2.8 7 7 
8. 4.8 2.4 8 2 
9. 11.0 5.5 9 
= = = = = = = = = 
8 
From the above analyses, Reason No.5 seems the most popular. 
More respondents in both lower and higher grades. about 37 
per cent of the sample population, felt that resort to arbi-
tration had no value if the Government refused to be bound 
by its decision. This is followed, though not closely, by 
Reason No. 3. Nearly 10 per cent of the sample felt that 
resort to arbitration was a logical step, particularly when 
the findings are binding on both sides. Reason No.4 alluded 
to honouring the findings and Reason No. 6 emphasized arbi-
tration without preconditions. A consensus common to almost 
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all the views expressed is that arbitration should be sacro-
sanct ; in other words, it should be independent, free from 
abuse, unfettered by preconditions and its decisions should 
be binding. Those who regard it as a worthless exercise were 
undoubtedly scandalized by the Government's frequent abuse 
in setting aside its recommendations. Reason Nos.2,7 and 8 
did not have many supporters. However, it is important to 
note that whereas the sample of respondents in the lower 
grades was larger than that of respondents in the higher 
grades, proportionately more respondents in the higher 
grades answered this part of the question - 81.5 per cent of 
200, compared with 70.3 per cent of 300 respondents in the 
lower grades. This was an indication that more respondents 
in the higher grades had clearer views about arbitration and 
did not hesitate to express them. 
A different system of analysis is used for comparing the 
unions. Unlike the analysis by grades where all the grades 
are divided into two groups, lower and higher grades, and 
the aggregates of the two groups compared, the unions are 
compared individually. The mean (IT) of all unions in each 
group of reasons is therefore different from that of the 
grades. The results nevertheless corroborate each other. 
1 
ABLE 33d 
REASON FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION 
ANALYSIS BY UNIONS 
REA 
SON 
No. 
U N I O N S (x)% 
BT T 
1 a 2 a 3 a 4 a 5 a 6 a A Li Li UNIONS 
1. 8 4 . 1 4 3.2 - - 3 4.3 - - - - 1.9 
2. 5 2.5 2 1.6 2 1 0 . 0 1 1.4 1 2.9 2 3.6 3.6 
3. 14 7.2 15 12 . 0 3 15 . 0 9 12.9 4 11.4 3 5.5 1 0 . 7 
4. 2 1 1 0 . 8 4 3.2 - - 1 1.4 1 2.9 6 1 0 . 9 4.9 
5. 85 43.6 45 36 . 0 7 35 . 0 13 18.6 15 42.8 1 9 34.6 35.1 
6. 1 0 5.1 7 5.6 4 2 0 . 0 5 7.1 1 2.9 1 1.8 6.9 
7. 5 2.5 4 3.2 1 5 . 0 - - 1 2.8 2 3.6 2.7 
8. 7 3.6 1 0 . 8 - - 3 4.3 - - 1 1.8 2.8 
9 . 1 2 6.2 5 4.0 2 1 0 . 0 4 5.7 2 5.7 3 5.5 6.2 
TOTALS 
167 85.6 87 69.6 19 9 5 . 0 3 9 55.7 25 71.4 37 67.3 74.8 
(b) 28 14.4 38 30.4 1 5.0 31 44.3 10 28.6 18 32.7 25.2 
(c) 195 125 20 70 35 55 
==== = = = : ===== === ===== ===== ===== ==== = = = = : = = = : ===== = = = : ==== = ======== 
1=SCPS; 2=IRSF; 3=FDA; 4=CSU; 5=NIPSA; 6=POA; a=% of Sample; 
(b)=Abstentions; (c)=Population Sample. 
In the above comparisons the percentage of abstentions was 
higher among the unions which organize lower grade civil 
servants. For example, FDA had 5 per cent abstentions, SCPS 
had 14.4, NIPSA had 28.6, IRSF had 30.4, POA had 32.7 and 
CSU had 44.3 per cent. This result is consistent with the 
result of the previous analysis by grades. 
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SUMMARY 
A number of positive statements can be made from the above 
analyses:-
1. Most of the respondents joined their unions in order to 
safeguard their rights. Many respondents joined because they 
believed in trade unionism. 
2. A great majority of respondents felt it was very 
important to belong to a union and were satisfied with their 
unions. Those who were dissatisfied nevertheless continued 
with their membership. 
3. Lack of success in the 1981/83 pay campaigns had no sig-
nificant impact on the size of membership. The branches 
surveyed indicated a net gain of members during the period. 
However, support for strikes declined after 1981. 
4. Officers attended meetings more often than ordinary 
members; but there was no significant difference between the 
pattern of attendance of the higher and the lower grades. 
5. Age and geographical (workplace) distribution of bran-
ches had no significant influence on the pattern of attend-
ance . 
6. The most popular reason cited for absence from meetings 
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was domestic. 
7. Most of the respondents rejected the Treasury offer. 
8. Respondents on higher grades were more militant. 
9. Family responsibility had no significant effect on 
decisions to strike. 
10. The failure of 1981 pay campaign had more impact on the 
higher grades. 
11. Most respondents felt resort to arbitration was valuable 
only if the recommendations were binding. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ATTITUDES OF SAMPLE 
POPULATION 
Apart from their attitudes towards strikes, overtime bans 
and arbitration, respondents1 views on a number of issues 
which impinge upon workplace industrial relations were 
tested. They were asked to state how important the issues 
were to them and how effectively their unions had handled 
the issues for them. The civil service unions originated not 
because of ideological reasons but rather because members 
had a cumulation of grievances for which they sought 
redress.1 The search for redress is still very much a basic 
motivation in the affairs of civil service unions. If this 
attitude had changed it can only be by degree, not all the 
way. Questions 21a and 21b attempt to measure the probable 
changes which may have occurred and the replies are linked 
with grades in order to facilitate interpretation. Respon-
dents were asked how important certain specified issues were 
to them and how effectively their unions represented them on 
these issues. The replies are analysed in the following 
tables:-
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TABLE 34a 
PAY ISSUES: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF 
REPRESEN 
TAT ION 
LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - - - -
(b) - - - 2 2 0.7 
(c) - - - 1 1 0.3 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 2 2 2 7 2.4 
(b) 1 6 1 10 18 6.0 
(c) 1 1 1 - 3 1.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 13 24 9 33 79 26.3 
(b) 17 36 16 50 119 39.7 
(c) 8 23 6 21 58 19.3 
TOTALS 41 92 35 119 287 95.7 
ABSTENTIONS 5 4 2 2 13 4.3 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
======= ========== ======= ======= ======= ====== ======== ======== 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 34b 
PAY ISSUES: ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - - -
(b) - - 2 2 1.0 
(c) - - 1 1 0.5 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 - 7 8 4.0 
(b) 4 - 12 16 8.0 
(c) - - 5 5 2.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 25 1 30 56 28.0 
(b) 27 6 42 75 37.5 
(c) 15 3 16 34 17.0 
TOTALS 72 10 115 197 98.5 
ABSTENTIONS - - 3 3 1.5 
SAMPLE 72 id 118 200 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 34c 
PAY ISSUE: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPORTANCE 
OF PAY 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 3 1.0 3 1.5 
Fairly Important 28 9.3 29 14.5 
Very Important 256 85.3 165 82.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents ; (b)= % of Sample. 
PAY ISSUE TABLE : SUMMARY OF 
34d 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 86 28.7 64 32.0 
Adequately " 139 46,3 93 46.5 
Poorly " 62 20.7 40 
1 O
 1! 
1 O
 II 
1 CN II 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The analyses above indicate that pay issue was very import-
ant to most members of both groups - 85.3 per cent of resp-
ondents in the lower grades group and 82.5 per cent of resp-
ondents in the higher grades. 9.3 per cent of the lower 
grades and 14.5 per cent of the higher grades said it was 
fairly important. Only 1.0 per cent of the lower grades and 
1.5 per cent of the higher grades felt it was not very 
important. These low percentages are most likely represent-
ative of those members at the lower end and those at top end 
of their salary scales. Annual pay increases would not make 
much difference to their status because their pay is either 
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too low or too high to be influenced by it. Although the 
views of both groups on the importance of pay issue were not 
s i gn i f i cant ly d i f f erent they differ on how we 11 t hey we re 
represented. 
TABLE; 35a 
HOURS. HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - 2 2 0.7 
(b) - 1 - 3 4 1.3 
(c) 1 - - - 1 0.3 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 9 3 16 29 9.7 
(b) 6 23 4 35 68 22.7 
(c) 1 6 1 13 21 7.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 16 14 6 5 41 13.7 
(b) 13 27 16 26 82 27.3 
(c) 1 11 5 17 34 11.3 
TOTALS 39 91 35 117 282 94.0 
ABSTENTIONS 7 5 2 4 18 6.0 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 35b 
HOURS. HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - 6 8 4.0 
(b) 2 2 5 9 4.5 
(c) - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 3 1 13 17 8.5 
(b) 21 1 44 66 33.0 
(c) 8 1 9 18 9.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 10 2 7 19 9.5 
(b) 15 1 17 33 16.5 
(c) 10 2 16 28 14.0 
TOTALS 71 10 117 198 99.0 
ABSTENTIONS 1 - 1 2 1.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
= = = = = = — ========== — ——~ ~ = ~ = = = = = — = = = = = = — = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ======== 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
< 
1 
TABLE 35c 
HOURS. HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 7 2.3 17 8.5 
Fairly Important 118 39.3 101 50.5 
Very Important 157 52.3 80 40.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
TABLE 35d 
HOURS. HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wei1 Represented 72 24.0 44 22.0 
Adequately " 154 51.3 108 54.0 
Poorly " 56 18.6 46 23.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The divergence of views on the issues of hours, holiday and 
leave was not unexpected. Lower grade civil servants have 
longer conditioned hours than higher grade civil servants. 
Until recently, higher grade civil servants had more days 
leave in the year than lower grade civil servants.^ it was 
therefore logical that lower grade civil servants should be 
more concerned about these issues. Sustained erosion of the 
traditional differential between the grades gave the higher 
grades the feeling that they were poorly represented. 
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More respondents in the higher grades said the issues were 
"not very important": 8.5 per cent, compared with 2.3 per 
cent of the lower grades. Similarly, more respondents in the 
higher grades said the issues were "fairly important": 50.5 
per cent compared with 39.3 per cent of the lower grades. It 
was therefore consistent that more respondents in the lower 
grades felt the issues were "very important": 52.3 per cent, 
compared with 40 per cent of the higher grades. 23 per cent 
of the higher grades said they were poorly represented, 
compared with 18.6 per cent of the lower grades. This 
reflects their feelings about the gradual process by which 
the unions organizing the lower grades have been successful 
in narrowing and eventually removing what was considered an 
anomaly, namely, the unjustifiable gap in the hours worked 
and leave allocation. 
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TABLE 3fra 
JOS PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUER 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - 1 1 0.3 
(b) - - - 4 4 1.3 
(c) - - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 5 1 4 10 3.3 
(b) 5 7 4 14 30 10.0 
(c) 1 2 2 4 9 3.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 16 28 14 41 99 33.0 
(b) 19 38 9 34 100 33.4 
(c) 1 11 5 17 34 11.4 
TOTALS 42 91 35 119 287 95.7 
ABSTENTIONS 4 5 2 2 13 4.3 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
195 
TABLE 36b 
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 - 6 7 3.5 
(b) 2 - 11 13 6.5 
(c) - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 1 9 11 5.5 
(b) 7 2 19 28 14.0 
(c) 3 - 4 7 3.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 15 5 24 44 22.0 
(b) 31 1 29 61 30.5 
(c) 11 1 14 26 13.0 
TOTALS 71 10 116 197 98.5 
ABSTENTIONS 1 - 2 3 1.5 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 _ 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 36C 
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 5 1.7 20 10.0 
Fairly Important 49 16.3 46 23.0 
Very Important 233 77.7 131 65.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
TABLE 36d 
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 110 36.7 62 31.0 
Adequately " 134 44.7 102 51.0 
Poorly " 43 14.3 33 16.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
Job protection and redundancy have clearly become issues of 
great importance in the civil service. The security which 
was traditionally attached to civil service jobs is a thing 
of the past. 77.7 per cent of respondents in the lower 
grades and 65.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades 
considered job protection and avoiding redundancy to be 
"very important" i ssues. However, it is si gni f i cant that 
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more respondents in the higher grades felt that the issues 
were either "fairly important" or "not important" - 23 per 
cent and 10 per cent, compared with 16.3 per cent and 1.7 
per cent respectively. This may be interpreted as a greater 
sense of job security among the higher grades. But whether 
this is so in reality is doubtful. Arguably, the principle 
of "last in first out" may suggest that provided most people 
in the higher grades had progressed from lower grades they 
should be more secure in their jobs than those in the lower 
grades, since their length of service should be longer. This 
hypothesis is examined in the analyses below:-
TABLE 36e 
ANALYSIS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE AND GRADES 
LENGTH OF SERVICE LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE I II III IV 
Under 1 year . 2 4 - 4 10 3.3 
Over 1 " 2 years 6 6 2 11 25 8.3 
i . 2 " 5 " 9 13 4 18 44 14.7 
" 5 " 10 " 20 44 6 43 113 37.7 
11 years & over 9 29 25 44 107 35.7 
Totals 46 96 37 120 299 99.7 
Abstentions - - - 1 1 -
Sample 46 96 37 121 300 — 
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TABLE 36f 
ANALYSIS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE AND GRADES 
LENGTH OF SERVICE HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE V VI VII 
Under 1 year 1 - 9 10 5.0 
Over 1 " 2 years 8 - 10 18 9.0 
it 2 " 5 " 8 2 21 31 15.5 
5 " 10 " 19 2 39 60 30.0 
11 years & over 36 6 39 81 30.5 
Totals 72 10 118 200 -
Abstentions - - - - -
Sample 72 
======== 
10 118 200 -
ANALYSIS 
TABLE 36a 
BY AGE GROUP AND GRADES 
AGE GROUP LOWER GRADES TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE I II III IV 
Under 21 years 3 - - - 3 1.0 
21 - 30 11 39 6 30 86 28.7 
31-40 9 24 14 67 114 38.0 
41-50 11 17 13 17 58 19.3 
51 years & over 12 16 14 7 39 13.0 
Totals 46 96 37 121 300 = 
Abstentions _ _ _ 
Sample 46 96 37 121 300 
1 
TABLE 36h 
ANALYSIS BY ARE GROUP AND GRADES 
AGE GROUP HIGHER GRADES TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE V VI VII 
Under 21 years - - - - -
21 - 30 " 13 3 16 32 16.0 
31 - 40 " 39 5 57 101 50.5 
41 - 50 " 13 1 29 43 21.5 
51 years & over 6 1 16 23 11.5 
Totals 71 10 118 199 99.5 
Abstentions 1 - - 1 -
Sample 72 10 118 200 -
The above analyses indicate that there was no respondent in 
the higher grades under 21 years old. In both the lower and 
higher grades a larger percentage of respondents have been 
in service for more than 5 years. A slightly larger percen-
tage of the higher grades have been in service for 11 years 
and over - 40.5 per cent, compared with 35.7 per cent of the 
lower grades. However, the difference was not sufficient to 
account for the gap in the sense of security between the two 
groups. The analysis by age group and grades indicates that 
67.7 per cent of the lower grades were in the age group up 
to 40 years and 32.3 per cent were in the age group 41 years 
and over, compared with 66.5 per cent and 33 per cent resp-
ectively in the higher grades. Age distribution among the 
lower grades was approximately the same as in the higher 
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grades. It would seem that the number of respondents who 
progressed from lower to higher grades was not large enough 
to justify the assumption that longer service had any con-
nection with the higher grades' sense of job security. 
Therefore, the above hypothesis is false. 
Perhaps a more feasible explanation of the respondents in 
the higher grades being less concerned about protection of 
jobs and avoiding redundancy may be found in the Civil 
Service Department's policy of "natural wastage rather than 
redundancy". Civil servants in the higher grades are like 
statutory tenants. Where "natural wastage" applies, posts 
vacated through resignations, retirements, death, etc are 
not usually filled. The duties of those posts are redistri-
buted among existing staff. This may mean no more than extra 
work for those in similar grades in the vicinity but it 
reflects adversely on the lower grades as promotion oppor-
tunities are seriously curtailed. 
The views of both groups on how wel1 they were represented 
on the issues were not too widely apart. 36.7 per cent of 
the lower grades said they were well represented, 44.7 per 
cent said they were adequately represented and 14.3 per cent 
said they were poorly represented; this compares with 31, 51 
and 16.5 per cent respectively of the higher grades. On the 
basis of this comparison, 81.4 per cent of the lower grades 
and 82 per cent of the higher grades said they were either 
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"well" or "adequately" represented. The difference (0.6 per 
cent) is not significant. The issues of job protection and 
redundancy are very high on the agenda of the Trade Union 
Side and are usually debated vigorously at Whitley Coun-
cils . 3 The 14.3 and 16.5 per cent of the lower and higher 
grades respectively, who felt they were poorly represented 
reflect the success of the unions in avoiding escalation of 
redundancy and keeping as much as possible to the policy of 
"natural wastage." 
TABLE 37a 
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
T O T 1 a T % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV . U l A L 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 2 - 3 5 1.7 
(b) 5 4 2 4 15 5.0 
(c) 2 2 - 2 6 2.0 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 1 - 4 6 2.0 
(b) 6 15 3 35 59 19.7 
(c) 5 8 6 11 30 10.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 5 9 3 7 24 8.0 
(b) 10 30 13 30 83 27.6 
(c) 4 19 8 23 54 18.0 
TOTALS 38 90 35 119 282 94.0 
ABSTENTIONS 8 6 2 2 18 6.0 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
======= =========== ==== ========= ======= ====== ======== ======== 
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 37b 
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - - 2 1.0 
(b) 6 1 6 13 6.5 
(c) - - 1 1 0.5 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - 7 9 4.5 
(b) 25 - 23 48 24.0 
(c) 8 1 11 20 10.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 3 11 16 8.0 
(b) 12 3 23 38 19.0 
(c) 14 2 33 49 24.5 
TOTALS 71 10 115 196 98.0 
ABSTENTIONS 1 - 3 4 2.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
======= =========== ====== =============== ==—=== ======= ======== 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 37c 
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 26 8.7 16 8.0 
Fairly Important 95 31.7 77 38.5 
Very Important 161 53.6 103 51.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b) = % of Sample. 
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TABLE 373 
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wei1 Represented 35 11.7 27 13.5 
Adequately " 157 52.3 99 49.5 
Poorly " 90 30.0 70 35.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The percentage of respondents in the lower grades who felt 
career prospects issue was "not important" was about the 
same as in the higher grades - 8.7 and 8.0 per cent respect-
ively. More respondents in the higher grades felt it was 
"fairly important" - 38.5, compared with 31.7 per cent in 
the lower grades. But more respondents in the lower grades 
felt it was "very important" - 53.6, compared with 51.5 per 
cent of the higher grades. Although the majority of respon-
dents in both groups felt career prospects issue was "very 
important" the larger percentage of the lower grades who 
held this view can be expected. This is because more respon-
dents in higher grades should be at the top of their career, 
unlike those in lower grades, the majority of whom would 
continue to aspire for higher grades. 
There is no surprise in the fact that fewer respondents from 
both groups felt they were well represented - 11.7 and 13.5 
per cent respectively of the lower and higher grades. 52.3 
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and 49.5 per cent respectively, of the groups felt they were 
adequately represented. But as much as 30 and 35 per cent 
respectively felt they were poorly represented. These 
results reflect a general low morale in the civil service 
where career prospects are very much subject to the influ-
ence of the public funding system. The unions have an uphill 
task in their negotiations especially in view of the Treas-
ury's preemptive brief to cut spending to the limits of cash 
provided. Their endeavour to publicize their efforts 
achieves very little when members judge them by their 
failures rather than the amount of fight they have had to 
put up. A larger percentage of the higher grades felt they 
were poorly represented probably because a good number of 
them had lingered in their positions when they should have 
moved on higher. 
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TABLE 38a 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 4 1 3 10 3.3 
(b) 5 4 1 13 24 8.0 
(c) 6 1 2 4 13 4.3 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 6 3 3 13 4.3 
(b) 8 19 9 25 61 20.4 
(c) 1 4 1 11 17 5.7 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 7 19 3 24 53 17.7 
(b) 7 21 9 23 60 20.0 
(c) 2 10 5 13 30 10.0 
TOTALS 39 88 35 119 281 93.7 
ABSTENTIONS 7 8 2 2 19 6.3 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
======= =========== ==== ========= ======= === = = ========= ======== 
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 38b 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF -
REPRESEN 
TATION 
HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 4 - 3 7 3.5 
(b) 6 2 16 24 12.0 
(c) 1 - 5 6 3.0 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 4 13 19 9.5 
(b) 13 1 29 43 21.5 
(c) 2 - 13 15 7.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 12 2 11 25 12.5 
(b) 17 1 18 36 18.0 
(c) 12 - 9 21 10.5 
TOTALS 69 10 117 196 98.0 
ABSTENTIONS 3 - 1 4 2.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 38c 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 47 15.6 37 18.5 
Fairly Important 91 30.3 77 38.5 
Very Important 143 47.7 82 41.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 38d 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wei1 Represented 76 25.3 51 25.5 
Adequately " 145 48.3 103 51.5 
Poorly 60 20.0 42 21.0 
================== ========= ============= ========= ========== (a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
More respondents in the higher grades said that the intro-
duction of new technology issue was "not very important" -
18.5, compared with 15.6 per cent of the lower grades. 
Similarly, 38.5 per cent of the higher grades said it was 
"fairly important", compared with 30.3 per cent of the lower 
grades. These two results are consistent with the larger 
percentage of the lower grades who said it was "very impor-
tant" - 47.7, compared with 41 per cent of the higher 
grades. The results reflect the policy of the unions especi-
ally those which organized staff in lower grades at the time 
of the investigation, namely, to oppose the introduction of 
new technology unless it was pre-negotiated. Some unions 
opposed new technology "per se". The issue was evidently 
more important to the lower grades because main-frame 
computers which required the services of staff in those 
grades as operators, junior programmers and analysts, were 
becoming wide-spread. Nowadays, micro computers are avail-
able practically in every office, particularly for the use 
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of more senior staff. No additional pay was agreed for those 
who use this aspect of the new technology in the course of 
their normal duties. However, the unions were able to nego-
tiate sizable allowances for those employed mainly as opera-
tors, programmers and analysts. The views of both the lower 
and higher grades on the effectiveness of union representa-
tion were the same. It would be interesting to observe the 
reaction of the higher grades in the reality of having to 
use the new technology to cope with present day demands of 
their duties without any financial rewards. The new techno-
logy issue would be just as important to them now as it was 
to the lower grades in earlier years. 
Issues relating to "job protection and redundancy" appear to 
be the same as the issues relating to "defence of job secu-
rity" . A distinction is made here between the two aspects in 
order to achieve a thorough analysis. Aspects relating to 
"job protection" refer to the post, the actual position and 
aspects relating to "defending job security" in the follow-
ing tables refer to the person, the individual in the post. 
209 
TABLE 39a 
DEFENDING JOB SECURITY 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
P M P C C O F 
LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - - - -
(b) - 2 1 4 7 2.3 
(c) - - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 2 1 7 10 3.3 
(b) 2 9 5 19 35 11.7 
(c) 1 - 2 3 6 2.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 19 28 13 29 89 29.7 
(b) 14 40 8 43 105 35.0 
(c) 2 7 5 14 28 9.3 
TOTALS 38 88 35 119 280 93.3 
ABSTENTIONS 8 8 2 2 20 6.7 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 _ 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 39b 
DEFENDING JOB SECURITY 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - - -
(b) 2 - 15 17 8.5 
(c) 1 - 3 4 2.0 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 1 7 9 4.5 
(b) 11 - 25 36 18.0 
(c) - 1 3 4 2.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 18 6 16 40 20.0 
(b) 33 2 37 72 36.0 
(c) 6 - 9 15 7.5 
TOTALS 72 10 115 197 98.5 
ABSTENTIONS - - 3 3 1.5 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 39c 
DEFENDING JOB SECURITY 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 7 2.3 21 10.5 
Fairly Important 51 17.0 49 24.5 
Very Important 222 74.0 127 63.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 39d 
DEFENDING JOB SECURITY 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
O F 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
REPRESENTATION (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 99 33.0 49 24.5 
Adequately " 147 49.0 125 62.5 
Poorly " 34 11.3 23 11.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The results here are rather predictable. Both groups agreed 
by an overwhelming majority that defending job security was 
a "very important" issue. However, more respondents in the 
lower grades held this view: 74.0, compared with 63.5 per 
cent of the higher grades; thus corroborating earlier 
results (cf. Table 36a et seq.) Another interpretation of 
this result should be considered. Because the number of 
posts in the lower grades is usually by far larger than 
those in the higher grades and sometimes the duties of the 
lower grade posts are not as involved as those of the higher 
grade posts, cuts are more likely to be focused among the 
lower grade posts. It is therefore feasible that the incum-
bents of the lower grade posts feel the full rigours of job 
losses long before it is felt by the incumbents of the 
higher grade posts. As on tables 36c and 36d (cf.), more 
respondents of the higher grades felt that "defending job 
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security" was either "not very important" or "fairly impor-
tant" , 10.5 and 24.5 per cent respectively, compared with 
2.3 and 17.0 per cent of the lower grades. 
Respondents' views regarding representation on this issue 
almost replicates the views expressed on the issues of job 
protection and redundancy. On the issue of defending job 
security, 82 per cent of the lower grades said they were 
either well or adequately represented, compared with 87 per 
cent of the higher grades. 11.3 per cent of the lower grades 
said they were poorly represented, compared with 11.5 per 
cent of the higher grades. On the issues of job protection 
and redundancy, 81.4 per cent of the lower grades said they 
were either well or adequately represented, compared with 82 
per cent of the higher grades. 14.3 per cent of the lower 
grades said they were poorly represented, compared with 16.5 
per cent of the higher grades. 
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TABLE 40a 
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
LOWER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 2 - - 2 0.7 
(b) 1 - - 1 2 0.7 
(C) - - 1 - 1 0.3 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 7 1 13 22 7.3 
(t>) 3 19 5 29 56 18.7 
(c) - 1 3 3 7 2.3 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 20 18 11 27 76 25.3 
(b) 14 36 8 28 86 28.7 
(c) - - - - -
TOTALS 39 83 29 101 252 84.0 
ABSTENTIONS 7 13 8 20 48 16.0 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 40b 
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - 1 1 0.5 
(b) 3 - 7 10 5.0 
(c) - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 3 - 8 11 5.5 
(b) 16 2 33 51 25.5 
(c) 4 - 7 11 5.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 14 7 13 34 17.0 
(b) 28 1 31 60 30.0 
(c) - - - - -
TOTALS 68 10 100 178 89.0 
ABSTENTIONS 4 - 18 22 11.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 40c 
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 5 1.7 11 5.5 
Fairly Important 85 28.3 73 36.5 
Very Important 162 54.0 94 47.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 40d 
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 100 33.3 46 23.0 
Adequately " 144 48.0 121 60.5 
Poorly " 8 2.7 11 5.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The views of both groups diverge very widely on the above 
issue. In the lower grades group a smaller percentage of 
respondents felt working conditions were either "not very 
important" or "fairly important" issues - 1.7 and 28.3 per 
cent respectively, compared with 5.5 and 36.5 per cent of 
the higher grades. From this, it would seem that the higher 
grades were not as concerned about working conditions as the 
lower grades. Hence, more respondents in the lower grades 
said that working conditions issues were "very important11 -
54, compared with 47 per cent of the higher grades. This 
result reflects the reality of superior furnishings and 
sometimes ornate environs of the offices of higher grade 
civil servants. The stipulation of minimum standards in 
offices as part of the health and safety regulations is 
arguably to protect the working conditions of lower grade 
staff who are sometimes obliged to work under intolerable 
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conditions. The local branch of each union usually appoints 
a health and safety representative from among its members to 
look after their interests. As the results of "effectiveness 
of representation" show, the unions keep a watchful eye on 
standards despite the fact that sometimes only those health 
and safety officers representing lower grades show interest 
and are more active.4 Those representing higher grades often 
do not take part in the usual official activities, for 
instance, periodic inspection of office premises. Both 
groups agree however, that they were "well" or "adequately" 
represented - 81.3 and 83.5 per cent, compared with 2,7 and 
5.5 per cent respectively who said they were poorly repre-
sented. 
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TABLE 41a 
PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg.Transfers. Promotions 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
C M F C C Ol? 
LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
Ci.Pl £ . 0 0 U r -
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 - - 2 3 1.0 
<b) 4 2 5 4 15 5.0 
(c) 1 - 1 - 2 0.7 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 6 4 18 30 10.0 
(b) 5 17 6 27 55 18.3 
(c) 1 9 - 3 13 4.3 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 11 20 7 30 68 22.7 
(b) 8 25 8 25 66 22.0 
(c) 8 10 4 9 31 10.3 
TOTALS 41 89 35 118 283 94.3 
ABSTENTIONS 5 7 2 3 17 5.7 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 _ 
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 41b 
PERSONAL PROBLEMS feg.Transfers. Promotions etc.) 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - 7 9 4.5 
(b) 2 - 8 10 5.0 
(C) - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 7 2 13 22 11.0 
(b) 17 1 19 37 18.5 
(c) 5 - 5 10 5.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 17 2 35 54 27.0 
(b) 16 3 20 39 19.5 
(c) 6 2 10 18 9.0 
TOTALS 72 10 117 199 99.5 
ABSTENTIONS - - 1 1 0.5 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 41c 
PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg.Transfers. Promotions etc.1 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 20 6.7 19 9.5 
Fairly Important 98 32.7 69 34.5 
Very Important 165 55.0 111 55.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 4Id 
PERSONAL PROBLEMS feg.Transfers. Promotions etc.1 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 101 33.7 85 42.5 
Adequately " 136 45.3 86 43.0 
Poorly " 46 15.3 28 14.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b) = % of Sample. 
The hypothesis that the higher the grade of an individual 
the less is he likely to have personal problems in connect-
ion width his work, is tested in the above analysis. This 
hypothesis assumes that because staff in higher grades are 
usually members of management they are not 1 ikely to have 
quarrels with the establishment, being themselves represent-
atives of the establishment as far as the rest of the staff 
are concerned. On the basis of the above results this hypo-
thesis is untenable. Both groups have more or less the same 
views about the importance of issues concerning personal 
problems. 55.5 per cent of the higher grades said the issues 
were "very important", 34.5 per cent said they were "fairly 
important" and 9.5 per cent said they were "not very 
important". These results compare with those of the lower 
grades where 55 per cent said the issues were "very impor-
tant", 32.6 per cent said they were "fairly important" and 
6.7 per cent said they were "not very important". The slight 
difference between the two sets of results is accounted for 
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by the number of abstentions - 5.7 per cent of the lower 
grades abstained, compared with only 0.5 per cent of the 
higher grades, an indication that the higher grades took the 
issues more seriously. This can be so, not because of some 
ideological reasons, for instance, the "them and us" kind of 
situation, but because individuals in the higher grades have 
themselves had personal problems. The proof of this is in 
the results of the other half of the question - "how 
effectively does your union represent you on these issues?". 
85.5 per cent of the higher grades said they were either 
well or adequately represented, compared with 79 per cent of 
the lower grades. Only 14 per cent of the higher grades said 
they were poorly represented, compared with 15.3 per cent of 
the lower grades. This shows that the unions do a very good 
job to afford their members with strong representation on 
these issues. 
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TABLE 42a 
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 1 - - 1 0.3 
(b) 4 5 - 6 15 5.0 
(c) 1 2 - 5 8 2.7 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 1 1 9 11 3.7 
(b) 8 16 5 24 53 17.7 
(c) 3 8 2 21 34 11.3 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 6 5 - 2 13 4.3 
(b) 11 29 15 28 83 27.7 
(c) 10 25 12 22 69 23.0 
TOTALS 43 92 35 117 287 95.7 
ABSTENTIONS 3 4 2 4 13 4.3 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
======= ========== ====== = = = = = = = = ======= = = = — = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 42b 
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - - - - -
(b) 5 - 3 8 4.0 
(C) 1 - 4 5 2.5 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 - 3 4 2.0 
(b) 26 1 23 50 25.0 
(c) 11 1 16 28 14.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 1 6 9 4.5 
(b) 15 3 26 44 22.0 
(c) 9 4 33 46 23.0 
TOTALS 70 10 114 194 97.0 
ABSTENTIONS 2 - 4 6 3.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 _ 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adeguately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 42c 
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 24 8.0 13 6.5 
Fairly Important 98 32.7 82 41.0 
Very Important 165 55.0 99 49.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 42d 
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 25 8.3 13 6.5 
Adequately " 151 50.3 102 51.0 
Poorly " 111 37.0 79 39.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
The issue of job satisfaction is more involved than it may 
seem. Most civil service jobs are repetitive and boring, 
particularly, jobs in the lower grades, where a lot more 
effort is needed in order to concentrate. The results above 
confirm this fact. Only 8 per cent of the lower grades and 
6.5 per cent of the higher grades said that ensuring job 
satisfaction was "not" a very important issue. 55 per cent 
of the lower grades and 49.5 per cent of the higher grades 
said it was "very important". But 32.7 per cent of the lower 
grades said it was "fairly important", compared with 41 per 
cent of the higher grades. In general, staff in lower grades 
are more likely to tolerate lack of job satisfaction than 
staff in higher grades. How do unions ensure job satisfact-
ion in an environment severely pressured by cash limits? An 
answer to this question would be very hard to come by. It is 
therefore understandable that only 8.3 per cent of-the lower 
grades and 16.5 per cent of the higher grades felt they were 
well represented on the issue. 37 and 39.5 per cent respect-
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ively said they were poorly represented. The 50.3 and 51 per 
cent of the lower and higher grades who said representation 
was adequate and the minority who felt they were well repre-
sented obviously understood the unions' predicament in the 
matter. 
TABLE 43a 
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
F U T T Q C fW 
LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 3 - 4 7 2.3 
(b) 4 5 3 10 22 7.3 
(c) - - - 2 2 0.7 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 6 2 8 18 6.0 
(b) 10 18 6 29 63 21.0 
(c) 1 2 1 2 6 2.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 13 26 9 33 81 27.0 
(b) 7 29 11 23 70 23.3 
(c) 5 2 3 7 17 5.7 
TOTALS 42 91 35 118 286 95.3 
ABSTENTIONS 4 5 2 3 14 4.7 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 _ 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 43b 
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV 
ENESS OF • 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - 5 7 3.5 
(b) 7 - 13 20 10.0 
(c) - - 1 1 0.5 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 5 2 16 23 11.5 
(b) 14 1 28 43 21.5 
(c) 5 - 2 7 3.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 22 4 24 50 25.0 
(b) 14 1 18 33 16.5 
(c) 3 2 5 10 5.0 
TOTALS 72 10 112 194 97.0 
ABSTENTIONS - - 6 6 3.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
= = = = = = = ; ========== ======= ================ = = === ======= ======== 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 43c 
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
O F 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
ISSUE (a) ( b ) (a) ( b ) 
Not Very Important 31 10.3 28 14.0 
Fairly Important 87 29.0 73 36.5 
Very Important 168 56.0 93 46.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 43d 
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wei1 Represented 106 35.3 80 40.0 
Adequately " 155 51.7 96 48.0 
Poorly 25 8.3 18 9.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
As shown in the analyses of tables 41(a-d) q.v., problems in 
employment are not peculiar to lower grades only. Staff in 
higher grades are also liable to have problems. There is 
however, a difference between the problems under considera-
tion here and those dealt with in table 41. The problems 
envisaged here are those which could lead to dismissal and 
those referred to in table 41 are those which could lead to 
resignation; nevertheless, they are equally important, for 
both dismissal and resignation mean that one is out of job. 
The fact that staff in lower grades are more likely to have 
disciplinary and grievance problems is reflected in the 
above analysis. 56 per cent of the lower grades said that 
issues relating to disciplinary and grievance problems were 
very important, compared with 46.5 per cent of the higher 
grades. 39.3 per cent of the lower grades said that the 
issues were either "not very important" or "fairly import-
ant", compared with 50.5 per cent of the higher grades. The 
frequent occurrence of these problems is a constant reminder 
227 
to the unions and an unquestionable indication that the 
situation has not changed since the early days when the 
search for redress necessitated their inception. 8.3 and 9.0 
per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively felt 
they were poorly represented; this is expected. 
TABLE 44a 
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 4 5 3 9 21 7.0 
(b) 7 18 5 47 77 25.7 
(c) - 3 1 9 13 4.3 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 4 3 3 3 13 4.3 
(b) 8 22 8 19 57 19.0 
(c) 1 4 1 6 12 4.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 4 7 6 2 19 6.3 
(b) 9 18 3 13 43 14.4 
(c) 4 5 4 6 19 6.3 
TOTALS 41 85 34 114 274 91.3 
ABSTENTIONS 5 11 3 7 26 8.7 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 -
======= =========== = = = = : ========= ======= ======= ======= ======== 
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 44b 
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 3 - 5 8 4.0 
(b) 24 2 37 63 31.5 
(c) 3 1 7 11 5.5 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 - 8 10 5.0 
(b) 19 3 22 44 22.0 
(c) 6 - 11 17 8.5 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 1 4 6 3.0 
(b) 5 2 12 19 9.5 
(c) 6 1 7 14 7.0 
TOTALS 69 10 113 192 96.0 
ABSTENTIONS 3 - 5 8 4.0 
SAMPLE 72 10 118 200 -
(a)=Wel1 Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 44c 
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 111 37.0 82 41.0 
Fairly Important 82 27.3 71 35.5 
Very Important 81 27.0 39 19.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 44<3 
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Well Represented 53 17.7 24 12.0 
Adequately " 177 59.0 126 63.0 
Poorly " 44 14.6 42 21.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
Early retirement has been a contentious issue between staff 
and employer on the one hand and between unions and their 
members on the other. Lowering the retirement age in the 
civil service is seen by employees as a ploy. They regard it 
as one of the inevitable consequences of "cash limits". The 
unions on the other hand welcome it as a remedy for the ever 
increasing unemployment. However much the unions advocate a 
lower retirement age, it is not appreciated by members who 
frequently plead with the management for an extension of 
service. Staff in lower grades who are able to furnish 
cogent reasons, usually economic, are allowed to stay on an 
additional year, may be two. Higher grade staff are some-
times re-employed in lower grades if they so desire or hired 
on short term contracts as consultants. Significantly, the 
unions are never involved in these arrangements. 
In the above analysis, only 19.5 per cent of the higher 
grades and 27 per cent of the lower grades said the issue 
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was "very important". 76.5 per cent of the higher grades and 
64.3 per cent of the lower grades said it was either "not 
very important" or "fairly important". Views on the effect-
iveness of representation have to be more on the positive 
side. 76.5 per cent of the lower grades and 75 per cent of 
the higher grades said they were either "well" or "adequate-
ly represented. 14.6 and 21 per cent respectively of the 
lower and higher grades said they were "poorly" represented. 
TABLE 45a 
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV LOWER GRADES 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
I II III IV 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) - 1 1 6 8 2.7 
(b) 1 10 2 14 27 9.0 
(c) - - - - - -
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 2 3 3 9 17 5.7 
(b) 5 18 5 29 57 19.0 
(c) 2 2 - - 4 1.3 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 10 15 8 21 54 18.0 
(b) 16 34 11 29 90 30.0 
(c) 5 7 5 8 25 8.3 
TOTALS 41 90 35 116 282 94.0 
ABSTENTIONS 5 6 2 5 18 • 6.0 
SAMPLE 46 96 37 121 300 — 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = : = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
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TABLE 45b 
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADES 
IMPOR 
TANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
EFFECTIV HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL % OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) 
REPRESEN 
TATION 
V VI VII 
NOT 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 1 - 2 3 1.5 
(b) 5 - 8 13 6.5 
(c) 2 - - 2 1.0 
FAIR 
LY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 5 - 6 11 5.5 
(b) 21 2 28 51 25.5 
(c) 1 - 5 6 3.0 
VERY 
IMPOR 
TANT 
(a) 11 4 23 38 19.0 
(b) 16 3 32 51 25.5 
(c) 7 1 10 18 9.0 
TOTALS 69 10 114 193 96.5 
ABSTENTIONS 3 - 4 7 3.5 
SAMPLE 72 id 118 200 -
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented; 
(c)=Poorly Represented. 
TABLE 45c 
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
IMPORTANCE 
OF 
ISSUE 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Not Very Important 35 11.7 18 9.0 
Fairly Important 78 26.0 68 34.0 
Very Important 169 56.3 107 53.5 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
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TABLE 4 SO-
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF 
REPRESENTATION 
LOWER GRADES HIGHER GRADES 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Wei1 Represented 79 26.3 52 26.0 
Adequately " 174 58.0 115 57.5 
Poorly " 29 9.7 26 13.0 
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample. 
One of the main reasons for attributing security to civil 
service jobs was the automatic right to non-contributory 
pens i on whi ch was uni que to government employees. Today, 
pensions are universal. Even private firms and self employed 
individuals set up pension schemes for themselves and their 
employees. The government is no longer the only employer who 
gives its employees non-contributory pensions. Government 
pensions, when calculated from very poor civil service pay 
are so meagre they are hardly worth looking forward to. 
Nevertheless, the so-called free pension scheme had been 
under considerable attack since the turn of the century, 
having been cited by some Whitehall oracles as a good enough 
reason for keeping civil service pay very low. This problem 
is reflected in the above analyses. Only 11.7 per cent of 
the lower grades and 9 per cent of the higher grades said 
overall pension entitlement was "not very important". 82.3 
and 87.5 per cent of the lower and higher grades respect-
ively, said it was either "fairly" or "very important". A 
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significant change has occurred in this aspect of the civil 
service industrial relations. Civil servants are no longer 
complacent about the security of their jobs or indeed about 
their automatic right to free pensions. "The Civil service 
Unions have been very vigilant and have maintained their 
strong resistance against a forced proletarianisation of 
their members."^ The majority of respondents agree that 
union representation on this issue is effective. 84.3 and 
83.5 of respondents in the lower and the higher grades 
respectively said they were either "well or adequately" 
represented, compared with only 9.7 and 13 per cent who said 
they were "poorly" represented. 
Tables 34a to 45d analysed respondents' views on the import-
ance of some fundamental workplace issues and the effective-
ness of their union representation on those issues. The 
results indicated to some degree certain changes which have 
occurred since the turn of the century. But it was necessary 
to measure how those changes have affected morale in the 
civil service. Respondents were therefore further asked to 
express their views on selected aspects of workplace indust-
rial relations. The views expresses were analysed in the 
following tables:-
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TABLE 46 
VIEWS ON MANAGEMENT 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES U ) (y) 
I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 4 7 2 3 16 5.3 2 1 6 9 4.5 
(b) 17 19 6 32 74 24.7 12 5 28 45 22.5 
(c) 12 31 12 41 96 32.0 31 3 44 78 39.0 
(d) 11 28 13 32 84 28.0 19 1 28 48 24.0 
(e) 2 10 4 13 29 9.7 8 - 11 19 9.5 
(f) 46 95 37 121 299 99.7 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) - 1 - - 1 0.3 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
The first point to be made here is that the views analysed 
above refer to local management and not to the Government as 
employer, although local management can be just as good or 
bad as the Government since it would be implementing govern-
ment policy. It was interesting to observe how respondents 
in higher grades some of whom were themselves managers 
expressed views similar to those expressed by respondents in 
lower grades. 9.5 per cent of the higher grades felt their 
management was "very bad" and 24 per cent felt they were 
"bad", compared with 9.7 and 28 per cent of the lower 
grades. 27 per cent of the higher grades and 30 per cent of 
the lower grades said it was either "good" or" very good" 
and 39 per cent of the higher grades compared with 32 per 
235 
cent of the lower grades said it was "fair". This means that 
as much as 62 per cent of the lower grades and 66 per cent 
of the higher grades felt their management was either not 
"bad" or not "very bad". In that respect, morale could be 
interpreted as high. 
TABLE 47 
VIEWS ON PAY 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES W (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 1 - - 1 2 0.7 - - 1 1 0.5 
(b) 7 12 7 7 33 11.0 4 1 11 16 8.0 
(c) 11 29 14 34 88 29.3 18 4 38 60 30.0 
(d) 18 37 10 52 117 39.0 39 3 52 94 47.0 
(e) 8 17 6 24 55 18.3 11 2 14 27 13.5 
(f) 45 95 37 118 295 98.3 72 10 116 198 99.0 
(g) 1 1 - 3 5 1.7 - - 2 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)-Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
In an earlier analysis, pay was shown to be a very important 
issue (cf. tables 34 [c-d]). In the above analysis, the role 
of pay as an indicator of morale is unmistakable. Morale may 
be regarded as "very high" if most respondents felt that pay 
was very good, "high" if most respondents felt it was good 
and "low" if most respondents felt it was bad. Only .7 per 
cent of respondents in the lower grades and .5 per cent of 
the higher grades felt that pay was "very good". As much as 
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39 per cent of the lower grades and 47 per cent of the 
higher grades felt it was "bad"; 18.3 per cent of the lower 
grades and 13.5 per cent of the higher grades felt it was 
" very bad". 11 per cent of the 1 ower grades and 8 per cent 
of the higher grades felt it was "good". 29.3 and 30 per 
cent respectively, felt it was "fair". By the above defini-
tion morale may be regarded as low rather that very low. 
Along the hierarchy, morale may be regarded as lower in the 
higher grades than in the lower grades. 60.5 per cent of the 
higher grades said pay was either "bad" or "very bad", 
compared with 57.3 per cent of the lower grades. The result 
reflects the constant conf1ict between the Government and 
its employees. 
TABLE 48a 
VIEWS ON WORKING CONDITIONS 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 4 5 2 7 18 6.0 4 1 8 13 6.5 
(b) 16 30 2 28 76 25.3 14 5 37 56 28.0 
(c) 21 38 18 55 132 44.0 39 4 49 92 46.0 
(d) 3 16 7 26 52 17.3 9 - 18 27 13.5 
(e) 1 4 8 4 17 5.7 6 - 5 11 5.5 
(f) 45 93 37 120 295 98.3 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) 1 3 - 1 5 1.7 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
====== === ====== ======= = = = == = = = ===== = = = = = = = = ==== == = = ====== 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
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The consensus of both the lower and higher grades on issues 
relating to working conditions was that they were important 
and that union representation on the issues was effective:-
TABLE 48b 
WORKING CONDITIONS fcf. table 40rc-d11 
IMPORTANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION 
VIEWS LG% HG% VIEWS LG% HG% 
Very Important 54.0 47.0 Well Represented 33.3 23.0 
Fairly " 28.3 36.5 Adequately " 48.0 60.5 
Total 82.3 83.5 Total 81.3 83.5 
LG=Lower Grades; HG= Higher Grades. 
From that result it could be inferred that working condi-
tions were generally good. The views analysed in table 48a 
above support this inference but not equally along the 
grades. For example, 0.2 per cent more respondents in the 
lower grades said working conditions were very bad. 3.8 per 
cent more respondents in the same grades said they were bad, 
whereas 0.5 per cent more respondents in the higher grades 
said they were very good; 2.7 per cent more respondents in 
the same grades said they we re good and 2 per cent more i n 
the same grades said they were fair. 23 per cent of the 
lower grades, compared with 19 per cent of the higher grades 
said working conditions were either bad or very bad, whereas 
80.5 per cent of the higher grades, compared with 75.3 per 
cent of the lower grades said they were either "very good", 
"good" or "fair". The 5.2 per cent difference indicates that 
working conditions were better for the higher grades. 
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TABLE 49 
VIEWS ON PROMOTION PROSPECTS 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) - - - 1 1 0.4 - 2 1 3 1.5 
(b) 4 11 3 7 25 8.3 3 - 9 12 6.0 
(c) 16 28 13 34 91 30.3 16 3 47 66 33.0 
<d) 10 30 15 47 102 34.0 26 3 38 67 33.5 
(e) 15 25 6 31 77 25.7 27 2 20 49 24.5 
(f) 45 94 37 120 296 98.7 72 10 115 197 98.5 
(g) 1 2 - 1 4 1.3 - - 3 3 1.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
======= = = = : ====== ======= = = = : === = = ====== ==== = ==== == === = === ====== 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f )=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
More respondents across the grades felt promotion prospects 
were bad or very bad - 59.7 per cent of the lower grades and 
58 per cent of the higher grades. The views of both groups 
were not significantly different. On the other hand, only 
0.4 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 1.5 per cent 
of the higher grades felt promotion prospects were very 
good. 38.6 per cent of the lower grades, compared wi th 39 
per cent of the higher grades felt they were either "good" 
or "fair". Although the difference is negligible, the result 
does indicate that promotions within the groups were more 
frequent than promotions across the groups, that is, from 
lower to higher grades. 
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TABLE 50 
VIEWS ON TRADE UNION FACILITIES 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 13 9 2 10 34 11.3 6 2 9 17 8.5 
(b) 13 35 11 39 98 32.7 30 2 41 73 36.5 
(c) 16 41 20 48 125 41.7 29 4 49 82 41.0 
(d) 2 5 4 15 26 8.6 5 - 13 18 9.0 
(e) 1 3 - 8 12 4.0 2 1 5 8 4.0 
(f) 45 93 37 120 295 98.3 72 9 117 198 99.0 
(g) 1 3 - 1 5 1.7 - 1 1 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
====== = = = : ====== ======= = = =: === = = ====== = = = = = = = = = ==== === = ====== 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f )=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)^Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
A difference between the views expressed by the two groups 
on the subject of trade union facilities was not likely, 
insofar as the management was not likely to give more or 
better facilities to one group in the same establishment. 
Facility time given for union business is not usually a 
matter of discretion; the rules prescribe a minimum length 
of time beyond which any extra time needs to be justified by 
the individuals. Only 12.6 per cent of the lower grades and 
13 per cent of the higher grades felt that trade union 
facilities were "bad" or "very bad". The percentage of those 
who said they were "very good", "good" or "fair" was 
consistent with the government policy which tended to 
encourage rather than discourage trade union activities in 
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its establishments, except at the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) dealt with below. 
TABLE 51 
VIEWS ON UNION/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 9 9 3 11 32 10.7 4 2 8 14 7.0 
(b) 15 30 9 39 93 31.0 26 4 46 76 38.0 
(c) 19 47 16 53 135 45.0 32 3 43 78 39.0 
(d) 1 5 5 12 23 7.6 9 1 12 22 11.0 
(e) 1 4 4 6 15 5.0 1 - 7 8 4.0 
(f) 45 95 37 121 298 99.3 72 10 116 198 99.0 
(g) 1 1 - - 2 0.7 - - 2 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad; 
(f )=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample; 
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample. 
The relationship between the trade unions and management in 
any establishment is governed by many factors; for example, 
how forthright the management is and the degree of aggress-
iveness of local and full time officials. A management that 
is unable to handle change would always have an uneasy rela-
tionship with the trade unions unless the union representa-
tives are "yes-men", whose main objective is to "feather 
their own nests". In the above analysis only a small percen-
tage of respondents said that relations were either "bad" or 
"very bad" - 12.6 and 15 per cent of the lower and higher 
grades respectively. This is by no means an indication that 
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the management of all the establishments sampled were forth-
right or that the trade union representatives were all "yes-
men". For instance, the 86.7 per cent of the lower grades 
and the 84 per cent of the higher grades who felt their 
re1ationship with management was not "bad" or "very bad" 
were made up of 10.7 per cent of the lower grades and 7 per 
cent of the higher grades who maintained that relations were 
"very good", 31 per cent of the lower grades and 38 per cent 
of the higher grades who said relations were "good" and 45 
per cent of the lower grades and 39 per cent of the higher 
grades who said relations were "fair". 
UNORGANISED CONFLICT 
The survey examined some manifestations of personal and un-
organised conflict. In question 22, respondents were asked 
to identify from a specified list, which personal actions 
they had taken as a direct result of the unrest between 
their unions and their employer: 
Relation between the CSD as employer and the civil 
service unions has been less than satisfactory in 
recent years. This question is to assess the degree of 
passiveness or militancy on the part of individual 
members in view of the employer' s tough stance. Since 
absolute confidentiality is guaranteed, please answer 
this question regardless of what is politic. What we 
need here is your own personal reaction.. . . 
Due to your union's inability to negotiate successfully 
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with your employer (including, where applicable, nego-
tiations at branch level), which of the following 
personal actions have you taken? 
An attempt was made here to discover how individuals exp-
ressed their frustration. The replies were analysed in two 
dimensions:-
1. To compare the degree of individual militancy or 
passiveness among active union members, that is, 
branch officers, with that of other ordinary 
members. 
2. To observe the influence of grade on the actions 
taken. 
TABLE 51 
ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT 
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS 
ACTIONS TAKEN (a) (b)% (c) (d)% (e) (f)% 
Work to rule 170 50.3 63 38.9 233 46.6 
Overtime ban 222 65.7 76 46.9 298 59.6 
Sabotage 18 5.3 2 1.2 20 4.0 
Sick absences 45 13.3 12 7.4 57 11.4 
Work with less or 
no enthusiasm 181 53.6 70 43.2 251 50.2 
Lateness 38 11.2 9 5.5 47 9.4 
Actively looking 
for another job 108 32.0 44 27.2 152 30.4 
No action at all 51 15.1 46 28.4 97 19.4 
(a)=Local Union Officers;(b)=% of 
ry Members; (d)=% of Sample(n=162; 
Sample(n=338) ; 
(e)=(a)+(c); 
(c) 
(f) = 
=0rdina-
%of(a+c) 
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Predictably, a larger percentage of union activists partici-
pated in each of the actions and most of them took a combi-
nation of two or more actions. On the other hand, a larger 
percentage of ordinary members took "no action at all" -
28.4 per cent, compared with 15.1 per cent union activists. 
An interpretation of this is that branch officers are more 
militant than ordinary members. This result is corroborated 
by previous evidence (cf. tables 30e and 31b) 
A total of 80.6 per cent of the respondents, activists and 
ordinary members took one or more of the specified actions; 
the 19.4 per cent who said they took no action are regarded 
as passive. This high degree of mi 1itancy portrays hidden 
discontent which may be interpreted in terms of low morale 
in the civil service. "Work to rules" and "overtime bans" 
are often instigated by the unions and are seen as official 
industrial action in those circumstances. However, together 
with the other specified actions they are being considered 
here as unofficial, that is, spontaneous action. 
Elimination of overtime has always been an official policy 
of the unions. Nevertheless, most members, including branch 
officers, do overtime in order to supplement their income.^ 
Therefore, the fact that a significant percentage of respon-
dents, an overall 59.6 per cent, spontaneously abandoned it, 
provides yet another evidence of low morale. 
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The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 
Sabotage as: 
Malicious or wanton destruction, especially, doing 
damage to plant etc by workmen on bad terms with their 
employers. 
The Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary gives an addi-
tional dimension to this definition: 
action taken to prevent the achievement of any aim. 
Sabotage, featuring malicious or wanton destruction, was 
clearly not envisaged in the context of the above question. 
It is unlikely and there is no evidence that civil servants 
vent their frustration by destroying government property; 
for if this were the case, government buildings and property 
all over the country would be in a perpetual state of wreck-
age, judging from the degree of low morale already evidenced 
in this survey. It is more feasible that individuals would 
rather take action to prevent or delay the achievement of 
certain management objectives. The survey indicates that a 
small percentage of employees have from time to time 
resorted to this form of industrial action. 
The survey also indicates that a small percentage of respon-
dents have sometimes resorted to sick absence and lateness. 
This should not be interpreted to mean that individuals have 
stayed away from work pretending to sick or that they have 
deliberately gone to work late. As a respondent explained: 
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It is rather a question of effort. A person may stay 
away from work because he really feels unwell whereas 
he would have gone to work if he had made a little more 
effort. Similarly, he may find himself behind time on a 
particular morning not because he had planned to be 
late; then he may decide not to hurry. The frustrations 
he had suffered at work had sapped the will-power he 
needed to cope with those occasions. 
A significant number of respondents said they worked with 
less Or no enthusiasm and others said they were actively 
looking for another job. This is yet again another confirm-
ation of the low morale hypothesis. 
If each of the actions specified above fits within the wider 
and more comprehensive definition of sabotage, that is, 
"action taken to prevent the achievement of any aim", the 
result of the above analysis conclusively proves that the 
government has created a large population of frustrated 
workforce who from time to time express their frustrations 
in sabotage. 
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TABLE 53a.ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
ACTIONS LOWER GRADES 
TOTAL 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=300) I II III IV 
Work to rule 24 43 20 60 147 49.0 
Overtime ban 19 69 26 70 184 61.3 
Sabotage 2 4 2 3 11 3.6 
Sick absences 7 11 6 20 44 14.6 
Work with less or no 
enthusiasm 16 49 15 70 150 50.0 
Lateness 1 9 4 15 29 9.7 
Actively looking 
for another job 9 31 7 36 85 28.3 
No action at all 20 14 4 21 59 19.7 
TABLE 53b.ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
ACTIONS HIGHER GRADES 
TOTAL 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
(N=200) V VI VII 
Work to rule 48 1 37 86 43.0 
Overtime ban 57 2 55 114 57.0 
Sabotage 4 1 4 9 4.5 
Sick absences 6 - 7 13 6.5 
Work with less or no 
enthusiasm 40 5 56 101 50.5 
Lateness 9 1 8 18 9.0 
Actively looking 
for another job 27 3 37 67 33.5 
No action at all 8 4 26 38 19.0 
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The above analyses show that members of the lower grades 
suffer frustrations just as much as members of the higher 
grades. However, taking the actions singly, significantly 
more respondents in the lower grades said they worked to 
rule, boycotted overtime and took sick leave; more respon-
dents in the higher grades said they were actively looking 
for another job. The action most taken by both groups was 
overtime ban. Approximately 50 per cent of the respondents 
said they worked with less enthusiasm and about 46 per cent 
said they had worked to rule. These figures not only empha-
size the point already made about low morale, they provide 
an alternative view of militancy along the hierarchy. 
Whereas earlier analyses had indicated greater propensity to 
militancy among the higher grades (cf. tables 19b, 19c, 20a, 
and 25a et seq.) the above analyses indicate that the higher 
grades are more likely to take part in collective action 
rather than in individual and spontaneous action. 
A larger percentage of respondents in the higher grades said 
they were actively looking for other jobs. This was probably 
because they had more qualifications and wider experience 
than respondents in the lower grades and were therefore more 
mobile. 
A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the higher 
grades said they resorted to sabotage. In the light of the 
above definition members in higher grades have more capacity 
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to influence corporate objectives. The efforts of members in 
lower grades to prevent or retard the achievement of overall 
workplace objective would be less effective because of the 
importance of their position relative to those of the higher 
grades. However, it is debatable which of the two groups has 
more negative power. 
The higher percentage of respondents in the lower grades who 
said they resorted to sick absences was consistent with the 
fact that jobs in the lower grades are more boring than 
those of the higher grades. 
Question 23 focuses on personal accidents and injuries sust-
ained at work. The assumption here was that accidents at 
work could reflect conflict and therefore a probability of 
direct link with frustration. No one would deliberately 
cause an accident either for himself or for others, but 
frustration at work may lead to carefree attitude with a 
high risk of avoidable accidents. Although the possibility 
may be remote for an individual to fake an accident in order 
to have a seemingly good reason to get away from a conflict 
situation as well as claim compensation from his employer, 
the probability cannot be overlooked. The results of this 
aspect of the survey are not a reliable indicator of morale 
because there are not many people who would want to indulge 
in such an impractical solution to a conflict. Furthermore, 
there would always be a number of cases where accidents are 
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genuine. With these "caveats" in mind, some of the accidents 
declared may be directly linked with personal conflict. 
Once again, the replies are analysed by grades in order to 
observe any indicative patterns. In the first part of the 
question respondents were asked to state how many accidents 
they had over a period of five years up to the time of 
completing the questionnaire. In the second part they were 
asked to state the total duration of absences, if any, occa-
sioned by injuries sustained. 
TABLE 54 
ACCIDENTS AT WORK 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
NUMBER 
OF ACCI 
DENTS 
LOWER GRADES 
( Y\\ 
HIGHER GRADES 
1 =» A (b) 
I II III IV 1° ) V VI VII 
None 36 72 22 97 227 75.7 56 10 103 169 84.5 
Up to 
10 9 24 15 24 72 24.0 14 - 15 29 14.5 
Over 10 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 0.5 
Total 45 96 37 121 299 99.7 71 10 118 199 99.5 
(c) 1 - - 1 0.3 1 - 1 0.5 
46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Total; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Abstentions; 
(d)=Sample Population. 
If the above result were taken as a measure of spontaneous 
militancy then it corroborates a previous finding, that is, 
whereas higher grades were more militant than lower grades 
2 
they were less likely to take spontaneous action (cf. table 
53). 84.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades said 
they had no accidents, compared with 75.7 per cent of 
respondents in the lower grades. On the other hand, 24 per 
cent of the lower grades, compared with 15 per cent of the 
higher grades, said they had up to ten accidents within the 
five years. 
TABLE 55 
DURATION OF SICK LEAVE DUE TO ACCIDENTS 
DURATION 
OF 
ABSENCE 
LOWER GRADES 
/ -3 \ 
HIGHER GRADES 
(b) 
I II III IV V VI VII 
None 42 84 27 112 265 88.3 65 10 108 183 91.5 
1-7 Days - 3 2 3 8 2.7 5 - 3 8 4.0 
8-14 " 2 3 2 1 8 2.7 - - - -
3 - 6 
Weeks 1 3 4 2 10 3.3 - - - -
Over 6 
Weeks - 3 2 1 6 2.0 1 - - 1 0.5 
Total 45 96 37 119 297 99.0 71 10 Ill 192 96.0 
(c) 1 - - 2 3 1.0 1 - 7 8 4.0 
(d) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = n = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ^  = = = = = = = = = = (a)=Total; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Abstentions; 
(d)=Sample Population. 
The number of days taken in sick absences was more among the 
lower grades, in other words, fewer respondents in the 
higher grades had taken sick leave due to injuries caused by 
accidents at work. Only 0.5 per cent of the higher grades 
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had been away sick for over 6 weeks, compared with 2.0 per 
cent of the lower grades. 4 per cent of the higher grades 
took up to 7 days sick leave, compared with 2.7 per cent of 
the lower grades. But 6 per cent of the lower grades were 
away sick for between 8 days and 6 weeks, compared with none 
in the higher grades. For the reasons indicated above, this 
result is not an adequate measure of morale particularly 
since some of the days taken might have been for serious 
accidents uninfluenced by frustrations. 
Yet another method is used to determine the degree of mili-
tancy in question 24. A number of controversial statements 
were proposed, with which respondents were asked to agree or 
disagree. The proverbial "them and us" barrier existing bet-
ween the lower and the higher grades is monitored in this 
question. It was primarily assumed that some of the state-
ments particularly antagonistic to management would elicit 
defensive sentiments from members of the higher grades. Some 
extreme statements were deliberately added in order to 
assess leftist tendencies in the hierarchy. The results were 
analysed by grades. 
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TABLE 56 
STATEMENT 1 
MEMBERS OF SENIOR GRADES FEEL THAT UNION ACTIVITIES 
CONFLICT WITH THEIR ROLE AS MANAGERS 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 17 27 20 48 112 37.3 24 6 36 66 33.0 
(b) 10 36 13 48 107 35.7 29 4 62 95 47.5 
(c) 9 21 3 13 46 15.3 9 4 13 6.5 
(d) 3 8 - 9 20 6.7 7 12 19 9.5 
(e) 1 3 1 3 8 2.7 1 4 5 2.5 
(f) 40 95 37 121 293 97.7 70 10 118 198 99.0 
(g) 6 1 - - 7 2.3 2 - 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
=: = = = = = == = ====== ======= = = = = = = = = ====== = = = = = = = = == = = = === = ====== (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
A greater majority of respondents both in the lower and the 
higher grades agreed or strongly agreed with the above 
statement - 73 and 80.5 per cent respectively; but the magn-
itude of this feeling was not reflected in earlier analyses. 
The analyses of participation in branch activities, for 
instance, attendance at meetings and representation of 
members, indicate almost equal participation between the two 
groups - 69.3 per cent of the lower grades held local 
offices, compared with 65.0 per cent of the higher grades 
(cf. tables 9 and 9a) and in the years 1981/82, 1982/83, 
2 
1983/84, an average of 66.7 per cent of the lower grades 
attended all meetings, compared with 65.7 per cent of the 
higher grades (cf. tables 14c-14h) The differences (1.7 and 
1.0 per cent respectively) are not significant and certainly 
do not corroborate the feelings expressed. Therefore, the 
higher grades appeared to have made greater sacrifices in 
order to participate in union activities as they did. 
TABLE 57 
STATEMENT 2 
MERGERS BETWEEN CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE NECESSARY 
TO EXERT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE EMPLOYER 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES ( X ) (Y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 16 33 7 56 112 37.3 32 4 39 75 37.5 
(b) 9 23 8 34 74 24.7 17 4 37 58 29.0 
(c) 7 14 9 11 41 13.7 11 1 10 22 11.0 
(d) 10 18 8 10 46 15.3 9 - 17 26 13.0 
(e) 2 8 4 10 24 8.0 2 1 15 18 9.0 
(f) 44 96 36 121 297 99.0 71 10 118 199 99.5 
(g) 2 - 1 - 3 1.0 1 - - 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = =z = = = = = = = = = = = (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e) =Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
The assumption here was that since any pressure on the emp-
loyer affects management and by implication members of the 
higher grades the above statement would elicit more disso-
nant att i tudes f rom the ma jor i ty of respondents in the 
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group, and a greater majority of respondents in the lower 
grades would be less dissonant on the matter. However, this 
was not the case. Whereas 62 per cent of the lower grades 
agreed or strongly agreed, a larger percentage of the higher 
grades, 66.5 per cent, also agreed or strongly agreed. 23.3 
per cent of the lower grades and 22 per cent of the higher 
grades disagreed or strongly disagreed. Although both groups 
seemed to share the same sentiments the higher grades 
appeared to be even more militant about the issue rather 
than be defensive of management/employer. An implication of 
this result is that members of the higher grades would 
neither necessarily identify with the employer on all issues 
nor suffer a conflict of loyalty on matters which impinge 
directly upon their personal well being. Their role as 
"management" and sometimes representatives of the employer 
would not necessarily alter the common values which, as 
employees, they share with members of the lower grades. 
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TABLE 58 
STATEMENT 3 
JT IS INEVITABLE THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE EMPLOYED BY 
THE CIVIL SERVICE WILL DECLINE WITH THE INTRODUCTION 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
VIEWS (n=300) (n= I II III IV V VI VII 200) 
(a) 12 21 12 22 67 22.3 17 2 12 31 15.5 
(b) 18 50 21 49 138 46.0 26 5 57 88 44.0 
(c) 3 12 2 14 31 10.3 8 - 20 28 14.0 
(d) 9 8 2 26 45 15.0 14 3 22 39 19.5 
(e) 1 4 - 9 14 4.7 6 - 7 13 6.5 
(f) 43 95 37 120 295 98.3 71 10 118 199 99.5 
(g) 3 1 - 1 5 1.7 1 - - 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
The main idea behind the above statement was that as new 
technology became widespread in the civil service, automa-
tion of most jobs may mean that fewer employees would be 
required. Here again, it was assumed that since "management" 
was in accord with the employer in the introduction of new 
technology and the consequent reduction of the civil service 
workforce, respondents in the higher grades would be more 
inclined to agree with the statement than respondents in the 
lower grades. However, the result indicates that both groups 
had taken for granted the inevitabi1ity of the outcome of 
widespread use of the new technology in the civil service. 
Both groups agreed with the statement but probably not 
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because they approved of it. Since most lower grade jobs 
were routine and therefore more easily computerized, job 
losses and redundancies would hardly be a welcome prospect 
for employees in those grades. 68.3 per cent of the lower 
grades and 59.5 per cent of the higher grades agreed with 
the statement. The higher grades, being perhaps more 
enlightened, were less pessimistic. A larger percentage of 
respondents in those grades disagreed, probably not because 
they disapproved but rather because they were acquainted 
with new technology well enough to know that it would not 
always mean fewer jobs or job losses. The result indicates a 
more rational approach by the higher grades. 
TABLE 59 
STATEMENT 4 
THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE RIGHT TO TRY AND PROTECT JOBS 
BY BANNING OVERTIME 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 22 46 19 55 142 47.3 34 5 48 87 43.5 
(b) 14 27 12 42 95 31.7 21 1 39 61 30.5 
(c) 2 17 3 15 37 12.3 5 2 10 17 8.2 
(d) 5 4 3 6 18 6.0 10 1 14 25 12.5 
(e) 1 2 - 3 6 2.0 1 1 5 7 3.5 
(f) 44 96 37 121 298 99.3 71 10 116 197 98.5 
(g) 2 - - - 2 0.7 1 - 2 3 1.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
====== == = ====== ======= === == === ======= ==== = = = = ===== = === = ====== (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
2 
Overtime has always been a tendencious issue among union 
members. Even among those members who endorsed banning over-
time as an official policy of the unions, there were those 
who did it because it was an essential supplement for their 
very low income. It was not unusual for a local union 
officer, taking part in a Trade Union Side debate, to agree 
and indeed vote in favour of a ban but refuse to implement 
it because it would mean a significant cut in his own 
income.^ On the other hand, it was usually the case that 
majority of those who supported overtime ban did not them-
selves do overtime either because they had no need for it or 
because it was not available in their departments. Those 
members who argued against a ban were usually those who 
depended on overtime to make ends meet and were grateful 
that it was available to them. 
It was assumed that nearly all the respondents in the higher 
grades would agree with the above statement, either because 
overtime was not available to higher grades or because 
members in those grades had very little need for it. The 
opposite was assumed for the lower grades. Over 80 per cent 
of the sample population, lower and higher grades, did no 
overtime because it was not available in their departments. 
This is consistent with the result which indicates that in 
both groups a larger percentage agreed and a smaller 
percentage disagreed with the statement. However, 5 per cent 
more respondents in lower grades agreed and 8 per cent fewer 
2 
respondents in the same group disagreed with the statement. 
TABLE 60 
STATEMENT 5 
ON KEY ISSUES MOST MEMBERS ARE PREPARED 
TO SUPPORT THEIR UNIONS 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
200) i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 5 11 7 1 24 8.0 2 2 2 6 3.0 
(b) 16 56 17 46 135 45.0 30 4 34 68 34.0 
(c) 9 13 7 32 61 20.3 18 3 33 54 27.0 
(d) 11 10 6 31 58 19.3 21 1 41 63 31.5 
(e) 2 5 - 10 17 5.7 - - 8 8 4.0 
(f) 43 95 37 120 295 98.3 71 10 118 199 99.5 
(g) 3 1 - 1 5 1.7 1 - - 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
====== === ====== ======= = = =: ==== = ======= = = = = = = = = ===== = = = = ====== 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
The above statement was intended to examine the loyalty of 
union members after the bitter experience of the defeat 
suffered by the civil service unions in the 1981 pay 
campaign. It should be generally accepted that members ought 
to back their unions on key issues. However, two very impor-
tant circumstances unfortunately affect this common assump-
tion, namely, the apathy of members and the fact that 
government intervention has put severe restrictions on the 
power and negotiating successes of the unions. During the 
1982/83 pay campaign many members withdrew their support 
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simply because they felt the unions' pursuit of fair wages 
was unrealistic in view of the insensitive attitude of the 
Government. In retrospect, it is difficult to tell whether 
subsequent defeats of the unions might have been self-
inflicted or whether it would have happened even if the 
unions had the full support of their members. This statement 
tests the current attitude of members and suggests that 
unions must be supported by their members in spite of, and 
especially because of the frequently difficult, if not un-
reasonable attitude of the employer. 
The result indicates that members of the higher grades were 
more sensitive to the unions' failure, or rather, the intr-
ansigence of the Government. 37 per cent of that group 
agreed with the statement, 35.5 per cent disagreed and 27 
per cent were uncertain. In the lower grades group, 53 per 
cent agreed, 25 per cent disagreed and 20.3 per cent were 
uncertain. There is enough evidence in this result to 
suggest that the unions can no longer be certain of adequate 
support from their members notwithstanding the importance 
and reasonableness of the issue. This finding will be tested 
in the next question on the GCHQ issue. 
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TABLE 61 
STATEMENT 6 
IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT UNEMPLOYMENT THE CIVIL SERVICE 
UNIONS' POLTCY OF RETIREMENT AT 60 SHOULD BE REVIEWED 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 15 22 9 31 77 25.7 12 1 26 39 19.5 
(b) 13 33 13 34 93 31.0 21 4 47 72 36.0 
(c) 4 18 5 24 51 17.0 9 2 12 23 11.5 
(d) 9 14 8 21 52 17.3 22 1 28 51 25.5 
(e) 2 8 1 9 20 6.7 6 2 5 13 6.5 
(f) 43 95 36 119 293 97.7 70 10 118 198 99.0 
(g) 3 1 1 2 7 2.3 2 - - 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
= = = = = = ====== === === = = =z = = : = = = = ======= = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Both the policy of retirement at 60 and the unions' overtime 
policy reflect their perennial concern for the less fortu-
nate, in this case, those who have no jobs. The retirement 
policy assumes that jobs vacated by retirees would be avail-
able for the unemployed. The rationale of the overtime 
policy is that jobs usually covered by overtime should be 
passed on to people on the dole queue. Although the policies 
may impose hardship on some poorly paid civil servants, they 
are supposed to ease the pressure on the job market; the 
intention is noble. However, the above statement suggests 
that the current age limit should be further reduced. Unlike 
overtime ban, retirement age is every working person's con-
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cern and there are very good arguments both for and against 
early retirement. Even in spite of recent changes in pension 
laws which have been widely publicized, most workers do not 
begin to think constructively about their pension until they 
are at the threshold of retirement. Retirement takes many 
people by surprise. Another factor in the debate which 
supporters of retirement at 60 and earlier often fail to 
consider is the current average life expectancy. The fact 
that people tend to live longer nowadays ought to mitigate 
the argument in favour of retiring workers so early in order 
to release jobs for people in their teens. The argument goes 
on but it is not the intention of this survey to indulge in 
the complex debate. However, the react i ons of both the 
higher and the lower grades are scrutinized in the light of 
the above discussion. More respondents in the higher grades 
seem to have considered the issue, since only 11.5 per cent 
of that group, compared with 17 per cent of the lower grades 
were uncertain about their views. Also, only 1 per cent of 
the higher grades abstained, compared with 2.3 per cent of 
the lower grades. 32 per cent of the higher grades, compared 
with 24 per cent of the lower grades disagreed with the 
statement. Those who agreed with it, 56.7 and 55.5 per cent 
of the lower and higher grades respectively were probably 
more influenced by the fact that the statement was only 
hypothetical. They would most likely disagree if it were 
presented as a real option. 
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TABLE 62 
STATEMENT 7 
UNLESS A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGY IS REACHED THE UNIONS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY 
START A POLICY OF NON-COOPERATION 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (Y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 10 23 10 28 71 23.7 26 3 11 40 20.0 
(b) 14 44 17 36 111 37.0 26 2 35 63 31.5 
(c) 10 13 6 20 49 16.3 7 1 23 31 15.5 
(d) 8 11 3 28 50 16.7 13 3 33 49 24.5 
(e) 2 2 1 9 14 4.6 - 1 14 15 7.5 
(f) 44 93 37 121 295 98.3 72 10 116 198 99.0 
(g) 2 3 - - 5 1.7 - - 2 2 1.0 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
= = = = — = = = = ====== ======= = = = . - === = ======= = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = ====== 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Statement 3 indicates that the lower grades accepted more 
readily than the higher grades the fact that new technology 
would displace people from their jobs. The fear implied in 
that acceptance was reflected in the action proposed above. 
As a statement calling for a policy of non-cooperation was a 
proposal of a sanction against "management" it was assumed 
that the higher grades would be less inclined to agree with 
it. On the contrary, more respondents in those grades dis-
agreed with it - 32 per cent, compared with 21.3 per cent of 
the lower grades. Predictably, 60.7 per cent of the lower 
grades, compared with 51.5 per cent of the higher grades 
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agreed with it. But it would seem that the two groups agreed 
or disagreed with the statement for different reasons. The 
lower grades seem to have reacted purely out of a sense of 
insecurity - their jobs were jeopardized by the advent of 
the new technology. The higher grades disagreed probably not 
because they s i ded with "management" but most 1i kely in 
order to ensure fair play.^ 
TABLE 63 
STATEMENT 8 
IF THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE BETTER 
PAY. IT'S NO USE CONTINUING MY MEMBERSHIP 
> 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 2 - 3 2 7 2.3 1 1 3 5 2.5 
(b) 1 9 - 1 11 3.7 4 1 3 8 4.0 
(c) 6 7 2 6 21 7.0 3 - 6 9 4.5 
(d) 18 40 17 41 116 38.7 21 6 39 66 33.0 
(e) 18 39 15 69 141 47.0 43 2 67 112 56.0 
(f) 45 95 37 119 296 98.7 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(9) 1 1 - 2 4 1.3 - - - - -
<h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Earlier analyses have indicated how important the pay issue 
is. Both groups agreed that they were adequately represented 
(cf.table 34a et seq.). In the above statement an observat-
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ion is made to see whether the importance of pay pervades 
the continuation of membership. It was assumed that all 
members were rational and would endeavour to put all circum-
stances surrounding their membership into economic perspect-
ive. This assumption was tested to observe which of the two 
groups would tend to rationalize their membership on a "quid 
pro quo" basis. The analysis indicates only 1.3 per cent 
abstention among the lower grade, with 7 per cent uncertain. 
4.5 per cent of the higher grades were also uncertain. 
However, the overall result was not as anticipated. Approxi-
mately the same percentage of respondents from both groups 
agreed with the statement - a low 6 per cent. A larger 
percentage of the higher grades disagreed - 89 per cent, 
compared with 85.7 per cent of the lower grades. 
It would seem therefore that whereas ability of the unions 
to negotiate better pay may encourage most members to conti-
nue their membership, inability to negotiate successfully 
would not significantly affect their decision to stay. Other 
factors, such as personal grievance against the union or its 
officials, would have to be present in order to make any 
difference. 
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TABLE 64 
STATEMENT 9 
FAILURE TO SECURE BETTER PAY WOULD SERIOUSLY 
AFFECT MY ATTITUDE TO WORK 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 8 11 3 18 40 13.3 12 1 12 25 12.5 
(b) 17 32 13 40 102 34.0 26 3 43 72 36.0 
(c) 4 16 2 24 46 15.4 17 3 22 42 21.0 
(d) 12 31 13 28 84 28.0 15 2 32 49 24.5 
(e) 3 4 4 10 21 7.0 2 1 8 11 5.5 
(f) 44 94 35 120 293 97.7 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) 2 2 2 1 7 2.3 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
People's attitude to work is subject to various influences; 
pay is certainly one of them. Equity demands that if pay is 
good individuals should work hard to justify it. Should the 
opposite apply if pay is bad? Most members believe, with 
good reasons, that civil service pay is bad. This belief is 
mainly responsible for the low morale in the service. The 
above statement assumes that morale is lower among the lower 
grades and anticipates that a larger percentage of respon-
dents in those grades would agree with it. It also assumes 
that if morale is higher among the higher grades more 
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respondents in that group would disagree with it. However, 
the result did not endorse these assumptions. 13.3 per cent 
of the lower grades strongly agreed, compared with 12.5 per 
cent of the higher grades. The slight difference is can-
celled out in the percentages of those who "agreed" - 36 per 
cent of the higher grades, compared with 34.0 per cent of 
the lower grades. Taking those who "strongly agreed" and 
those who "agreed" together, the analysis indicates that 
48.5 per cent of the higher grades agreed, compared with 
47.3 per cent of the lower grades. More respondents in the 
higher grades were uncertain - 21 per cent, compared with 
15.4 per cent of the lower grades. More respondents in lower 
grades disagreed - 28 per cent, compared with 24.5 per cent 
of the higher grades. Also, the lower grades had a larger 
percentage of those who "strongly disagreed" - 7 per cent, 
compared with 5.5 per cent of the higher grades. More 
respondents in the higher grades agreed with the statement 
and more respondents in the lower grades disagreed with it; 
the differences are only slight. Contrary to the assump-
tions, morale was just as low in the higher grades as it was 
in the lower grades. 
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TABLE 65 
STATEMENT 10 
BRINGING INFLATION DOWN TO A VERY LOW SINGLE FIGURE 
IS AT PRESENT MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 4 8 7 2 21 7.0 - 2 5 7 3.5 
(b) 10 16 5 11 42 14.0 9 3 17 29 14.5 
(c) 10 18 4 16 48 16.0 12 2 16 30 15.0 
(d) 11 29 11 47 98 32.7 17 1 35 53 26.5 
(e) 7 24 10 44 85 28.3 34 2 44 80 40.0 
(i) 42 95 37 120 294 98.0 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) 4 1 - 1 6 2.0 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Statement 10 is a right wing statement which was purposely 
included in order to test the propensity of both groups. The 
unions which organize members in lower grades were regarded 
by many to be left wing. Consequently, the notion that 
unions which organize members in higher grades were right 
wind, is assumed. This statement and the next three were 
designed to examine the veracity of both assumptions. More 
respondents in the lower grades were expected to disagree 
with the statements and more respondents in the higher 
grades were expected to agree with them. In the above 
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statement more respondents in the lower grades strongly 
agreed - 7 per cent, compared with 3.5 per cent of the 
higher grades. 21 per cent of the lower grades agreed, 
compared with 18 of the higher grades. This is contrary to 
expectation. More respondents in the higher grades disagreed 
- 66.5, compared with 61 per cent of the lower grades. 
Again, this is contrary to expectation. 
Although both groups appeared to be left wing, the higher 
grades apparently appeared to be more left wing than the 
lower grades. These findings may be corroborated in the next 
three analyses. 
TABLE 66 
STATEMENT 11 
IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMIC COMMONSENSE THE POWER OF 
TRADE UNIONS SHOULD BE CHECKED 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) i II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 3 2 1 - 6 2.0 - 1 4 5 2.5 
(b) 6 10 2 12 30 10.0 4 1 15 20 10.0 
(c) 8 12 7 8 35 11.7 6 1 19 26 13.0 
(d) 13 28 14 37 92 30.7 23 4 36 63 31.5 
(e) 15 41 13 62 131 43.6 39 3 43 85 42.5 
(f) 45 93 37 119 294 98.0 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) 1 3 - 2 6 2.0 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
====== ~—— ====== ======= === === = = ======= = = = = === = == === = = = = ====== (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y) = % of Sample. 
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Statement 11 intentionally attacks the power of the unions 
with the expectation that whichever group is right wing 
would agree with it. Approximately equal (small) percentage 
of respondents from both groups agreed with it - 12 per cent 
of the lower grades and 12.5 per cent of the higher grades. 
A higher percentage of the higher grades was uncertain - 13 
per cent, compared with 11.7 per cent of the lower grades; a 
higher percentage of the lower grades abstained - 2 per 
cent, compared with 0.5 per cent of the higher grades. Both 
groups cancelled each other out in this respect. Majority of 
respondents in both groups disagreed - 74.3 per cent of the 
lower grades and 74 per cent of the higher grades. Again, 
both groups appeared to be left wing, but whereas this 
result was expected in the case of the lower grades, it was 
contrary to expectation in the case of the higher grades. 
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TABLE 67 
STATEMENT 12 
NEW TOUGHER LAWS TO SEVERELY RESTRAIN PICKETING 
SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (Y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 3 4 2 2 11 3.7 1 2 10 13 6.5 
(b) 5 14 9 12 40 13.3 7 1 18 26 13.0 
(c) 8 12 3 11 34 11.3 3 2 11 16 8.0 
(d) 11 23 11 34 79 26.4 21 4 33 58 29.0 
(e) 17 40 12 60 129 43.0 40 1 45 86 43.0 
(f) 44 93 37 119 293 97.7 72 10 117 199 99.5 
(g) 2 3 - 2 7 2.3 - - 1 1 0.5 
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Statement 12 proposes further emasculation of the unions, a 
very right wing idea. It was assumed that members in higher 
grades would find picketing repugnant to their tight sche-
dule because it is time consuming. Indeed it is rare to find 
members in higher grades, for example, principal, senior 
principal or above, on picket lines. When picketing appears 
difficult on a government premises it is more often than not 
because "management" is leaning heavily on junior staff on 
picket duty. Since senior staff represent "management" it 
was assumed that their rarity on picket lines should reflect 
their favourable attitude towards the statement. 
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Very small percentages of both groups agreed with the 
statement. As expected, the result indicates that more 
respondents in the higher grades "strongly" agreed - 6.5 per 
cent, compared with 3.7 per cent of the lower grades. 13 per 
cent of the higher grades and 13.3 per cent of the lower 
grades agreed, but a greater majority of both groups dis-
agreed. In each group, 43 per cent "strongly" disagreed. 
26,4 per cent of the lower grades and 29 per cent of the 
higher grades "disagreed". The combined percentages of those 
who "strongly" disagreed and "disagreed" were 69.4 per cent 
of the lower grades and 72 per cent of the higher grades. 
This larger percentage of the higher grades was contrary to 
expectation. 
The result again corroborates earlier findings. Both groups 
were left wing in their views but members of the higher 
grades appeared to be more left wing. 
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TABLE 68 
STATEMENT 13 
AS MUCH OF BRITAIN'S CIVIL SERVICE AS POSSIBLE 
SHOULD BE PRIVATISED 
VIEWS 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n=300) 
HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
(n= 
200) I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) - 2 1 2 5 1.7 - 1 2 3 1.5 
(b) 2 4 4 6 16 5.3 2 - 9 11 5.5 
(c) - 9 - 3 12 4.0 3 - 2 5 2.5 
(a) 15 23 9 13 60 20.0 5 3 21 29 14.5 
(e) 28 56 23 96 203 67.7 62 6 84 152 76.0 
(f) 45 94 37 120 296 98.7 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(g) 1 2 - 1 4 1.3 - - - - -
(h) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree; 
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions; 
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample. 
Statement 13 advocates privatisation of the civil service. 
The unions have always fought against privatisation simply 
because it would commercialize the vital services provided, 
thus putting profits before welfare. Again, this is a right 
wing idea which was expected to command the approval of 
members in higher grades. The result indicates that the same 
percentage from each of the groups, although very small, 
agreed with the statement. 1.7 per cent of the lower grades 
and 1.5 per cent of the higher grades "strongly" agreed; 5.3 
per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively "agreed". A larger 90 
per cent of the higher grades and 87.7 per cent of the lower 
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grades disagreed. This replicates previous results and 
proves that the higher grades were no more right wing than 
the lower grades. The assumption that members in higher 
grades were right wing or less left wing than members in 
lower grades was unfounded. Evidence from the above analyses 
show that members in higher grades were even more left wing 
in their attitudes than members in lower grades. 
The analyses of results from all the 13 statements indicate 
that members in higher grades were more militant, more left 
wing and more prone to rationalize their reactions to indus-
trial relations issues than members in lower grades. 
THE GCHO ISSUE 
The issue of abolition of trade unions at the GCHQ was very 
much on the news headlines during the preparation of the 
questionnaire. Feelings were running high among civil 
service trade union membership. There were demonstrations 
outside Downing Street and organized marches to the House of 
Commons were well attended. Nevertheless, there were also a 
good number of activists who agreed with the government on 
the issue. The situation presented an ideal opportunity to 
test members' attitude towards strikes especially when prin-
ciple, not financial improvements, was at stake. The two 
final questions were designed to elicit the contrasts of 
opinion which might exist. For instance, would a member who 
disagreed with the abolition necessarily come out on strike 
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in support of his/her views? 
The following tables measure the attitude differences bet-
ween the grades and contrast the views of union activists 
and ordinary members. 
QUESTION 25a 
Are you in favour of the decision to abolish trade unions at 
GCHQ? 
TABLE 69 
ABOLITION OF TRADE UNIONS AT GCHO 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES (x) (Y) HIGHER 
(n=300) 
GRADES (x) (y) (n= 
200) 
V J. C i W o I II III IV V VI VII 
(a) 1 1 - 6 8 2.6 - 1 4 5 2.5 
(b) 42 90 37 112 281 93.7 69 9 112 190 95.0 
(c) 2 4 - 3 9 3.0 3 - - 3 1.5 
(d) 45 95 37 121 298 99.3 72 10 116 198 99.0 
(e) 1 1 - - 2 0.7 - - 2 2 1.0 
(f) 46 96 37 121 300 100.0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
=== = = = = = = = : = = = = = = = = = = = —=—— = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = === = = ====== 
(a)=Yes; (b)=No; (c)=Don't know; (d)=Totals; 
(e)=Abstentions; (f)= Population Sample; (x)=Total; 
(y)=%of Sample. 
Only 5 per cent of the higher grades and 6.3 per cent of the 
lower grades either agreed with the decision, abstained or 
did not have an opinion on the issue. 95 per cent and 93.7 
per cent of the higher and lower grades respectively dis-
agreed with the decision. The views of both groups were not 
markedly different. Belonging to a trade union is believed 
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to be a fundamental human right and the unions in attacking 
the abolition decision were fully aware of the Government's 
reasons. The Government placed more importance on "national 
security" than on the human rights of members at GCHQ. 
Although both groups overwhelmingly supported the unions the 
higher grades were more in accord with the unions' princi-
ples. This once again corroborates earlier findings that the 
higher grades were more prone to rationalize, and slightly 
more militant. 
TABLE 69a 
ABOLITION OF TRADE UNIONS AT GCHO 
ANALYSIS BY TRADE UNION STATUS 
REPLIES (a) (b) (c) (b) 
Yes 7 2.1 6 3.7 
No 324 95.9 147 90.7 
Don't know 6 1.8 6 3.7 
Totals 337 99.7 159 98.1 
Abstentions 1 0.3 3 1.9 
Sample Population 338 100.0 162 100.0 
(a)=Union Officers; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Ordinary Members; 
The above table indicates an overwhelming support for the 
unions' views both by the branch officers and ordinary 
members. Only 9.3 per cent of the ordinary members either 
agreed with the Government's decision, abstained or were 
uncertain, compared with 4.1 per cent of the branch 
officers. This was predictable. 
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Question 25b 
Assuming a ballot in favour of an all out strike, would you 
come out in support of your GCHQ colleagues? 
TABLE 70 
STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF GCHQ MEMBERSHIP 
ANALYSIS BY GRADE 
LOWER GRADES (x) (y) HIGHER GRADES (x) (y) 
VIEWS (n=300) (n= I II III IV V VI VII 200) 
(a) 28 56 20 89 193 64. 3 59 4 68 131 65.5 
(b) 8 15 12 14 49 16. 3 4 4 30 38 19.0 
(c) 9 24 5 14 52 17. 4 9 2 18 29 14.5 
(d) 45 95 37 117 294 98. 0 72 10 116 198 99.0 
(e) 1 1 - 4 6 2. 0 - - 2 2 1.0 
(f) 46 96 37 121 300 100. 0 72 10 118 200 100.0 
(a)=Yes; (b)=No; (c)=Don't know; (d)=Totals; 
(e)=Abstentions; (f)= Population Sample; (x)=Total; 
(y)=%of Sample. 
Those respondents from both groups who answered "no", "don't 
know" or abstained, averaged 35.1 per cent. This means that 
an average of 64.9 per cent of the respondents (both groups) 
said they were prepared to strike in support of their GCHQ 
colleagues; a seemingly impressive response. However, in 
statement 5 above, the assumption that members would 
generally support their union on key issues was tested. An 
unimpressive result of that test led to the conclusion that 
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the unions could no longer safely rely on their members' 
support on key issues. A closer examination of the negative 
replies to that question shows the following results:-
TABLE 70b 
NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO STATEMENT 5 
REACTIONS LOWER GRADES % HIGHER GRADES% 
Abstentions 1.7 0.5 
Uncertain 20.3 27.0 
Disagree 19.3 31.5 
Strongly disagree 5.7 4.0 
Total 47.0 63.0 
Up to 63 per cent of the higher grades either disagreed, 
strongly disagreed or were uncertain, compared with 47 per 
cent of the lower grades. Only 37 per cent of the higher and 
53 per cent of the lower grades agreed or strongly agreed. 
This is not consistent with the result of question 25b 
above. 63.4 per cent of the lower grades and 65.5 per cent 
of the higher grades said they would strike in support of 
their GCHQ col leagues. If an earlier test for degree of 
support on a key issue indicates only 47 per cent and 53 per 
cent then the larger percentages indicated on the GCHQ issue 
can only be optimistic. In other words, a ballot of the 
entire membership might show an impressive percentage of 
members who say they would strike but when the chips are 
down the percentage of members who would actually back their 
promise would most likely be disappointing. 
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The comparison made between the lower and the higher grades 
in table 70 did not show a significant difference in the 
views of the two groups. However, the comparison made below 
between union officers and ordinary members is worthy of 
closer examination. 
TABLE 70c 
STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF GCHQ MEMBERSHIP 
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS 
REPLIES UNION 
OFFICERS 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
ORDINARY 
MEMBERS 
% OF 
SAMPLE 
Yes 245 72.5 79 48.8 
No 44 13.0 43 26.5 
Don't know 44 13.0 37 22.8 
Totals 333 98.5 159 98. 1 
Abstentions 5 1.5 3 1.9 
Population Sample 338 100.0 162 100.0 
In the above analysis, 72.5 per cent of union officers said 
they would strike, compared with 48. 8 per cent of ordinary 
members. It should be noted that this result is a product of 
the same population sample which produced an earlier unimp-
ressive result. Even if the union officers were to give 100 
per cent support, which according to the above result is not 
possible, it would still fall short of what can be regarded 
as an adequate support. This is because there are many more 
ordinary members than there are branch officers. A new stra-
tegy to increase the percentage of ordinary members who 
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would back their promises or respond at least in comparable 
proportion to union officers, would have to be developed in 
order to reverse the apparent loss of enthusiasm among the 
membership. This places an onus on branch officers and a 
greater charge on full-time officials to target "anomie" for 
elimination and simultaneously eradicate apathy in the 
membership. Until this happens, the unions should be 
cautious of any vote of confidence from their members. Fur-
thermore, the strike, which is traditionally a weapon of 
last resort should be further relegated until the revival of 
"esprit de corps". 
SUMMARY 
The following positive statement can be made from the above 
analyses:-
1. Most respondents felt that pay and conditions, job pro-
tection, job security and career prospects were very impor-
tant and that they were adequately or well represented on 
these issues. 
2. Morale in the civil service was very low. 
3. Most respondents worked to rule and/or worked with less 
or no enthusiasm; many were actively looking for other jobs. 
4. Sick absences and "late coming" were not popular among 
respondents. 
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5. It was felt that union activities conflicted with the 
role of senior civil servants as managers. 
6. Most respondents disagreed with the statement that most 
members would support their unions on key issues. 
7. Retirement at 60 was acceptable to most respondents. 
8. Ability of the unions to negotiate better pay had no 
influence on respondents1 decisions to stay with their 
unions. 
9. A large majority of respondents were against restriction 
of union power and privatization of the civil service. 
10. A large majority of respondents were against the aboli-
tion of trade unions at the GCHQ and were prepared to take a 
strike action to maintain the "status quo." 
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CHAPTER 6 
SYNTHESIS OF INTERPRETED DATA AND VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, the seven hypotheses enunciated in chapter 
2 are each discussed and tested in order to establish their 
validity. The link between the hypotheses and specific 
questions in the survey questionnaire makes it possible to 
cite the results of data analysed in the previous two 
chapters (4 and 5) as proof of validity or invalidity, as 
the case may be. The hypotheses facilitated data collection 
and in turn the data form a basis for their validation. Some 
of the theories reviewed in chapter 1, notably, the theories 
of power and conflict played a significant part in the 
development of the hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses and 
the survey results on which their validity depends support 
Margerison's "Industrial Sociology Approach" to Industrial 
Relations. Unlike Dunlop's "Systems model" which emphasizes 
theoretical aspects of rule making or Flander's "Oxford 
Approach" which places more value on political variables, 
the "Industrial Sociology Approach" more readily acknow-
ledges the concept of the economic man and the endemism of 
conflict in an employer-employee relation. As militancy 
presupposes conflict, a study of conflict in all its aspects 
necessarily implies a study of militancy. 
Since the focus of this investigation is the attitude of 
trade union activists it seems reasonable to begin with what 
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Allen (1966J1 considers inherent in their efforts to improve 
income and conditions - militancy. Marsh (1979)2 defines 
militancy as:-
combative or warlike attitudes by trade unions 
or their members, taking the form of strikes, 
overtime bans, go-slows, withdrawal of co-
operation or demonstrations in order to bring 
pressure to bear on employers. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. High personal commitments produce anti-
militant attitude among union members. 
This hypothesis imposes a limitation on the contention that 
one has to break an egg in order to make an omelette. 
Militancy in the form described above involves personal 
sacrifices and it usually presupposes the achievement of a 
desired goal. It is suggested here that willingness to make 
these sacrifices is severely restrained by high personal 
commitment. In times of crisis when union leaders feel it 
appropriate to flex the union's muscle by proposing an 
industrial action, responses such as "I can't afford a 
strike now - I have a mortgage to pay or I have mouths to 
feed" are not uncommon. This hypothesis proposes that such 
high commitments reduce the degree of militancy among 
members. 
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EVIDENCE: The survey examined the reactions to a strike call 
of members with the following categories of commitments:-
(a) Financial commitments such as mortgages and rent; 
(compared with those who had no such commitments). 
(b) Single persons with dependant children; (compared 
with those who had none). 
(c) Married persons with children; (compared with those 
who had none). 
(d) Divorced/separated persons with children; (compared 
with those who had none). 
RESULTS:-
(a) The notion that members with higher financial 
commitments such as mortgages and rent would be less 
inclined to militant actions was unfounded. Of the 500 
sample population, 463 respondents indicated their reactions 
to the strike call; 37 abstained. Basing the calculation on 
those who gave their reactions, 403 respondents (87 per 
cent) took action; 60 respondents (13 per cent) did not. 
This sample was divided into three groups - mortgage payers, 
rent payers and those who had no such commitments. 65 
respondent, (14 per cent) paid mortgages; 346, (75 per cent) 
paid rent and 52, (11 per cent) had no such commitments. Of 
the 65 respondents who paid mortgages, 60, (92 per cent) 
came out on strike. 305, (88 per cent) of the 346 who paid 
rent came out and 38, (73 per cent) of the 52 who had no 
such commitments also came out. Since the percentage of 
those who had higher commitments and yet came out was larger 
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than the percentage of those who had no such commitments, 
financial commitments such as mortgages and rent appear to 
have negative effect on militancy. 
actions to the strike call 2 had one child each under 
eighteen, 2 had two chi ldren each under eighteen and 2 had 
two children each over eighteen; 106 had no children. A 
comparison made between the reactions of these four groups 
shows that family responsibilities among single persons had 
no significant effect on a decision to take a strike action. 
100 per cent of the groups with one and two dependant 
children under eighteen supported the strike but only 50 per 
cent of the group with one dependant child over eighteen 
supported it, compared with 91 per cent of those who had no 
children. Because of the small sample in three of the groups 
this result is not significant per se; it can only be 
supplementary. 
(c) The result of comparison between married persons 
who had chi 1 d ren and t hose who had none was mo re 
significant. Of the 301 married persons who recorded their 
reactions, the following had dependant children under 
eighteen:-
(b) Out of the 112 single persons who gave their re-
74 one child 
74 two children 
21 three or more 
132 none; 
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the following had dependant children over eighteen:-
26 - one child 
10 - two children 
3 - three or more 
262 - none. 
In the above distribution, the following percentages took 
action:-
children under eighteen (%):-
one child - 93.2 
two children - 85.1 
three or more - 85.7 
none - 83.3 
children over eighteen (%):-
one child - 76.9 
two children - 90.0 
three or more - 66.7 
none - 87.4 
Thus, each of the groups was militant but in varying 
degrees. However, to the extent that the percentage of those 
who had no children but took action was smaller in each 
category than the percentage of those who had two children, 
family commitment had negative effect on militancy; but to 
the extent that the percentage of those who had three or 
more children over eighteen and took action was smaller than 
the percentage in all the other categories, family commit-
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ment had little (not significant) effect on militancy. 
(d) A similar evaluation of family commitment among 
divorced/separated persons indicated that the following 
percentages took action: children under eighteen (%):-
one child - 85.7 
two children - 80.0 
three or more - nil 
none - 88.9; 
children over eighteen (%):-
one child - 75.0 
two children - nil 
three or more - 66.7 
none - 88.1 
This establishes a pattern similar to the married persons. 
Here again, the effect of high personal commitment on 
militancy was not significant. 
High personal commitment would not per se produce anti-
militant attitude among members. Other factors, for example, 
principle, political etc., must be present. The very reason 
why the civil service unions originated supports this 
conclusion. Even though pay was very poor and individuals 
were muzzled by the blackmail of the patronage system of 
recruitment into the service, a cumulation of grievances 
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soon produced principles strong enough to fillip the pio-
neers of the civil service trade unions into action. Their 
very poor economic condition did not deter their discovery 
of the essence of united effort. The result of this aspect 
of the survey proves conclusively that the rationale of 
clubbing together as a trade union has remained constant 
over the years. Strong feelings about the situation pervaded 
the economic circumstances of the pioneers and formed an 
underlying principle of trade unionism. High personal 
commitments would not necessarily produce anti-militant 
attitude among union members because the financial and other 
personal commitments examined in the above evidence had no 
influence on the respondents' response to a strike call. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. When members put their personal commitments 
above everything else in their hierarchy of 
priorities they would tend to yield more 
readily to offers made in a wage bargaining 
by their employer. In other words, their 
resistance curve would tend towards 0 as 
the employer's concession curve tends to-
wards 0, having discovered his employees' 
reaction curve. 
This hypothesis presents an "a fortiori" case. 
Even in spite of previous defeats of the unions by the 
Government after prolonged industrial action, the Government 
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can never be certain that union leaders will not call a 
strike and that union membership wi 11 not support it. In 
other words, the threat of industrial action will always 
remain a potent weapon as long as the employer's uncertainty 
remains. The situation envisaged in thi s hypothesis was 
where union members will not support a strike primarily on 
account of their commitments. It was proposed that the 
employer's knowledge of this weakness among the union 
membership would automatically put him in a stronger 
bargaining position and he would tend to be stingy with his 
concession. 
Two issues need to be explained before testing the hypo-
thesis: -
1. commitments are not the only reason why union members 
may be unable to support a strike; 
-2. the employer may not be in a position to discover his 
employees' reaction curve in time for the discovery to 
influence his concession curve. 
Members may have other varied reasons for their refusal to 
support a strike but economic and financial situations are 
the most likely reasons to create a chronic obstacle to a 
strike. On the other hand, discovery of the relative 
weakness of the employees' position by the employer is only 
a question of time. He is usually able to guess the unions 
strengths and weakness from the beginning; his approach is 
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dictated by what he perceives as expedient in the circum-
tances. Besides, if the employer decides not a acknowledge 
the union's position of strength the employees' resolve to 
strike to the bitter end is not likely to deter him. 3 
According to Magenau and Pruitt, power can only exist and be 
exerted if there is a reciprocal perception of it. In their 
view, the fact that "I feel stronger than you" is "no 
guarantee that you will feel weaker than me or,...that you 
will accept my contention that you should concede. 
However, it may be argued that the employer's determination 
not to acknowledge the union's power, that is, to ignore the 
strike, is underpined by his assessment of the union's 
relative weak position due to a palpable reluctance of the 
employees to strike. 
The decision of the CCSU to take a selective strike action 
in the 1981 pay campaign was not only for convenience; it 
was necessary. Despite the widespread discontent among civil 
servants there was an undercurrent of lethargy concerning 
industrial action. When the unions and the membership 
expressed sympathy for the public because of the disruption 
to public services which an all-out strike would cause, 
their concern was construed by the Government as a sign of 
weakness; and rightly so. It was evident that a call for an 
all-out strike would not be adequately supported. The 
selective strike and the series of half-day strikes were 
therefore calculative. Their effect on the Government was a 
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resolution to maintain a tough stance through to the end. In 
that instance, the Government was able to predict the 
reaction curve of the membership and successfully anaesthe-
tized its concession curve. 
EVIDENCE: Two aspects of the Treasury offer were examined:-
(a) ballot on the offer 
(b) the stages at which individuals were prepared 
to accept the offer. 
467 respondents gave their reactions to the ballot on the 
Treasury offer. Of that population, 155 (33.2%) accepted the 
offer, 288 (61.7%) rejected it and 24 (5.1%) abstained. With 
reference to the selective strike, 460 respondents stated 
the stages at which they were prepared to accept (or not 
accept) the offer. Of that population, 45 (9.8%) were pre-
pared to accept before the selective strike, 7 (1.5%) were 
prepared to accept after two weeks of the strike, 49 (10.7%) 
were prepared to accept half way through the strike and 359 
(78.0%) said the offer was never acceptable to them. 
RESULT: 
Since the hypothesis was based on personal 
commitments, readiness to accept an offer, and the influence 
of these on the outcome of a bargaining process it was 
necessary to analyze the commitments of those respondents 
who said they would accept the offer before the selective 
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strike together with those who said the offer was never 
acceptable to them, then compare the results. The following 
criteria formed the basis of the comparison: 
(a) Rent payment 
(b) Mortgage payment 
(c) Owners of property (probably ) after paying off 
the mortgage 
(d) Those who had no property and paid nothing for 
their accommodation 
(e) Financial commitments under £100 per month 
(f) Financial commitments over £100 per month 
(g) Those who had no financial commitments 
(h) Those who had one child 
(i) Those who had two children 
(j) Those who had three or more children 
(k) Those who had no children 
The comparison necessitated 48 combinations of commitments 
as follows:-
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COMMITMENTS 
a+g+h 
a+g+i 
a+g+j 
a+g+k 
b+g+h 
b+g+i 
b+g+j 
b+g+k 
c+g+h 
c+g+i 
c+g+j 
c+g+k 
d+g+h 
d+g+i 
d+g+ j 
d+g+k 
a+e+h 
a+e+i 
a+e+ j 
a+e+k 
TABLE 71. 
% 
2.2 
4.4 
2.2 
2.2 
RESPONDENTS 
WHO SAID 
OFFER WAS 
NEVER 
ACCEPTABLE 
% 
1.7 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
2.5 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
6.7 
2.2 
0.8 
4.4 
RESPONDENTS WHO 
ACCEPTED THE OFFER 
BEFORE THE SELECTIVE 
STRIKE 
TABLE 71 CONTINUED 
COMMITMENTS RESPONDENTS WHO RESPONDENTS 
ACCEPTED THE OFFER WHO SAID 
BEFORE THE SELECTIVE OFFER WAS 
STRIKE NEVER 
ACCEPTABLE 
% % 
b+e+h 6.7 5.0 
b+e+i 13.3 5.7 
b+e+j 2.2 1.7 
b+e+k 15.6 13.6 
c+e+h 2.2 0.8 
c+e+i 2.2 0.8 
c+e+j - 0.3 
c+e+k 6.7 2.8 
d+e+h 
d+e+i 
d+e+j 
d+e+k - 0.3 
a+f+h - 1.4 
a+f+i - 0.3 
a+f+j - 0.3 
a+f+k - 3.6 
b+f+h - 8.9 
b+f+i - 10.3 
b+f+j 2.2 2.2 
b+f+k 15.6 24.0 
c+f+h 2.2 0.8 
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TABLE 71 CONTINUED 
COMMITMENTS 
c+f+ i 
c+f + j 
c+f+k 
d+f+h 
d+f+i 
d+f + j 
d+f+k 
RESPONDENTS WHO 
ACCEPTED THE OFFER 
BEFORE THE SELECTIVE 
STRIKE 
% 
2.2 
8.9 
2.2 
RESPONDENTS 
WHO SAID 
OFFER WAS 
NEVER 
ACCEPTABLE 
% 
0.3 
0.3 
2.5 
0.3 
0.3 
If in the above comparisons the respondents who accepted the 
offer before the selective strike had predominantly more 
commitments than those who said the offer was never accept-
able to them, then it would have been safer to conclude that 
their decision to accept before the strike, was exacerbated 
by their commitments. But since the larger majority who said 
the offer was not acceptable were also just as committed, 
such a conclusion would be untenable. Therefore there was no 
evidence that personal commitments had any significant 
influence on the decision to accept or not to accept the 
offer. 
However, even though 61.7 per cent of the respondents voted 
for rejection of the offer and this decision was solidly 
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backed in the actual event by a prolonged industrial action, 
the employer's concession curve was nevertheless 0. It was 
unlikely, indeed it was impossible that a less militant 
reaction from the CCSU would have elicited any concession. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Assuming a trade-off between the employer's 
power^ to impose a wage and the trade union's 
power to resist, anti-militant tendencies 
among union members would shift the employer's 
resistance curve towards oo. 
This is a corollary of the previous hypothesis. It was 
assumed that Pareto's law6 operates in the relationship 
between the unions and employers, being a factor in the 
power rivalry between the two sides. The idea that "one 
man's gain is another man's loss" takes on a significant 
role in the power struggle. The endemism of weakness on the 
union's side historically stemmed from the recognition by 
the individual employee, of the employer's "managerial 
prerogative". This prerogative is similar to what 
Hyman(1975) referred to as "the right accorded to management 
in capitalism to direct production and to command the labour 
force".7 Fox (1971) defines the employees weak position as 
follows:-
....in entering into a contract of employment, the 
employee legitimises the employer in directing and 
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controlling his actions... and legitimises, too, the 
employer's use of sanctions if necessary to maintain 
this obedience.8 
The same sentiment is echoed by Torrington and Chapman:-
. ...the individuals who become employees of the orga-
nisation surrender a segment of their personal auto-
nomy to become relatively weaker, making the organi-
sation inordinately stronger.9 
But more specifically, the weak position of a civi1 servant 
relative to the power of the Government, his employer, stems 
from the early patronage system of recruiting into the 
service. Although this system has long been eradicated the 
ethos of the employer's superiority has remained and is con-
tinuously expressed in the Government's habitual "executive 
and administrative" actions. Salaman(1987) argues that:-
Management's inherent authority is based, therefore, 
on society's infrastructure legitimising its role and 
power in the operation of the economic system. Conse-
quently it has little need to utilise overtly 
coercive power in exercising this authority because 
the subordinates it seeks to control accept the values 
on which its power and authority rests.*° 
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It is precisely the use of this power or its abuse that 
necessitated a countervailing force in the authority of 
trade unions. The employer's authority is legitimised by the 
same law which challenges the legitimacy of the unions' 
power. Unlike the employer, the unions need to increase 
their authority and sustain their power by being militant. 
In this hypothesis, it is proposed that anti-militant ten-
dencies among union members would make the employer even 
more powerful, giving him an unlimited capacity to resist 
the unions. 
EVIDENCE: The survey systematically plotted the gradual 
decline in militancy throughout the civil service, paying 
particular attention to:-
(a) Support given to the selective strikes during the 
1981/84 pay campaigns. 
(b) Respondents* reaction to a hypothetical all-out 
strike during the same period. 
(c) Members' attitude towards their unions. 
RESULTS:-
(a) A total of 109 branches gave their responses to 
a request for support during the pay campaign of 1981/82, 
1982/83, and 1983/84. Three types of support were identified 
from the responses:-
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(i) a lot 
(ii) poor 
(i i i) none 
To facilitate interpretation of the result, types (ii) and 
(iii) were grouped together. In 1981/82, 66 (60.5 per cent) 
of the branches said their members gave a lot of support; 43 
(39.5 per cent) said their branches gave poor or no support. 
Support drastically declined in 1982/83 - 28 branches (25.7 
per cent) said their members gave a lot of support, and 81*1 
branches (74.3 per cent) said their members gave poor or no 
support, a massive drop of 34.8 per cent. A similar decline 
was recorded for 1983/84 - 29 branches (26.6 per cent) gave 
a lot of support and 80 branches (73.4 per cent) gave poor 
or no support. 
Because the civil service union membership had become less 
militant their employer became very powerful and gradually 
dismantled the mask by which it portrayed itself as a 
reasonable employer. Taking unilateral action became common-
place. For instance, disbanding the civil service Pay 
Research Unit was not a chance action of the Government; it 
was done retrospective of perceived powerlessness of the 
civil service unions. 
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(b) The above results were corroborated in a hypo-
thetical question about an all-out strike during the same 
years. Three reactions to the question were elicited:-
(i) stay out indefinitely 
(ii) come out for a week or two then return to work 
(iii) ignore the strike call. 
Again to facilitate interpretation, reactions (ii) and (iii) 
were merged with those who abstained from the question. 271 
respondents (54.2 per cent) said they would have stayed out 
indefinitely and 229 (45.8 per cent) said they would have 
stayed out for a short while or ignored the strike call in 
1981/82. For 1982/83 and 1983/84 the number of respondents 
who would have stayed out indefinitely declined and those 
who would have ignored the strike call increased. The 
figures were 217 (43.4 per cent) and 283 (56.6 per cent), 
and 224 (44.8 per cent) and 276 (55.2 per cent) respect-
ively. These results indicate an unmistakable decline in the 
unions' capacity for militancy. 
(c) Members' support for their unions on key issues 
was tested in the statement "On key issues most members are 
prepared to support their unions." The following reactions 
were elicited:-
(i) strongly agree ...30 
( ii ) agree 203 
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(iii ) uncertain 115 
(iv) disagree 121 
(v) strongly disagree 25 
(vi) abstain 6 
To facilitate interpretation, (i) and (ii) were grouped 
together and the rest were put in one separate group. 233 
respondents (46.6 per cent) either agreed or strongly 
agreed, and 267 (53.4 per cent) disagreed or strongly 
disagreed etc. The significance of this result is that a 
disagreement between the union membership and the leadership 
is a sufficient cause of weakness in the movement. Union 
leaders should be cautious of a ballot majority in favour of 
an industrial action especially if they instigated it. Anti-
mi 1itant tendencies were apparent in the above evidence. The 
Government's awareness of the union leaders' predicament is 
evident in their ability to veto arbitration rulings with 
impunity, implement rejected wage offers, take administra-
tive action such as banning trade unions at GCHQ; all these 
suggest that the Government's resistance curve now tends 
towards oo. 
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HYPOTHESIS 4. The level of militancy among the active civil 
service trade unionists had declined to such 
a point that it threatened the effectiveness 
of their unions1 negotiating strategy. 
Wage claims put forward by civil service trade unions are 
usually the result of calculations, comparisons with the pay 
of similar jobs outside the service and most importantly, 
surveys often sponsored jointly by the CCSU and the Treasury 
(see Appendix 5 and 6). The wage negotiation strategy of 
asking for an over-inflated and unrealistic figure is hardly 
feasible in an environment dominated not by the caution of 
how much the firm can reasonably sacrifice from its profit 
but by political pressures and sometimes unfounded worry of 
triggering wage inflation. Given that the claims put forward 
are generally what union leaders genuinely believe and can 
substantiate to be equitable remuneration for their members 
it must be frustrating for them to face year after year the 
type of response which can be expected only from "cowboy" 
employers, not from a reasonable employer which the Govern-
ment purports to be. 
For instance, at the beginning of the 1985 pay campaign the 
Government's prior announcement of 3 per cent public sector 
cash limits was a sign of an impending conflict. Against the 
background of the announced figure, a 15 per cent claim 
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might have seemed unrealistic but it was quite reasonable 
judging from the low pay settlements since 1980 - the year 
in which the Government unilaterally scrapped the civil 
service National Pay Agreement and Pay Research Unit. Since 
then, the Government had forced pay deals which led to the 
gradual erosion of civil service pay in respect of its 
purchasing power and its comparability with that of other 
workers. The Retail Price Index showed that an Executive 
Officer on maximum pay would need a 14.1 per cent rise for 
his/her salary to be restored to its 1980 purchasing power. 
Even the Government's own New Earnings Survey indicated that 
the same Executive Officer needed a 25.5 per cent rise for 
his/her salary to regain its 1980 position in relation to 
the pay of workers doing similar jobs outside the service. 
In spite of these facts, the CCSU submitted a claim for 7.5 
per cent base both on what they felt the Government could 
reasonably afford and on a survey jointly sponsored by the 
unions and the Treasury. The Government ignored the survey 
and made an offer of just 3 per cent, which was later 
increased to a range of 4.5 - 5.0 per cent. 
This hypothesis postulates that lack of militancy or anti-
militant responses from union members render union leaders 
incapable of achieving an optimum wage settlement thereby 
creating a serious gap between what they can substantiate to 
be equitable and the eventual outcome. 
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EVIDENCE: The survey examined anti-militant tendencies among 
members under the following contexts:-
(a) Pre-survey attitudes of members 
(b) Attendance at meetings and participation in 
union activities. 
(c) Attitudes monitored from the survey: reactions 
to statements 1, 3, 5 and 9. 
RESULTS:-
(a) Trade union movement in the civil service was a 
product of militant action. Civil servants who were hitherto 
barred from expressing and seeking redress for their 
grievances gradually picked up the courage to speak out. 
Common grievances and shared sense of purpose brought them 
together; the discovery of strength in numbers underpined 
the inauguration of the movement. The movement was born 
militant and it remained so until its propensity towards 
militancy was attenuated by another equally potent initia-
tive - Whitleyism.12 
The success of Whitleyism in the public service was attri-
buted to the fact that civil servants had "almost jettisoned 
industrial action, strike action, and so forth, as a means 
of settling their disputes,...because of being in the public 
service,...[they] fully utilise all the opportunities of 
negotiation, of persuasion, of argument, that the Whitley 
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Council system gives..."AJ The General Strike of 1926 
brought them to the brink of a strike action but virtually 
all of the 12,640 civil servants who actually came out were 
industrial civil servants.14 Until the late 1970s, "strike" 
had remained an ultimate weapon, the threat of which was 
rarely used. The uneasy peace which seemingly prevailed was 
in the words of Flanders "...by constant capitulation of the 
one side to the other's demands, or by joint acquiescence in 
stagnation and the avoidance of any change that would stir 
up resistance."15 
With feelings running high, matters were bound to come to a 
head when an overdue showdown would once again re-establish 
the significance of trade unionism. The showdown did come 
(1981). The apparent f ai lure of CCSU in the event may be 
attributed to two remote causes:-
(i) The General Strike of 1926 had shown the non-
industrial civil servants as passive and the Government had 
come to regard them as incapable of any degree of mi 1itancy 
worth bothering about. Consequently when the showdown came 
in 1981, the daily papers, echoing the Government, were 
saying they will soon back down - it would not be 1 ong -
they have not got the stamina. So, even though the strategy 
of selective strike action meant that the unions were able 
to carry on the strike for much longer than expected, the 
Government endured the losses inflicted hoping that its 
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theory of the unions' lack of stamina would prevail. The 
Government was right. 
(ii) Salaman's contention that power over people has 
internal and external dimensions in the context of the 
collective nature of industrial relations, makes a signi-
ficantly relevant point with regard to the civil service 
unions. He argues:-
Any collectivity, whether a work group, trade union 
or management, exercises internal power and autho-
rity over its individual members in the establish-
ment and achievement of the collectivity's objectives. 
Without the exercise of such power and authority the 
collectivity lacks direction and control (i.e. is not 
a collectivity). It is the exercise of this internal 
power and authority which,' to a large measure, pro-
vides the real source and extent of the power which 
the collectivity may direct towards influencing others 
and controlling their situation.*6 
Unfortunately, the only situation that would give the civil 
service unions such power and authority is a "closed shop" 
situation; for then individuals would have a valued reward 
for being a member - a civil service job. Then also, the 
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unions would have some enforceable sanctions which they 
could use to keep their members in line; for instance, a 
suspension or expulsion from the union would be meaningful -
loss of pay or loss of job. At present the threat of suspen-
sion or expulsion from the union means nothing. In fact, if 
a civil service union expels a member the union is the loser 
not the member who would keep his/her subscription money as 
well as enjoy nearly all the benefits of membership. He/she 
would merely join the gang of free-riders. On the other 
hand, the loss of one member means a lot to the union which 
is constantly in search of ways to increase its membership. 
Thus, internal discipline is almost non-existent and without 
it the union will always find it impossible to control its 
members. It cannot make such stipulation as would require 
members to attend meetings or take an industrial action 
under the pain of losing pay or their jobs. 
Consider the following equation: 
The degree of importance which members attach to their 
belonging to their union (•&) is equal to the effective-
ness of the union's sanction on them:-
Let: 
& = high degree of the union's importance to its members 
Ai = highly effective union sanction 
x = ability to free ride 
y = degree of apathy 
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pp-- closed shop situation 
low level effectiveness of union sanction 
$2 = /u; 
JS + x + x 
Y 
= ,/uj; and = yM1; 
y 2;(y 2,y 3 ) 
The Government was aware of this lack of internal control 
and capitalized on it by playing the so called free-riders17 
against union members. The 1985 pay offer of 4.5 per cent 
cited above was the final despite the threat of an all-out 
or selective strike action. The gap between 7.5 per cent 
which the unions originally claimed and the final offer was 
never bridged. It became a loss which members wrongly 
regarded as a weakness of the CCSU. 
(b) Attendance at meetings and degree of participa-
tion in branch activities were examined in the analysis on 
table 15. The following results were gathered from a sample 
of 162 ordinary members:-
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TABLE 72 
MEETINGS ATTENDED 1981/82 1982/83 1983/ 
% % % 
AGM only 3.7 3.1 6.2 
Mandate meeting only 0.6 0.6 -
Pay meeting only 1.9 1.9 3.1 
AGM and Mandate meeting 1.9 3.1 1.9 
AGM and Pay meeting 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Mandate and Pay meeting 0.6 0.6 0.6 
All meetings 8.0 8.6 10.4 
Over the three year period those who attended only the AGM 
represented an average of 4.3 per cent of the sample. From 
the same sample, attendance of the Mandate meeting (only) 
averaged 0.4 per cent in the same period and attendance of 
Pay meeting averaged 2.3 per cent. Those who attended two of 
the meetings averaged 2.3 per cent for AGM and Mandate, 0.6 
per cent for AGM and Pay and 0.6 per cent for Mandate and 
Pay meetings. Average attendance of all meetings was 9.0 per 
cent. If these percentages were applied to the total rank-
and-file civil service non-industrial union membership they 
would represent a population of members who care very little 
about their union affairs, a clear indication of anti-
militancy. 
This degree of participation and support of branch activi-
ties together with the growing number of free-riders and 
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those who would always cross picket lines because they do 
not believe in strikes, make the Government's resistance 
very easy. There is no magic way union leaders can win equi-
table wage increases. If members do not support their union 
and are not willing to be militant over a justified cause 
such as pay, then there will always be a gap between what 
the union leaders ask for and what they actually get. 
(c) Reactions to some of the statements analyzed in the 
previous chapter in order to measure the degree of militancy 
indicate that there is at least a good degree of "notional" 
anti-militancy among members. In statement 1, the idea that 
members of senior grades feel that union activities conflict 
with their role as managers, was examined. There is at least 
a potential danger that members who feel that union activi-
ties conflict with their role as managers would sooner or 
later be anti-militant. It is not uncommon for members to 
resign either from their branch offices or from their union 
because they are taking on new duties or because they are 
being promoted in their departments. Respondents who said 
they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
exhibited some measure of militancy; but those who agreed or 
strongly agreed were regarded as anti-militant. The former 
category was 10.4 per cent and the latter was 76.0 per cent 
of the sample, a clear sign of overall anti-militancy. 
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Statement 3: It is inevitable that the number of people 
employed by the civil service will decline with the intro-
duction of new technology. When the new technology was being 
introduced most sub-committees of the civil service Whitley 
Council had heated arguments about its implications, parti-
cularly with regard to manning levels. It was widely 
believed that most jobs would disappear as result of compu-
terisation. The official side was cautious about signing the 
"no redundancy agreement". Experience has since shown that 
manning levels have increased considerably even in spite of 
the new technology. Despite the installation of many 
personal computers with word processing facilities in 
offices, typists and typing pools still function as a vital 
part of the office. Statement 3 assumed that those respon-
dents who agreed or strongly agreed with it were pro-manage-
ment and therefore anti-militant, and those who disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with it were not just optimistic but 
militant. Unions organizing lower grades, notably the CPSA, 
instructed their members not to co-operate with the intro-
duction of new technology in their environment. Not many 
members obeyed the instruction. 64.8 per cent of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with statement 3, and 
22.2 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed with it. 
Again, the survey indicates tendency towards anti-militancy. 
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Statement 5: On key issues most members are prepared to 
support their unions. The assumption that a large majority 
of respondents would agree or strongly agree with this 
statement is not a primary indicator of militancy or anti-
militancy. Agreement of the union membership with union 
leaders on key issues was thought to be fundamental to the 
achievement of union objectives, especially improvement of 
wages and conditions of employment. However, since the 
employer is not likely to make a concession without a fight, 
militancy becomes an important aspect. The result indicates 
that 46.6 per cent of the respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement and 53.4 per cent disagreed, 
strongly disagreed, abstained or were uncertain. This again 
indicates anti-militant tendency. 
In statement 9: failure to secure better pay would seriously 
affect my attitude to work: militancy was linked with 
attitude to work. Since the civil service pay was linked 
with low morale it was reasonable to assume that fewer 
respondents would disagree or strongly disagree with the 
statement because most members believed that pay in the 
civil service was bad. The survey result was contrary to 
this view. A larger majority of respondents disagreed with 
it. Only 47.8 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with it; 
thus corroborating the anti-militant tendency. 
Anti-militant tendencies among members of the non-industrial 
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civil service unions are exemplified in the evidence studied 
above and are largely responsible for the apparent lack of 
success of the CCSU in wage negotiations with the Govern-
ment . 
HYPOTHESIS 5, Militancy is a more potent factor in 
trade union power1** than high union 
membership. 
This hypothesis considers the two basic elements of trade 
union power, that is, militancy and density of unionization. 
It assumes that whereas the larger the proportion of poten-
tial members who are actually in the membership of a union 
the more powerful the union would be; the powerfulness being 
totally subject to the degree of mi 1itancy within the mem-
bership. This assumption may be viewed in different ways. 
One way is to regard union density as a motor car without 
fuel and mi 1 itancy as its fuel. From the point of view of 
power and achievement both militancy and density of 
unionization are interdependent just as a motor car and its 
fuel are interdependent from the point of view of motion. 
However, if the two elements are visualized in units and 
varying units of one element are mixed with varying units of 
the other, for instance where militancy is (x) and union 
density is (y), larger quantities of (x) would produce 
better results with smaller quantities of (y) than vice 
versa. In other words:-
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2x * y = (2x)y 
would produce better results than 
2y * x = (2y)x 
The largest conceivable units of (x) is a situation where 
militancy in the union is at its peak; in other words, when 
there is 100 per cent co-operation between the union leaders 
and members. Without this co-operation any industrial action 
of the members unsupported by the leaders would be regarded 
as unofficial, for it would have taken place without the 
official approval of the union and according to the provi-
sions of its rules. Apart from achieving nothing, members 
who take this type of action may face disciplinary action of 
the employer or dismissal. 
On the other hand, the largest concentration of (y) is a 
"closed shop" situation, either pre-entry or post entry. 
Here again, the co-operation of the membership is an 
absolute must if the union leaders' call for an industrial 
action is to achieve any measure of success. Any action of 
the union leaders unsupported by the membership is like 
barking without a bite, a mere noise of a toothless bulldog. 
However, this hypothesis maintains that the power of the 
union depends more on the members' capacity for militancy 
rather than on the number of its members. 
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EVIDENCE: The survey indicated a high degree of militancy on 
some issues and little or none on others. The importance of 
these issues are examined here to establish:-
(a) their significance in the union/management power 
struggle; 
(b) the effect of union density on the success/failure 
of militant actions. 
RESULTS:-
(a) The first indicator of militancy examined in 
the analyses was the degree of support given by branches 
during the pay campaign of 1981, 1982 and 1983. It was esta-
blished that branch support declined in 1982 and 1983 after 
the failure of the same exercise in 1981. Militancy over 
pay, an issue of paramount importance to members, was in 
decline. Attendance at meetings was next examined; it was 
shown that an overall poor attendance was prevalent. Whether 
this is construed as anti-militant behaviour or simply a 
perennial dislike of meetings, it betrays a repugnance inhe-
rent in members towards any strain additional to the normal 
strain of daily work. This repugnance is apparently more 
prevalent among the non-industrial civil servants.*9 
The 1981 pay campaign gives a clear picture of the ideal 
state of mind indicative of a militant membership. Although 
there were divergent views about what type of industrial 
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action to take, it was quite evident "ab initio" that among 
those members who were vociferously in favour of an all-out 
strike there were those who were uncertain about themselves 
going on strike and those who were quite sure they would 
not. Nevertheless, the resounding war cry of the membership 
together with the resolve of the union leaders should have 
achieved the purpose of making the Government think twice 
about the tough stance which it had chosen. The survey 
question about the stages at which the Treasury offer was 
acceptable to members showed that the offer was never 
acceptable to 78.0 per cent of the respondents. This could 
be interpreted as wi11ingness to strike i f necessary. 
However, the discretion of the union leaders to opt for 
selective strike action showed foresight. An all-out strike 
would not have lasted even two weeks, let alone the eventual 
duration of the selective strike, in spite of the huge 
demonstration of wi11ingness to go all out. 
On the other hand, failure of the selective strike did not 
diminish the efficacy of militancy. The degree of militancy 
was just not enough to match the Government's bullishness. 
Similarly, the degree of militancy indicated by the ballot 
on the Treasury offer was inadequate. Although 61.7 per cent 
of the respondents voted to reject the offer it would not 
have made any difference if the offer were rejected by the 
entire membership, since it was implemented without the 
consent of the unions. The membership and the union leaders 
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were not prepared for the degree of militancy necessary to 
intimidate the Government. And rightly so; for it would have 
necessitated something more than the NUMS1 type of militancy 
without any guarantee of success.20 
Reaction to the series of half-day strikes in support of the 
1981 pay campaign was very favourable; over 80 per cent of 
the survey respondents took part. If all those who took part 
knew that what was required of them for the fight was the 
ferocity of ten million lions they would probably have 
preferred not to exert their wild-cat aggressiveness. Their 
response showed militancy but it was not enough. 
The Government's rebuttal of the foregoing instances of 
militancy dealt a lasting blow on the future willingness of 
members to strike. By 1982, propensity to strike had irreco-
verably dropped. 
Responses to two of the statements previously examined are 
discussed here in order to highlight their implications for 
the power struggle. The three statements were singled out 
because they demonstrate fundamental weakness in members' 
attitude to militancy. If it is accepted that solidarity is 
a connotation of militancy then participation in union 
activities and giving full support to its cause are 
prerequisites to the claim of membership. Payment of union 
dues, an action which is relegated to oblivion as soon as a 
318 
check-off authority has been signed, is not a substitute for 
the physical, mental and moral support which are the essence 
of the movement. Union dues are necessary; they pay the 
salaries of full-time officials. But full-time officials are 
not psychic. Their effectiveness depends on the participa-
tion of members. They are there to channel the effort and 
energy of members into achievements. 
The pioneers of the civil service trade union movement were 
brought together by common purpose. With solidarity and 
effort, the movement grew out of genuine grievances and 
functioned with energy until it was necessary for the 
members to put the elements - solidarity, effort and energy 
- into proper perspective. Then they acquired the services 
of full-time personnel to spearhead their drive for redress. 
Not only was mi 1 itancy at its peak, it was a phenomenon 
which presented civil servants in a different light; their 
behaviour had become unpredictable. This element of unpre-
dictability has now faded away. Civil servants nowadays 
appear by and large to have reverted to the pre-trade union 
days when individuals had work related problems, suffered 
injustices and accommodated unreasonable employer's attitude 
simply because they were afraid to speak out. 
From reactions to statement (1): "Members of senior grades 
feel that union activities conflict with their role as 
managers" and statement (5): "On key issues most members are 
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prepared to support their unions" it can inferred that atti-
tude to militancy has changed. 76 per cent of the survey 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with statement (1), an 
indication that members in higher grades nowadays perceive 
union activities as a burden. How do members of junior 
grades feel about union activities? An answer may be 
inferred from their participation at meetings. The following 
figures gathered from the analysis on table 15 are 
indicative, (junior grades only):-
TABLE 73 
MEETINGS 
AGM 
MANDATE 
PAY 
AGM & MANDATE 
AGM & PAY 
MANDATE & PAY 
ALL MEETINGS 
ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE 
(% of sample) (% of sample) (% of sample) 
(1982/83) (1981/82) 
6.0 
0.3 
2.3 
6.0 
1.3 
1.0 
45.4 
6.0 
1.7 
2.0 
7.6 
1.7 
1.0 
47.0 
(1983/83) 
6.0 
0.7 
2.3 
9.0 
1.7 
1.3 
49.7 
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TABLE 74 
(senior grades only):-
MEETINGS 
AGM 
MANDATE 
PAY 
AGM & MANDATE 
AGM & PAY 
MANDATE & PAY 
ALL MEETINGS 
ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE 
(% of sample) (% of sample) (1981/82) 
4.5 
0.5 
2.0 
7.0 
1.0 
49.0 
(1982/83) 
3.5 
1.5 
2.5 
8.0 
0.5 
1.0 
47.5 
ATTENDANCE 
(% of sample) 
(1983/83) 
2.5 
2.0 
2.5 
8.5 
1.0 
1.0 
51.0 
The above figures include branch officers. From this pattern 
of attendance it can be seen that the attitude of members in 
junior grades towards union activities was not significantly 
different from that of members in senior grades. The conten-
tion here is that militancy would be repugnant to members 
who regard union activities as a burden. Their attitude to 
militancy in now more predictable that ever before. 
Over 52 per cent of the respondents failed to agree with 
statement 5. Perhaps this would have been justifiable if the 
statement had specified support on "all issues"; for that 
would tantamount to declaring the union infallible. If the 
union cannot rely on the support of all its members at least 
on "key issues", it is hardly feasible for the union to 
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count on sufficient momentum when the achievement of an 
objective necessitates even a modicum of militancy. 
The argument that high union membership or high density of 
unionization is a less potent function of union power, is 
reinforced by comparing contemporary density of unionisa-
tion against the background of the degrees of militancy 
discussed above. In 1979 the public sector labour force 
was estimated at 6.3 million, out of which, union membership 
was estimated at 5.2 million - a density of 82.4 per cent.21 
Between 1979 and 1982, this figure had risen to 83.8 per 
cent.22 Non-industrial civil service unions recorded an 
average density of 82.7 per cent during this period. Despite 
these healthy numbers the unions suffered repeated defeats 
from the Government. If high density of unionization were 
more potent than militancy the high density should have made 
up for what was lacking in the degree of militancy. This was 
not so. Indeed, it can be argued that if the civil service 
unions operated closed shop but were 1acking in militancy 
they would have been defeated just the same. However, it 
seems rather ironic that were the civil service unions to 
develop such coherence and authority to make them powerful 
enough to challenge the Government on any issue and win they 
would do so at the peril of being condemned as anarchists by 
the very individuals on whose behalf the victory was won. 
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HYPOTHESIS 6. Within the civil service the higher the grade 
of work being done the greater is the pressure 
on the individual to leave his/her union acti-
vities behind. 
This hypothesis postulates that civil servants on higher 
grades are often under pressure to abandon their involvement 
with their unions because of their affiliation with manage-
ment . When the duties of a job include formulation of 
policies which are sometimes inextricably linked with 
conflict management, or dealing with highly confidential 
management matters such as corporate finance and personnel, 
it is unethical to burden the same person who is involved 
with union matters either as a lay activist or a local 
officer, with the responsibility of secrecy which such a job 
entails. Indeed, it is not unusual for individuals offered 
promotions into such positions to be asked to resign from 
their unions either as a precondition or as a voluntary 
gesture. The former Society of Civil and Public Servants 
(SCPS)23 organised members from junior management grades to 
directors. SCPS had a membership agreement with the First 
Division Association (FDA) mainly in order to prevent poach-
ing. SCPS members who were promoted into very senior 
positions sometimes resign from their current union and join 
the FDA. Although they cite their long-standing and distin-
guished services to SCPS in defence of their action, it 
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sometimes seems they have been seduced by the lofty name and 
the idea of the elite FDA. In reality however, they tacitly 
aspire for the comfort of being among colleagues who share 
with them the same idea of where their loyalty should be, 
particularly in times of conflict - on the management side. 
As SCPS members, it would be quite embarrassing for them to 
cross picket lines where their fellow members are on picket 
duty. They would probably find it easier if they were FDA 
members because of the absence of group pressure and because 
FDA would have voted against the action anyway.2^ Although 
the latter excuse became less convincing since the formation 
of the Council of the Civil Service Unions (CCSU) the influ-
ence of group pressure on individual FDA members would be 
different from that of the SCPS, that is, to abstain rather 
than to participate. 
EVIDENCE: The survey compared the responses of members of 
the lower grades with those of the higher grades in the 
following aspects:-
(a) Attendance of meetings. 
(b) Reaction to the hypothetical all-out strike during 
the same period. 
(c) Reaction to the series of half-day strikes. 
RESULTS:-
(a) The comparison of the frequency of meeting 
attendance made above between the higher and the lower 
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grades indicates no significant difference. Indeed, on 
aggregate, members in the higher grades seemed to attend 
meetings more frequently than members in the 1ower grades. 
47.4 per cent of respondents in 1ower grades attended al 1 
meetings, compared with 49.2 per cent of respondents in 
higher grades (see Tables 3 and 4). On the other hand, fewer 
respondents in higher grades attended single meetings during 
the same period - 7.2 per cent compared with 9.1 per cent of 
respondents in lower grades. This may be interpreted to mean 
that members in lower grades are more likely to ignore their 
branch meetings than members in higher grades. In this 
context therefore, the survey results did not support the 
hypothesis. 
(b) Taking part in any industrial action is always a 
good indicator of involvement in union activities. In 
particular, to go on strike is not a casual act these days 
when there are stringent rules, most of which discourage 
strikes with an implied threat of disciplinary action or 
dismissal for breach of contract. The replies of respondents 
to the question on a hypothetical all-out strike action were 
given with the full awareness of such repercussions. The 
effect of previous unsuccessful strikes also played a part. 
Reactions to the question were unfettered by pressures such 
as are possible in ballots taken by show of hands and may be 
regarded as a reliable indicator of degree of participation 
in union affairs. The comparison made in the previous 
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chapter between the reactions of respondents in higher and 
lower grades showed a slight difference which may be 
regarded as significant from the point of view of this 
hypothesis. The percentage of respondents in higher grades 
who abstained from the question over the three year period 
was 4.0 (3f), compared with 10.6 (x) of respondents in lower 
grades. 46.5 per cent of respondents in lower grades said 
they would stay out indefinitely, compared with 49.0 per 
cent of the higher grades. This means that 53.5 per cent and 
51.0 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively 
were nominally non-supporters of the hypothetical strike. A 
slightly higher percentage of respondents in the higher 
grades, by the above definition, showed involvement in union 
activities. 
(c) An implication of this hypothesis was that most 
members in higher grades shy away from union activities and 
that in a strike situation, those who cross picket lines or 
refuse to strike regard strikes as demeaning, hiding under a 
welcome group pressure. The hypothesis also implied that the 
behaviour of most members in lower grades is exactly the 
opposite. However, according to respondents' reactions to 
the series of half-day strikes this view is untenable. 88.0 
per cent of respondents in higher grades participated, 
compared with 75.7 per cent of the lower grades. This means 
that 24.3 per cent of the lower grades avoided the strike, 
compared with 12.0 per cent of the higher grades. 
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HYPOTHESIS 7. Unorganised conflict is more manifest 
when the union exhibits anti-militant 
tendencies. 
The concept of unorganised conflict as distinguished from 
organised conflict has been challenged by Edwards2^ to be a 
questionable idea. He argued that most individual actions 
may reflect group pressures and certain institutionalised 
norms. Indeed, any individual actions in which group 
pressures are apparent or which reflect institutionalised 
norm should not be mistaken for unorganised conflict. Also, 
it is true that a given action need not be unorganised any 
more than it should reflect the presence of conflict. 
Absenteeism for instance, may arise from several causes and 
it may well be difficult to say whether it is unorganised or 
conflictual. Nevertheless, a certain amount of deliberate 
absenteeism does exist and if the cause of it can in any way 
be linked with the definition of conflict as proposed by 
Kornhauser et al.2^ and numerous other writers on the 
subject, then it is conflictual. 
The gulf of difference between centrally orchestrated action 
from a union headquarters and a spontaneous action of an 
individual union member, makes it imperative to establish a 
nomenclature for each of the concepts. The concept of 
unorganised conflict envisaged in this hypothesis strictly 
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relates to an action of an individual motivated not by 
another individual or group, certainly not by the union, but 
by a personal or collective grievance. For instance, lack of 
promotion prospects may induce an individual to adopt casual 
attitudes to work. The main concern of this hypothesis is 
whether individual employees resort to personal "tit for 
tat" actions when their unions fail. 
EVIDENCE: The survey examined a number of actions which are 
manifestations of unorganised conflict. The reactions of 
respondents to the following individual actions were scruti-
nized: -
(a) Work to rule. 
(b) Sabotage. 
(c) Absenteeism. 
(d) Working with less or no enthusiasm. 
(e) Lateness. 
(f) Actively looking for another job. 
RESULTS:-
(a) Working to rule is a stoppage of work which 
usually takes the form of retarding or interrupting a 
service or process by the literal carrying out of orders, or 
rules, or the mass observation of safety regulations. As a 
form of industrial action it is difficult to operate without 
the sanction of the union. This is because the individual 
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needs to be acquainted of the legality of such a practice 
and unions are usually better informed. However, it is quite 
possible for an individual to carry out his duties strictly 
according to his employment contract, thereby implementing 
work-to-rule without being in breach of his contract. In the 
civil service, for instance, an individual might send the 
manuscript of a report or correspondence to the typing pool, 
knowing that it could take up to three weeks to get it back, 
whereas he could do it within days on his office personal 
computer. Individuals may implement such delays with impu-
nity particularly if the use of PCs, word processors or 
typewriters were not in their contract or job description. 
Do they resort to such actions? The result discussed here 
excludes occasions when members were advised to work-to-rule 
from their union headquarters. 
Every year since the major defeats of the civil service 
unions in the early 1980s pay increases made by the Govern-
ment have been less than satisfactory. More often than not, 
the offers have been made with grudge and have been forced 
on civil servants, allowing them no option of resort to 
arbitration. The Government acquisition of this quasi-
despotic power over its employees was progressive. First, to 
eliminate the embarrassment of perpetually setting aside the 
findings of an authentic research carried out by a duly 
constituted body, the Government dismissed the PRU. Next, 
the very essence of arbi t ration was vi 1 i f ied when the 
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Government time and time again chose to ignore its reommen-
dations. Refusal to go to arbitration was the Government's 
"coup de grace". This situation did put a huge number of 
civil servants, especially those with several years of 
service, in a predicament. For many, it was too late to 
start looking for another job. Recession and high unemp-
loyment made this option very difficult for those who were 
willing and able to change their jobs. Most civil servants 
were therefore caught with their backs to the wall. The 
Government had developed total immunity from the counter-
vailing force of the unions. In spite of the fact that the 
civil servant today has a union, belongs to a collective, he 
is almost as helpless as his counterpart in the days of the 
patronage system. 
It is significant that 46.6 per cent of the respondents said 
they practised work-to-rule. The recent ploy of linking pay 
increases to performance is an indirect admission by the 
Government that the individual is quite capable of imposing 
his own sanction where the unions fail. 
(b) Sabotage: Only 4 per cent of the respondents 
said they had resorted to sabotage. This may well be so if 
the concept of sabotage is only limited to damage to 
property. An observation was made in the previous chapter 
that if sabotage of this nature were widespread Government 
buildings throughout the nation would be perpetually vandal-
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ized. However, sabotage has a wider meaning than destruction 
to property- When it means "action taken to prevent the 
achievement of any aim", it would also cover four of the 
items listed above, that is, working to rule, absenteeism, 
working with less or no enthusiasm and lateness. It is 
debatable that certain sick absences can come within the 
category. In this wider context therefore, sabotage may be 
more widespread than is apparent. 
(c) Only 11.4 per cent of the respondents said that 
they had taken sick leave. Compared to the general level of 
sick absences in the civil service, this figure is very low. 
However, it should noted that the figure represents sick 
absences induced by frustration. Frustration can also induce 
another type of sick absence. The phrase "on-site sick 
absence" is used here to facilitate a definition. An "on-
site sick absence" involves a situation where an individual 
excuses himself from certain duties of his job on account of 
an ailment which does not totally prevent him from attending 
work. In other words, he would go to work regularly but he 
would limit the range of duties he may perform. For example, 
if part of his duties include climbing ladders he might say 
that he suffers from vertigo and produce a doctor's certifi-
cate advising him not to climb ladders. Or, a person who 
uses a word processor or a computer to perform some of his 
duties might say that constant use of the VDU gives him a 
headache and substantiate his claim with a doctor's certifi-
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cate. Most of these cases may be genuine but there is no 
denying that some may be claims made purely in order express 
latent frustration, since there is no easy way to test the 
veracity of the claims. 
(d) The above definition does not constitute 
"working with less or no enthusiasm" because there is an 
element of negotiation involved before an individual is 
allowed to abstain from some of his duties. Working with 
less or no enthusiasm is not negotiable, as individuals, 
driven to listlessness by frustration, go about their work 
spontaneously avoiding as much of it as they can possibly 
get away with. Some of them would pretend to be working hard 
when they are being observed. The basic principle which 
underlies this discussion is motivation. Lawler (1967)2? 
postulates that an employee's motivation to perform effect-
ively is determined by the following variables: 
1. The probability that a given amount of effort towards 
performing effectively will result in a reward or 
valued outcome. 
This variable really contains two aspects:-
(a) the probability that effort will result 
in performance 
(b) performance will result in reward; 
Vroom (1964)28 refers to the first of these subjective prob-
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abilities as an "expectancy" and to the second as an "inst-
rumentality" 
2. The individual's perception of the value of reward or 
outcome that might be obtained by performing effect-
ively. 
In Lawler's view, reward value and effort/reward probabil-
ity combine multiplicatively in order to determine the indi-
vidual's motivation. On the other hand, Adams (1963)29 a n £ 
Homans (1961)30 postulate "that perceived discrepancies in 
ratios of rewards to investments (of effort)31 produce 
feelings of inequity, and consequently negative effect, 
regardless of the direction of the discrepancy. In other 
words, tension is produced by relative gratification as well 
as relative deprivation. Discrepancies produced by "over-
reward" are associated with feelings of guilt, while those 
produced by "under-reward" are associated with feelings of 
anger or unfairness".32 it is unlikely that the feeling of 
unfairness such as has permeated morale in the civil service 
will be eradicated by the Government's current pressure to 
link pay increases with performance. At least 50.0 per cent 
of the respondents said they worked with less or no enthu-
siasm. This is hardly a surprise; had the civil service 
unions succeeded in securing equitable pay the situation 
would have been different. Success in linking pay increases 
with performance cannot be absolute; it can only be 
333 
relative. Since the yardstick by which performance can be 
measured in most civil service jobs is subject to the super-
visor's personal opinion, background and frame of reference, 
reliance on this method of determining pay increases can 
only generate more dissatisfaction and further deterioration 
of morale. 
(e) The views expressed here about lateness naturally 
excludes unintentional late-coming. Arriving late due to 
unforeseeable delays in transportation can hardly qualify as 
a manifestation of conflict. It is a sign of conflict how-
ever, when individuals deliberately will not make an effort 
to arrive on time. The focus of this area of the survey was 
on this aspect of lateness. Many civil service jobs have a 
direct link with the public where opening hours have to be 
maintained and offices manned. For this reason, lateness is 
not typical and cannot be acceptable in the service. On the 
other hand, the introduction of flexible working hours in 
the service has gone a long way to making individuals very 
conscious about time keeping. Given these preconditions, an 
overall 5 per cent lateness, including involuntary ones, 
throughout the civil service may be regarded as significant. 
Over 9 per cent of the survey respondents said they resorted 
to lateness as an expression of their dissatisfaction. Since 
group pressure was not feasible in those instances they were 
manifestations of militancy at personal level; unorganized 
conflict was in evidence. 
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(f) Actively looking for another job: It is hardly 
a desirable option for anybody currently in a job to be 
constantly looking for another job. Most people would prefer 
to have a permanent and secure job. Unfortunately, this is 
no longer so in the civil service since pay and conditions 
are being forced on employees as "Hobson's choice". For many 
civil servants who have spent their entire working lives in 
the service and are either too old or too demoralized to 
look for other jobs, it is a very difficult option to have 
to stay in a job they are fed up of doing. It is equally 
difficult for those who are able and willing to move, 
because jobs are not easy to find these days. So, morale is 
abysmally low al 1 round. The survey shows that over 30 per 
cent of the respondents said they were actively looking for 
another job. Evidently, these people would be searching 
outside the civil service and their success would mean a 
loss of members to the civil service unions. It is therefore 
hardly feasible that the unions would instruct or advise 
their members to leave thei r civi1 service jobs. The 
decision to move out of the civil service can only be 
personal and spontaneous, arising from dissatisfaction. This 
is interpreted as an indisputable evidence of unorganised 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter begins with a summary of the survey conclusions 
and findings, followed by a summary of the hypotheses which 
were tested in the previous chapter. Then the theories 
outlined in Chapter 1 are reviewed in order to highlight 
their relevance to the survey and to indicate areas in which 
fresh knowledge has been contributed to the debate. This is 
followed by a discussion of the problems which are facing 
the unions and their members, as interpreted from the 
survey. Some solutions are suggested mainly for the benefit 
of the unions. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS 
CONCLUSION 1 
Most members join their unions in order to safeguard their 
rights to better pay, better working conditions and job 
security. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) A belief in trade unionism had the greatest influence 
on the various reasons given by respondents for joining 
their unions. 
(b) Educational background or qualifications of respondents 
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had little influence on their reasons for joining. 
(c) Grade or social status of respondents had no influence 
on their reasons for joining although it might have played a 
significant part in their decision to join. 
CONCLUSION 2 
Belonging to their unions was just as important to respon-
dents as possessing relevant qualifications for their jobs. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
finding:-
Only very few respondents said belonging to their unions was 
not very important; and fewer still said they had no opinion 
about the importance of belonging to a union. The majority 
of these respondents were in the lower education group or 
had no qualifications. 
CONCLUSION 3 
The unions by and large met the respondents' expectations in 
terms of their reasons for joining. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) Most of the respondents were satisfied with the perform-
3 
ance of their unions and even those who had reasons to be 
dissatisfied, about 25 per cent of the sample, maintained 
their membership nonetheless. (See page 88) 
(b) A larger majority of the respondents would continue 
their membership even if the unions fail to negotiate better 
pay. (See table 63). 
CONCLUSION 4 
The defeat suffered by the unions in the 1981 pay campaign 
had an adverse effect on respondents1 willingness to support 
future campaigns wholeheartedly. Consequently, it would be 
ill-advised for the unions to rely on the support of their 
members when it comes to a show-down. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) Branches from where there was no support for the pay 
campaign increased in 1982 and 1983. Similarly, branches 
from where there was poor support increased in those two 
years. 
(b) Most respondents felt less will ing to support their 
unions on key issues. (See table 60, statement 5.). 
(c) The attitude of active white-collar civil service trade 
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unionists to industrial action is influenced more by their 
experience of the negotiating process and the behaviour of 
the employer than it is by the structure of their personal 
circumstances, whether inside or outside of the work situa-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 5 
The propensity to strike was higher among younger respon-
dents. 
CONCLUSION 6 
Respondents in the higher grades exhibited greater degree of 
militancy. 
CONCLUSION 7 
Branch officers were more militant than ordinary members. 
These conclusions can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) More respondents in the age groups 21-30 and 31-40 took 
the series of half-day strike actions. (See tables 24 and 
24a). 
(b) More respondents in the higher grades rejected the 1981 
pay offer outright. 
(c) More respondents in the higher grades took the series of 
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half-day strike actions. (See tables 25 and 25a). 
(d) Fewer branch officers said they would ignore the hypo-
thetical strike. (See table 30e). 
(e) More branch officers supported the overtime ban.(See 
table 31b). 
CONCLUSION 8 
Family and financial commitments had little or no influence 
on decision to take the strike action. 
CONCLUSION 9 
Moral principles played a greater part in decisions to take 
strike actions. 
These conclusions can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) More respondents who had rent or mortgage commitments 
came out on strike. (See page 140). 
(b) More single/married respondents with children came out 
on strike. (See pages 141 and 142). 
CONCLUSION 10 
Belief in the efficacy of "arbitration" was greater among 
respondents in the higher grades. 
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This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
finding:-
More respondents in the lower grades felt "arbitration" had 
little or no value. More respondents in the higher grades 
trusted "arbitration". (See tables 32a and 32b). 
CONCLUSION 11 
Pay in the civil service was low. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
finding:-
Most respondents in both the higher and the lower grades 
felt that civil service pay and promotion prospects were bad 
or very bad. (See table 47 and 49). 
CONCLUSION 12 
The responsibilities of senior civil servants as managers 
conflict with their role as trade unionist. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
finding:-
The view expressed by majority of respondents in both the 
lower and higher grades was that the duties of the higher 
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grades as managers were not compatible with their trade 
union activities, although this did not necessarily diminish 
their participation, (cf. tables 14(c-e) and 14(f-h) and see 
table 56). 
CONCLUSION 13 
Although the Government's aboli t i on of t rade un ions at the 
GCHQ is a key issue and despite the fact that majority of 
the respondents said they would come out on strike against 
the decision, an adequate support for such a strike would be 
very doubtful. 
This conclusion can be derived from the following survey 
findings:-
(a) Since the unsuccessful pay campaign in 1981 support for 
industrial action, especially strikes, has been in decline. 
It is even more so now with the onslaught of anti-trade 
union laws. 
(b) Most respondents would regard GCHQ as a moral issue but 
because of the logical conclusion of the argument, that is, 
that abolition of trade unions in the civil service was not 
likely in the foreseeable future, it would remain only a key 
issue. More respondents disagreed, strongly disagreed with 
or were uncertain about supporting their unions on key 
issues. 
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SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis postulates that members' propensi ty to 
militancy is influenced by high personal commitments; 
however, there is no significant evidence from the survey 
results to support this. A comparison between respondents 
who had financial, family and other commitments and those 
who had none, indicates greater propensity to militancy 
among the former group. 
The second hypothesis proposes a corollary of the first. It 
assumes that the more importance individuals place on their 
personal commitments the less militant they would tend to 
be. Again, the empirical evidence does not support this. The 
majority of those respondents who voted to reject their 
employer's offer and escalate the dispute had more personal 
commitments than those who accepted the offer. 
In the third hypothesis, militancy was conceptualized as the 
life-line of trade unionism. The employer is assumed to 
acquire more power as the union is perceived to be less 
militant. Three separate evidence cited from the survey 
corroborated each other in one conclusive proof. If mili-
tancy is visualized as a continuum, the degree of militancy 
exhibited by the unions in the 1981 struggle was just enough 
to push the Government's resistance curve to infinity (oo). 
Resistance became much easier for the Government in the 
years that followed, whereas if carried to the other extreme 
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of the continuum, militancy might have force the Government 
to capitulate, since the British Government was not likely 
to react in the same way as the Peking Government at 
Tiananmen Square if civil servants were to resort to civil 
disobe- dience in pursuit of their claim. 
The fourth hypothesis reinforces the proof of the third 
hypothesis. Discovery of weakness among the union membership 
made the Government more forceful and unreasonable at the 
bargaining table, thereby frustrating the efforts of the 
union negotiators. 
The fifth hypothesis highlights militancy as the main force 
behind trade union power. Density of membership is seen as 
an important variable but not as essential as militancy. 
Although the survey indicates a decline in the level of 
militancy after the 1981 defeat the fact that union density 
in the years that followed that defeat was well over 80 per 
cent did not compensate for the decline; whereas tenacious 
militancy, even by a declining membership, emphasized not by 
refusal to attend union meetings or to support other union 
activities but by giving full support, intensified by 
actions such as hunger strikes or even civil disobedience 
might have forced the Government to concede. 
The contention implicit in the sixth hypothesis, that higher 
grade civil servants instinctively avoid involvement with 
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their union activities is not supported by the survey 
result. A comparison between the higher and the lower grades 
from the point of view of attending union meetings and 
participating in union activities shows that members in 
higher grades took part and supported their unions more than 
members in lower grades. 
The seventh hypothesis argues that "indirect (unorganized) 
militancy" exists, especially in view of the unions' anti-
militant tendencies. The failure of the unions to negotiate 
better pay may not cause loss of membership but there is 
evidence from the survey that it causes low morale and when 
morale is low enthusiasm to perform better is almost non-
existent. Low morale saps the courage to avoid manifesta-
tions of unorganized militancy. 
RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES OUTLINED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the theories examined in the literature review 
centred on the endemism of conflict in the relationship 
between the employer and employee. The acquisition, threat 
and the use or abuse of power has been and will always 
remain a contentious issue; it has been a major preoccupa-
tion of observers and writers in Industrial Relations. The 
legitimacy of slavery, a master's quasi-devine right of life 
and death over his slaves has long been eradicated, but 
something similar to such a right has threatened to persist 
in the relationship between capital and labour, employer and 
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employee, and indeed, between the Government and its 
employees. The war against slavery was vigorously waged by 
right-thinking men who spoke out fearlessly, fought to the 
death and were no less prolific in producing written 
argument which ultimately vanquished the protagonists of 
slavery. Those industrial relations analysts and industrial 
sociologists who busy themselves collecting data, analyzing 
them and interpreting empirical laws deduced from them will 
continue to perform a similarly essential task until 
employer/employee relationships have been purged of the 
connotations of slavery. 
However, the writers engaged in this war of words and 
proliferation of theories are polarized according to the 
context of their argument. For instance, writers on power 
and conflict, such as Thomas (1976), Dunlop (1944), Hyman 
(1975), Dahl (1957 ), Edwards (1978), Marchington (1975), 
Lukes (1974) and many more, are popular for their definition 
of Industrial Relations concepts. Others like Kessler 
(1980), Fox (1974), Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) and 
Purcell (1981) are noted for their critical appraisal of the 
characteristics and attitudes of the actors on the indus-
trial relations arena. The work of both groups nevertheless 
contribute significantly to the knowledge and understanding 
of Industrial Relations and are equally relevant to the 
findings of this survey. 
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Thus, Thomas (1976) depicted the fringe of conflict in which 
the interests of the actors are polarized as an "either/or 
conceptualization of a conflict issue". Blake et al. (1964) 
visualized it as a "win/lose" situation. Whatever epithet is 
accorded to the concept, the bottom line is that it illus-
trates "Pareto Optimality" which exists between the Govern-
ment and the civil service unions where conflict of interest 
between the two sides is total. The survey results indicate 
that the outcomes of pay campaigns over the years have been 
total satisfaction for the Government and total frustration 
for the unions; the Government's satisfaction occurring at 
the expense of the unions and their members. 
Hyman(1975) traces the endemism of conflict in the employer/ 
employee relationship back to the fact that the interests of 
both groups are largely at variance, each group seeking to 
wield power and mobilise resources in order to ensure the 
predominance of its own interests. The civil service unions 
harangue their membership in order to mobilise support and 
generate militancy. The resulting power is neutralized by 
the Government through its legislative powers. The Govern-
ment then goes on to assert its predominance by enforcing 
unilateral decisions and wage levels which have been 
vociferously rejected by the unions. Hyman's theory is 
actualized in the perennial clashes between the Government 
and the civil service unions and in particular, in the 
abysmal level to which the survey shows morale to have sank. 
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Purcell's contribution is directly relevant to the findings 
of the survey. His analysis of the patterns of industrial 
relations traces the phases of the relationship between the 
Government and its employees' organizations from what he 
termed "cooperative constitutionalism" to "adoptive coopera-
tion" and from "antagonistic constitutionalism" to "uninhi-
bited antagonism". Analyses of the survey data indicate that 
the Government had gone through all the four phases and has 
currently settled within the latter two phases, leaving the 
civil service unions no choice but to comply. 
This situation exemplifies the findings of Edwards and 
Scullion (1982) who concluded that conflict may not always 
emerge in action if the power of one side is so great that 
all forms of protest are suppressed. Success in suppressing 
conflict in this way has many implications. For instance, 
the party with the upper hand, which in the case of the 
civil service means the Government, feels free to ignore or 
set aside procedures. Industrial peace is sacrificed on the 
altar of the Government's ego. The survey highlights 
instances when the Government repeatedly sets aside the 
recommendations of arbitration and other pay review bodies. 
It also indicates that failure of the Government to recog-
nize the rationale of loyalty to procedure is partly 
responsible for the perpetual unrest in its relation with 
its workforce; Fox's observation is thus corroborated:-
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The desirability of peaceful settlement; the importance 
of observing the other party's expectations in respect 
of procedure; the restraints and conventions of social 
interaction which maintain an environment favourable 
to compromise; these are at once the preconditions and 
the consequences of successful conflict-regulation. In 
so far as there is normative agreement about these 
behaviours, it embodies a recognition by both sides 
that any immediate tactical advantage resulting from 
violation of shared expectations would be outweighed by 
damage to the system within which they had hitherto 
accomplished satisfactory results.1 
This sentiment is echoed by Kevin Hawkins:-
....the essential prerequisite of effective procedural 
relations is a recognition by both sides that their 
power to take action unilaterally must be held in 
check.2 
Finally, the conclusions of Goldthorpe and Lockwood are 
directly relevant to the survey results in that despite 
undesirable Government practices in the area of Industrial 
Relations highlighted in the survey, practices which 
continue to keep civil servants proletariat, the Government 
tries to project an image which portrays its employees as 
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middle-class. Had this middle-class image been correct the 
embourgeoisement thesis would have been confirmed. However, 
evidence from the survey which indicates that a much larger 
proportion of the civil service workforce only qualify as 
working-class confirms that the embourgeoisement thesis is 
largely unfounded and corroborates the findings of Gold-
thorpe and Lockwood. 
THE PROBLEMS FACING THE UNIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS 
The essence of trade unionism is in its capacity to provide 
a day-to-day means of democratic representation of its 
members' interests. If a union lacks this capacity it might 
as well cease to exist. By this definition, the civi 1 
service unions were approaching a point where their exist-
ence was becoming meaningless; their prestige was declining 
and limitations to their power posed internal organization 
problems which was alienating their frustrated members. At a 
time when members were becoming keenly aware of the extent 
to which their employer had relegated them in terms of pay 
and conditions, their interest in the union had suffered 
considerably from atrophy. Local branches were running short 
of officers because very few members were interested. A 
vicious circle was beginning to set in - members felt the 
unions had lost their power and were becoming increasingly 
"dues paying members" only; at the same time the unions felt 
the need to flex their muscles but stamina was almost non-
existent. Members' attitudes were changing but only few 
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recognized the change that was taking place or why it was 
happening. Some of the unions knew something was wrong but 
did not know what it was and others simply refuse to 
acknowledge the fact that a change was taking place; 
everything was attributed to the "apathy of members". 
Let us assume that "apathy" was rightly responsible for the 
unions' predicament, it is not sufficient to just leave it 
at that and use it as a scapegoat. One way out of the 
difficulty is to investigate the causes of apathy and 
examine the factors which influence members attitude towards 
the problems which they are up against. This is the reason 
for the necessity of this survey. More specifically, the 
hope and enthusiasm which underpined members' fight for 
better pay and conditions in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were vanquished by their employer. These, together with the 
events leading up to 1984 when the Treasury repeatedly 
implemented pay offers that were rejected by the civi 1 
i. 
service union membership had left most members disillusioned 
and less optimistic about the success of future strikes. The 
timing of the survey was therefore appropriate not only from 
the point of view of the historical context but more impor-
tantly from the point of view of capturing in real time the 
reactions of members to the new constraints imposed on them. 
In the years up to 1982 the Government pretended to negoti-
ate pay and conditions with the CCSU whereas in fact their 
intent was to enforce predetermined packages. They were 
353 
successful in doing so in spite of heavy financial losses 
caused by the strikes. In 1983, the claim put forward by the 
CCSU was well researched and was backed with supporting 
evidence (see Appendix 5). The constituent unions of the 
CCSU also each put forward their own evidence in support of 
claims for better conditions (see Appendix 6 "SCPS" Support-
ing Evidence for Claim for Reduction in Hours of Work). In 
line with the Government's nonchalant attitude nothing came 
out of the logical argument put forward. Low pay and poor 
conditions which were at the roots of the grievances of 
Government employees in the last century seem to have 
remained the principal cause of low morale in the service. 
It should be recalled that trade union movement in the civil 
service did not come into existence just for its own sake. 
The exigencies of the time formed the basis of its sponta-
neous characteristics which are almost lacking in the 
movement today. The exigencies are still present, though 
they differ somewhat from those which filliped the pioneers 
of the movement into action. The fact that employment in the 
civil service was a favour which members of parliament 
handed out as they pleased, placed civil servants at the 
time in an awkward position. The so-called patronage system 
made it difficult for employees to voice any criticisms 
against their employers or grumble about the injustices 
which they suffered. All the employees shared one common 
handicap - they had no means of redress for their 
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grievances. 
Despite the progress which was made since that time, from 
the acceptance of trade unionism in the service through to 
the successes attributed to Whitleyism, the consequences of 
the patronage system seem to have surfaced again only this 
time in a form more serious than it was in the last century. 
When employees were muzzled and prevented by their debt of 
gratitude from seeking redress for their grievances they did 
not have a means of democratic representation which seem-
ingly exists today. The Government, having allowed trade 
unions to function in the civil service, seem to regret 
their existence and is doing everything possible to render 
them useless. 
Thus, this survey puts the present day problems of the 
unions into context by making a distinction between popular 
beliefs and real life views interpreted from the collected 
data. The problems may be summarized as follows:-
(a) Low pav 
This originated from the fact that the pay of 
civil servants is funded from public revenue. The 
excuses made by the Government for keeping it low 
include the security of civil service jobs, right 
to the so-called non-contributory pension and the 
claim that pay increases in the service cause inf-
lation. 
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(b) Low morale 
Low morale is a direct consequence of low pay. 
Those employees who have already spent the major 
part of their working lives in the civil service 
find it difficult if not impossible to move to 
other jobs. They are thus forced to stay in a job 
which gives them little or no job satisfaction 
and an inequitable remuneration. Most newly emp-
loyed persons who take civil service jobs because 
there are no other jobs available leave as soon as 
they can find a better alternative. If there are 
no alternatives then the civil service jobs are 
just better than going on the dole queue. 
(c) Difficult/Unreasonable employer 
An employer who has the advantage of the formid-
able power of capital at his disposal is in a 
position of strength compared with his employees 
who are constantly in need of subsistence. If the 
employer also turns out to be the Government with 
the authority to make and unmake laws then his 
power is unlimited. Such is the power which the 
Government has over its employees. The only time a 
slight equilibrium may be restored between the two 
sides is when there is a severe labour shortage 
which makes recruitment into the civil service 
extremely difficult. The unions apparently have 
356 
very little power to match that of the Government, 
especially when the Government uses all possible 
means, including artificially created unemploy-
ment, to maintain its supremacy. 
(d) Hioh unemployment 
Apart from the problem of decimating the union 
membership, high unemployment makes pay negotia-
tions extremely difficult for the unions. For 
instance, if the Government insists on giving 
increases just enough to retain staff or ease 
recruitment problems then the unions will never be 
able to produce any reason good enough to justify 
increases beyond the limit set by the Government; 
with the current rate of unemployment there cannot 
be recruitment or retention problems such as could 
make the Government shift from its position. 
(e) The recession 
Unemployment always gets worse during a recession 
because as business looses momentum firms are 
forced to lay off staff and redundancies abound. 
Recession affects almost all forms of business and 
its knock-on effect usually throws the economy 
into a vicious circle. The Government needs no 
further excuses to squeeze its own employees even 
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harder during a recession; like the fami liar 
cliche "there is a war on!", recession has conno-
tations of extreme sacrifice and austerity speci-
fically for civil servants. They are expected to 
set an example for the rest of the working popula-
tion be absorbing the full impact of the nations' 
economic chasm. The unions have no choice but to 
co-operate; the Government has seen to that. The 
worst part of it all is that the forced sacrifices 
are forgotten as soon as the recession is over. 
Back to the negotiating table, the Government 
trumps up other excuses to maintain the squeeze. 
(f) The apathy of members 
The growing tendency of members to adopt an indif-
ferent attitude towards their unions must be one 
of the greatest distinguishing marks between the 
present day membership and those whose effort 
brought the movement into existence. It is hard to 
reconcile the fact that those pioneers had very 
little going for them and yet did not succumb to 
apathy, whereas present day unionists have a lot 
more in their favour - density of membership, full 
time specialists and favourable laws - to name a 
few, and yet they lack the courage which those 
early unionists had in abundance. 
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The problems listed above are by no means exhaustive but 
they are mutually interconnected, each seemingly reinforcing 
the other. In other words, a solution for one may go a long 
way to solving the others. But the reality of having to deal 
with a difficult and often unreasonable employer poses an 
almost insurmountable obstacle. High unemployment and the 
recession are political problems; there is not much the 
unions can do about them. The problem of apathy however, 
although not apparent, is singularly viable. Solve the 
apathy problem and the solution for low pay and low morale 
may well be within reach. 
DISCUSSION 
One of the simplest questions in the survey questionnaire 
was why individuals joined their unions; it also turned out 
to be for some respondents a very difficult question to 
answer. Many interesting reasons were given - see chapter 4, 
p. 83, but the most startling was the answer given by about 
a dozen interviewees. It did not seem important at the time 
but after analyzing the questionnaire replies and it was 
observed that none of the 500 respondents gave that 
particular answer, it was quite clear how more convenient it 
is to have plenty of time to consider each question before 
putting down an answer, rather than having to give an 
instant reply. The interviewees' answer was that they had 
never stopped to think about it. This is quite different 
from the "I don't know" type of answer because given the 
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time the interviewee would probably be able to specify a 
reason. The "I don't know" reply is almost the same as join-
ing the union for no reason. An observation that can be 
easily overlooked from the reactions of both the interview-
ees and the respondents is that neither of them would react 
to the question if it was not put in the first place. This 
is precisely why many union members loose interest in their 
union affairs from the very moment they sign their member-
ship forms. It is also why unions prosper more in factory 
situations. The local white-collar union representative does 
not usually function in the same way as his factory shop-
steward counterpart. The shop-steward's duty toward his 
constituents does not end, but begins when he signs them on. 
He takes personal interest in their welfare in the factory, 
checks on them frequently to make sure they have no problems 
and if they have, he tries to sort them out. They respect 
him because they know he is trustworthy. In time of crisis, 
all he has to do is say the word and everybody is out on 
strike; not so much because of group pressure but because of 
loyalty to him primarily, then to the group which he has 
formed and then to the union. 
The so-called membership secretary in a local branch of a 
civil service white-collar union should learn to perform in 
a similar manner. There is no magic way to inspire interest 
in union affairs. Interest should originate from the 
organizers, the local officer, not by ushering members to 
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union meetings but by sharing in their day-to-day cares and 
by establishing a bond with them which transcends the 
"officer/rank-and-file" relationship. When this trust 
relationship has been achieved no other form of soliciting 
interest in union affairs is necessary, as members would 
have already learnt to share in the interests of a trusted 
officer just as he manifestly does in theirs. Rapport thus 
established may not guarantee 100 per cent attendance at 
union meetings but it would attract a good number of 
attentive members. It may be argued that there is not enough 
facility time to permit this degree of liaison with members. 
The local officer who takes on the duties of membership 
secretary should be dedicated and should be prepared to 
spend some of his/her own time in order to cover his 
constituency adequately. If there are many members in the 
constituency, the number could be split among as many 
membership secretaries as would give each secretary not more 
than a dozen members at the most. Where there are more than 
three membership secretaries, a periodic coordinating 
meeting should be held among them in order to compare notes 
and lend a helping hand to one another if necessary. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why there is always a shortage of 
volunteers for local offices is because members feel they 
are thankless jobs. Comments like "I get nothing but critic-
ism out of it" is common and is largely true. 3 if members 
feel this way then a simple solution is for the union to pay 
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local officers some allowance commensurate to the amount of 
their own time spent. 
MORE UNION INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR MEMBERS' WORKPLACE AFFAIRS 
The relationship described above is a necessary prelude to a 
direct participation of the union in the development of its 
members. Unions should objectively motivate their members to 
perform efficiently and if necessary, keep a record of their 
achievement in this direction for negotiation purposes. They 
should participate in suggesting, and if possible, designing 
courses that would help their members' self development. 
Courses developed for members should not be limited to trade 
union affairs alone; they should cover all aspects of their 
day-to-day duties. This degree of union involvement has 
become even more urgent and necessary in view of the recent 
"performance point" agreement. Having achieved this, it 
becomes imperative that they should also participate in 
monitoring the progress of their members to ensure that no-
one who deserves to move on, stagnates. This should not be 
difficult; after all, unions do take part in job evaluation 
and job satisfaction exercises. 
The benefits of this degree of union involvement are many. 
In the first place, it is in the interest of the unions to 
promote an educated workforce; their productivity bargaining 
would be that much more effective. Since the training thus 
provided would be available to members only, the unions 
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would create an elite workforce that would perform more 
efficiently and more effectively than their non-member coll-
eagues. Also, when rapid progress, linked strictly with 
merit, is one of the benefits the unions can offer their 
members, it becomes per se, a selling point, particularly if 
management is unable to provide such training and develop-
ment. Not only would the unions gain the loyalty of their 
existing members they might even get more non-members to 
join. There can be only very few people in the workplace who 
do not care about advancement. Every successful case is an 
invitation to non-members. 
HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECT 
The current system of periodic health and safety tour of the 
premises is a perfect recipe for boredom. Inspection of the 
premises by one or two persons representing management and 
one or more representatives from each union is carried out 
as quickly as the management representatives can possibly 
make it; the quicker, the better for them. Rather than 
object to the slapdash method, the union representatives 
usually go along with it because they too invariably wish to 
get it over and done with. But by far the greatest criticism 
of the unions' performance in this area is the fact that 
they often cannot find anyone to represent them. Time spent 
in each area of the premises is hardly more than the time 
required to walk briskly from one end of the area to the 
other. Members working in the area probably recognize the 
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management representatives but usually cannot tell which 
local officer represents what union. They do not even know 
who their own union's health and safety representative is; 
sometimes their union has no one to represent them. In those 
circumstances, rather than speak to strangers who would 
regard them as trouble makers if they spoke of any hazards 
in the area, they simply look on while the group moves 
along. If there is any hazard worth reporting it is drawn to 
the attention of the group. Because it is reported to the 
group and not to the reporter's own local representative it 
is more often than not left unattended to; none of the union 
representatives at the scene feels it is his/her responsibi-
lity to chase it. 
The purpose of the periodic tours is to discover potential 
health and safety hazards before they become major problems. 
Management may feel that a reported incident is not worth 
bothering about but it is the duty of the local union 
representatives to put pressure and insure that no member 
suffers as a result of management negligence. This aspect of 
the unions' functions is just as important as all the 
others. The unions should therefore consider incentive 
payments in order to attract volunteers who would take the 
duties seriously. 
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PROTECTION AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRIKE 
Strikes have consequences for strikers. Even before legis-
lations which severely restricted freedom to take a strike 
action were brought in, strikes involved financial sacri-
fices . Enthusiasm for the cause being fought for was often 
checked only by the thought of losing money while the strike 
was on. The situation is different nowadays when individuals 
may face disciplinary action or dismissal. The probability 
of losing the fight against an employer that has long proven 
records of intransigence is very high and can be a powerful 
deterrent. One more factor which is rapidly beginning to 
gain grounds is apparently not the fear of losing money or 
the risk of disciplinary action, but the growing concern 
about incorrect deductions from pay packets after a strike.^ 
If the deductions are too small no one would complain. It is 
usually more than double what it should be and it takes 
several months to put right.5 Whether this is a deliberate 
ploy of the employer (via local management) should be a 
subject for another investigation. 
In the interest of their members and for the sake of their 
own survival the unions should take these deterrents more 
seriously and find ways to counteract them. For instance, 
the feasibility of taking out an insurance cover to indemni-
fy members against financial losses caused by strikes should 
be investigated. The unions should have a policy of replying 
centrally all disciplinary letters pertaining to a strike 
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action. The risk of losing members by leaving them to face 
the management by themselves after a strike (official or 
unofficial) is too great. Members who do not resign may 
never again react positively to the union's instruction to 
strike. 
Where illegal deductions have been made on account of a 
strike action, it is the duty of the union to see to it that 
the error is put right forthwith. 
GETTING MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN TRADE UNIONS 
The pioneers of the trade union movement in the civil 
service handled their own affairs in spite of the 
difficulties and the odds stacked against them. When they 
wrote their own petitions, organized their own protest 
meetings and lobbied parliament on their own behalf, it is 
hardly conceivable that apathy would have played a 
significant role among them as it does among the membership 
today. It is therefore logical to view apathy as a side 
effect of the involvement of full-time officers in the orga-
nisation of the movement. The advent of full-time officers 
was supposed to ease the pressure on those enthusiasts who 
coordinated and channelled the efforts of the pioneers. It 
did more. The full-time officers who were selected to take 
on the pressure, handled the business skilfully and their 
achievements, despite some initial problems, enabled the 
pioneers to leave matters reliably in their hands. It was a 
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gradual process which was bound to introduce inertia among 
the hitherto very active pioneers. The inertia appears to 
have developed into what is regarded as apathy today. Apathy 
is linked with the reality of paid full-time individuals who 
now organize, negotiate and think for members. Dues paid by 
members bought not only the services of the full-time offi-
cials but sadly also a feeling of complacency. The full-time 
of f icials' dilemma is that if they ran the union both at 
headquarters and at local branch level, members would object 
to being treated as morons; whereas, left to organize their 
own local branches, they do it so halfheartedly: a "dog in 
the manger" situation 1 
The union and its members are like a horse and its jockey; 
one cannot do without the other. It is therefore necessary 
for their mutual survival that the malady of complacency is 
isolated and eradicated. The pioneers took the initiative 
when they invited the full-time officials to organize them; 
now it is the turn of the full-time officials to take the 
initiative and educate their members so that they would once 
again fulfil their role with the confidence which was 
characteristic of their forebears. At present, a full-time 
official is assigned to each branch of the union. Education 
of members could take the form of more active involvement of 
the full-timer in the organization of the branch, using a 
standard format. All the suggestions made in the foregone 
discussion, put together, could make a coherent pattern of 
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reform and way forward for the unions. 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE-RIDERS 
A free-rider is "a non-unionist; a worker who receives the 
benefits of the union's activities in collective bargaining 
without paying the contributions which union membership 
implies, hence getting something for nothing".6 if non-
unionists were asked why they choose not to belong to a 
union several interesting answers would certainly emerge. 
Although no one would freely admit it, the lure of getting 
the main benefits of membership without paying the dues is 
much too great for them to resist. There are those who would 
say that they had never been asked; others might use the 
"conscientious objector" argument. The fact is that those 
who belong to unions are exercising their democratic rights 
and those who choose not to belong should be allowed the 
same rights. That argument however, only covers the right to 
belong or not to belong to a union. It has nothing to do 
with payment for services rendered. When the union 
negotiates pay and conditions it is done for members and 
non-members alike; whatever the union achieves is applied to 
all employees affected, unionists or non-unionists. If the 
employer will not negotiate singly with each employee but 
will only deal with an accredited representative and apply 
the bargaining results to all employees, then every employee 
who benefits should pay for the "labour relations" services 
rendered by the representative. A sum, equivalent to at 
368 
least 85 per cent of the union dues, should be deducted from 
the pay of non-unionists and paid to the appropriate unions 
for services rendered. This is only fair. A similar system 
operates at Polytechnics and Universities in Britain today. 
When students enrol for courses they are charged a fee for 
the students ' union. This fee is automatic; the student is 
allowed no choice. 
There is no need for a protracted "closed shop" argument 
here. The unions perform labour relations services for which 
all employees should pay. Payment of this fee should not 
obligate individuals to join any of the unions but those who 
wish may pay the extra 15 per cent and sign an agreement to 
be bound by the rules of the union. The 85 per cent fee 
entitles employees to the benefits of collective bargaining 
and no more; whereas those who pay the extra 15 per cent 
obtain the full benefits of union membership. 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITANCY 
As observed earlier, the essence of union power is mili-
tancy. Militancy was the root of trade union movement in the 
civil service and must be kept alive if the movement is to 
survive. Because of new laws aimed at severely curbing union 
power, new forms of militancy must be devised to circumvent 
legal restrictions - a form of militancy without repercuss-
ion. The civil service trade union movement needs to be 
reformed in order to accommodate the changing phase of 
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militancy. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY FOR THE UNIONS 
The findings of this survey of influences on the attitudes 
of active white-collar civil service trade unionists should 
provide some insight into the nature of the Government's 
power and the likely responses of the civil service trade 
unions to the introduction of more anti-trade union laws and 
attempts to reduce them to the status of staff associations. 
However, it is debatable whether it is possible - on the 
basis these findings - to generalize about the trade union-
ists ' reaction to the ever increasing power of the Govern-
ment. On the issue of strikes, the survey adequately demon-
strated the view that the sense of common purpose is still 
alive among members and that militancy is very important if 
the unions are to retain their countervailing force. In 
certain respects, such as where an action is recommended 
from the headquarters, union leaders should proceed with 
extreme caution if a ballot turns out in favour of the 
action. 
Finally, there are certain implications derived from this 
investigation which are important for any policy initiative 
which attempts to implement changes in response to the pres-
sures of the Government whose behaviour is made unpredict-
able by the amount of power it controls. Firstly, this 
investigation demonstrated the importance of leadership in 
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initiating policies. In spite of the enthusiasm of the local 
activists the rationale of apathy means greater reliance on 
the expertise of full-time officials. Since apathy stems 
from the existence of headquarters and full-time staff, it 
means greater responsibility of the full-timers to intensify 
their involvement with individual members. 
Secondly, the civil service unions do not operate "closed 
shop" or "union shop". Moreover, if the Government has its 
way, it would restrict the operation of trade unions in the 
service in such a way that they might as well cease to 
exist. A strategy must be developed which would enable the 
size of membership to take care of itself. The unions may be 
powerless in dealing with the Government but they can put 
more effort into achieving more success for individual 
members in respect of advancement in the job so that non-
members, feeling left behind, would wish to join and share 
in their colleagues success. This would also probably help 
with the problem of free-riders. The Government cannot 
interfere with this manner of success without violating 
human right and natural justice. 
Thirdly, even though the investigation shows little evidence 
that financial commitments stifle militancy, it is necessary 
to establish adequate financial benefit for members who take 
legitimate strike action. The possibility of indemnifying 
each member with insurance companies against such a contin-
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gency should not be overlooked. 
Fourthly, a recognition that there is a wide gap between the 
proletarian reality in which the overwhelming power of the 
Government forces civil servants and the Utopian middle-
class which they assume for themselves should provide full-
time officers and their leaders with the impetus to fight 
on. 
Thus, the findings of this thesis not only support the 
conclusions of Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963)7, Bain(1971)8, 
and C1egg (1975)9, but it conf i rms the cone1us i on of 
Winchester (1983) 1 0:-
It can be concluded that until a more systematic 
analysis of the forms of state economic intervention 
and the nature of power in collective bargaining is 
combined with an institutional analysis of public 
sector industrial relations, future developments will 
appear as unpredictable as many of the changes of the 
last fifteen years have seemed to observers and parti-
cipants . 
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CIVIL SERVICE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; an independent survey 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please coaplete this questionnaire as soon as you receive it and return It to 
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC In the stamped addressed envelope provided. Before 
answering each question, please read all the alternative answers and the 
instructions* Host of the questions Just ask you tick the box next to the 
answer that best fits your viewe. Remember, we want your own reactions to 
various industrial relations Issues In recent years* We guarantee total 
confidentiality to all participants. 
First, please give us some details about yourself that would help us analyse the 
results. 
la* What is your grade? 
lb. Where do your work? 
lc. How long have you worked there? 
(i) Under 1 year 
(ii) 1-2 years 
(iii) 2-5 years 
(iv) 5-10 years 
(v) 11 years or more 
Id. What did you do before that , 
le. Father's occupation 
What work does (did) your father do? 
Blue-collar 
White-collar 
Don't know 
If. Do you work In New Technology area? 
Yes. -
No 
• 
P 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
D If you have answered Yes to question (If.) please continue with question 
lg; otherwise, continue from question 2a. 
lg. Has your area of new technology recently undergone a change? 
Yes (please elaborate):-
No 
lh. Do you feel threatened by new technology? 
Yes 
No 
2a. What Is your sex? MALE FEMALE 
2b. What Is your age? 
Under 21 
21 - 30 
31 - AO 
Al - 55 
56 - or over 
3. Marital status (Including family) 
Single 
Married 
Divorced/Separated 
Children Under 12 D 12 or over O 
Aa. Please indicate your category of dwelling 
House 
Flat 
Room/Apartment 
Other (Please specify) 
Ab. Which of the following commitments do you have:-
Hire purchase 
Car maintenance 
Life assurance 
Alimony 
Other (Please specify) 
ic. Please Indicate which wage bracket your total Income (Including overtime 3 7 5 
and Income from other sources) puts you under:-
Pounds (net) per week 
Under 51 
51 - 100 
101 - 150 
151 - 200 
201 - 250 
251 - 300 
301 - 350 
351 or over 
5a. Which of these do you pay for your dwelling? 
Rent 
Mortgage 
Other (Please specify) 
5b. How many full time wage earners are there in your home? 
One 
More than one 
• 
• 
a 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Now, please answer the following questions about your Trade Union and related 
issues. 
6. Do you hold any local union or Trade Union Side Whitley position? 
Yes O 
No D 
If you have answered Yes to question 6. please continue with question 7a. 
onwards; otherwise, continue from question 8. 
Please tick 
7a. Which positlon(s) do you hold? appropriate box(es) 
Branch Ghainnan/President 
Branch Secretary 
Branch Treasurer 
Branch Committee member 
Member of the Executive Committee 
Headquarters staff 
Member of TU Side (Office Whitley) 
Other(s) (Please specify) 
P 
D 
• 
• 
P 
P 
P 
D 
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7b. Please answer the following questions about all or any 
of the pay compaigns listed* 
(1) How many new members did you recruit In your 
branch/area during these periods? 
(11) How many members resigned from your branch/area? 
(ill) How much support did your members glve:-
Took part in selective strike 
A lot 
Poor 
None 
7c How old is your branch? 
(i) Under 5 years 
(11) 5-10 years 
(111) 11 - 20 years 
(iv) 21 - 30 years 
(v) Over 40 years 
7d. What is the geographical distribution of your 
membership ? 
(i) Within 1 mile 
(ii) Under 5 miles 
(iii) Under 10 miles 
(iv) Over 10 miles 
1981 1982 1983 
**** AAAA A AAA 
**** AAA A 
AAAA AAA* 
AAA* A AAA 
AAA A A AAA 
Please tick 
appropriate box 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Please tick 
appropriate box 
P 
P 
P 
P 8. Please give the following details about the union meetings you attended during the periods listed below:-
8a. Which meetings did you attend? 
A.G.M. 
Meeting before Conference -
(Mandating meeting) 
Other (Please specify) 
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
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If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for 
doing so:-
(Tick no more than three boxes 
for each you have missed) 
They don't achieve anything— 
not interested in subject of 
AGM 
meeting 
meetings tend to be long and 
boring 
was not told meeting was being 
held 
MANDATING 
MEETING 
OTHER 
(specify) 
domestic reasons-
leave/of ficlal duty 
difficult to travel to/ 
held at difficult time-
individual cannot influence 
decisions 
pressure of work-
no meeting was held-
other (please specify)-
If you have left early from any of these meetings, please give your main 
reasons for doing so:-
had to go back to work-
had to attend to my private business-
got bored-
other (please specify)-
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
Please answer the following questions about 6trikes and overtime bans:-
Durlng the 1981 pay negotiations, at what Stage were you prepared to 
accept the offer proposed by CSO/Treasury? 
before the selective strike-
after two weeks of the strike-
half way through the strike— 
offer w a 6 never acceptable to me-
1981 
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9b. When a ballot vas taken on the final offer, did you:-
vote for acceptance-
vote for rejection and escalation of industrial action-
abstain—•— ——— 
9c. If you voted for acceptance, please Indicate your reason:-
i 
the offer was good enough-
escalation of the dispute would be futile-
I could not afford further loss of earnings-
other (please specify) 
9d. If you voted for rejection, please indicate your reason:-
offer meant etlll lower living standards-
little more resistance would have forced a concession-
belief in the CCSU's ability to succeed 
other (please specify) 
9e. What was your reaction to the series of one day/half day all out strikes 
during the period:-
(i) agreed and took action-
al) agreed but did not take action-
al!) disagreed but took action 
(iv) disagreed and took no actlon-
1981 
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9f. If you n s v e ticked box 9e (1) please Indicate your reason: 
to maintain union solidarity 
loyalty to my union 
I must play my part 
I believe in our cause (right to a living wage) 
other (please specify) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 9g- If you have ticked box 9e (ii) please indicate your reason:-
one day/half day strike would not influence the final outcome 
most members at my branch did not come out 
I could not afford the loss of pay 
to avoid disciplinary action of my employers 
other (please specify) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 9h. If you have ticked box 9e (iv) please indicate your reason: claims were not justifiable in the economic circumstances 
I do not believe in strikes 
other (please specify) 
• 
• 
• 10a. If an all-out indefinite strike were called by CCSU and endorsed by your 
union In support of pay claim 1981, 1982 or 1983 would you have:-
(i) stayed out indefinitely-
(II) come out for a week or two then return to work-
(iii) ignored the strike call— 
1981 1982 1983 
10b. If you have ticked boxes In 10a (ill) please Indicate your reason: 
I do not believe in strikes 
I cannot afford to go on strike 
strike would conflict with my job 
I do not believe in the union*s cause 
• 
D 
• 
P 
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11a. When the unions called a ban on overtime for an Indefinite period, did 
you:-
(i) boycott overtime while the ban lasted-
(ii) boycott overtime for a short whiles 
(ill) ignore the ban altogether 
1981 
lib. If you have ticked box 11a (ill) please Indicate your reason 
1 could not do without overtime a 
I considered the ban Ineffective • 
I did not agree with the union's cause • 
my work would suffer • 
* other (please specify) • 
12. Now please give us your views about the 
(Tick appropriate boxes for each issue) 
Issues listed below:-
(a) 
How important to you are these 
Issues? 
(b) 
How effectively does your union 
represent you on these Issues? 
No 
opinion 
Not very 
Important 
Fairly 
.mportant 
Very 
Important ISSUES Well 
Ade-
quately Poorly 
Pay 
Hours/Hoildays/Leave 
Protecting jobs In 
your establishment 
and avoiding 
redundancy 
Career prospects 
Introduction of 
new technology 
Improving service to 
the public 
Working conditions 
Individual personal 
problems, eg trans-
fer, promotions etc 
Ensuring job 
satisfaction 
Disciplinary and 
grievance problems 
Securing early 
retirement 
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13. Have you In the paBt 12 months approached any of the following for help or 
advice on any topic? 
13(a) 13(b) 
If you have, how did you In general, how helpful was 
usually contact them? their response? 
Telephone Letter Face to Face Helpful Adequate Not helpful 
Branch Secretary 
Member of Branch 
Committee 
Member of Executive 
Committee 
Anyone at your 
Union HQ 
13c. If you have not, what was your reason? (Please write in) 
1A. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the statements 
below by placing a tick in the appropriate box:-
strongly 
agree 
agree un-
certain 
dis-
agree 
strongly 
disagree 
Members of senior grades feel that union 
activities conflict with their role as 
managers 
Mergers between Civil Service unions are 
necessary to exert significant pressure 
on the employer 
It is inevitable that the number of 
people employed by the Civil Service 
will decline with the introduction of 
new technology 
The Civil Service unions are right to 
try and protect jobs by banning overtime 
Cont'd..». 
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Cont*d..•. 
strongly 
agree 
agree un-
certain 
dis-
agree 
strongly 
disagree 
On key Issues most members are prepared 
to support their unions 
In the light of current unemployment the 
Civil Service unions policy of retire-
ment at 60 should be reviewed 
Unless a satisfactory agreement on the 
introduction of new technology is 
reached, the unions should immediately 
start a policy of non cooperation 
If the Civil Service unions are unable 
to negotiate better pay it's no use 
continuing my membership 
Failure to secure better pay would 
seriously affect my attitude to work 
Bringing inflation down to a very low 
single figure is at present most 
Important for the country's economic 
recovery 
In the interest of economic common 
sense the power of Trade Unions should 
be checked 
New tougher laws to severely restrain 
picketting should be brought In 
As much of Britain's Civil Service as 
possible should be privatised provided 
the price is right 
15. Finally, please indicate your views on the following aspects In your work 
place:-
Very 
Good 
Good Fair Bad Very 
Bad 
Management 
Pay 
Working Conditions 
Promotion Prospects 
Trade Union Facilities 
Union/Management Relations 
PLEASE DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM. 
BEFORE YOU POST IT BACK TO US IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED COULD YOU READ IT THROUGH 
TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS. 
Thank you very much for your help 
Middlesex Polytechnic 
The Burroughs 3 8 4 
London 
NW4 4BT November 1985 
01-202 6545 
-Telex 8954762 
APPENDIX la 
Dear Colleague, 
With the permission of your HQ I distributed a pilot questionnaire late last 
year in connection with the research into 'The Industrial Attitudesof White Collar 
Civil Service Trade Unionists' which I am doing at the Middlesex Polytechnic. Since 
the completion of the pilot survey, the project has shown some promise and I have 
obtained further permission of your HQ to seek your co-operation in completing this 
main questionnaire. 
The research focuses on the consequences of ending the pay comparability process 
in 1981 and examines the stability in the Civil Service which is particularly 
threatened by uncertainty over the issues of pay and employment security. The 
objectives are to develop further and follow up the areas initially explored in the 
pilot exercise, i.e. to analyse in a broader context the attitudes of Civil Service 
trade unionists, including their economic circumstances, work and union situations, 
etc., in order to approach their reactions to specific issues such as pay determination 
The response of the group to their new environment will be of great importance in 
determining the future climate of industrial relations in the Service. 
The questionnaire enclosed has been designed to be completed in no more than 
15 minutes. The information you give will be treated with strict confidentiality. 
If you would be kind enough to take a few minutes now to complete and return it 
to the Polytechnic, I would be grateful. A reply-paid envelope is provided. 
Thanks for your co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Bede Achike, 
Research Student. 
Enc. 
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CIVIL SERVICE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: an independent survey 
(l) _C7> 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE I D 
Area Serial Number Union 
Please complete this questionnaire as soon as you receive It and return it to 
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC in the replied paid envelope provided* Before answering 
each question, please read all the alternative answers and the instructions. 
Most of the questions just ask you to tick the box next to the answer that best 
fits your views. Remember, ve want your own reactions to various Industrial 
relations issues In recent years* Ve guarantee total confidentiality to all 
participants. 
1. First, please give us some details about yourself that would help us 
analyse the results. 
la. What is your grade? 
lb. Where do your work? 
lc. How long have you worked there? 
(i) Under 1 year 
(ii) 1 - 2 years 
(iii) 2 - 5 years 
(iv) 5 - 1 0 years 
(v) 11 years or 
• 1 
• « 
• • 
• < 
• • 
Id. What did you do before that 
le. Father's occupation * 
What work does (did) your father do? 
Blue-collar 
White-collar 
Don't know 
If. What Is your sex? MALE D 1 FEMALE D 2 
lg. What Is your age? 
Under 21 
21-30 D 2 
31-40 D 3 
41-50 D 4 
51 - or over I—1 6 
lh. Marital status 
Single 
Married 
Divorced/Separated 
li Family:-
(i) How many children under 18 have you? 
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(15) 
(16) 
One 
two 
three of more 
none 
(ii) How many children have you over 18 and still your 
responaibility? 
One 
two 
three or more 
none 
1J. Please indicate your level of academic/professional qualification :-
[TICK ONLY THE HIGHEST ATTAINED] 
None 
GCE "0" [1-5 
Level [6 or more 
GCE "A" [1-3 
Level [4 or more 
HNC/HND 
LLB/LLM 
BA., B.Sc etc 
POSTGRADUATE DIPLOMA -
MA., M.Sc, MBA* etc. 
Ph.D 
Professional qualifications 
(Specify) — ___ 
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2a. Please Indicate your category of dwelling 
House 
Self-contained flat 
Room e.g. bed-sitter 
Other (Please specify) 
2b. Which of these do you pay for your dwelling? 
Rent 
Mortgage 
Other (Please specify) 
(21) 
(22) 
2c. 
3a. 
Please indicate the extent of your monthly commitment in the following 
categories:- (Tick appropriate boxes) 
Hire purchase (including car purchase)-
Car maintenance 
Life assurance (other than mortgage linked)-
Alimony — 
Credit Cards-
Band Loans/Overdrafts-
Under £100 Over £100 None 
Other (Please specify) 
Please indicate which wage bracket your total income (including overtime 
and Income from other sources) puts you under [Respondent's Income only]. 
Pounds (net) per week 
Under 51 
51 - 100 
101 - 150 
151 - 200 
20L - 250 
251 - 300 
301 - 350 
351 or over • 8 
2 
3b. How many full/part, time wage earners are there in your home? 
Full-time (31> Part-time 
One d 1 One D 
More than one More than one 
4. Please answer the following questions about your work: 
4a. Has any area of your work been affected by the introduction of 
computerised methods within the last 3 years? 
Yes • 1 No • 2 
If you have answered yes to question 4a please continue with questions 4b and 
4c; otherwise, continue from question 5. 
4b- Please state approximately when these were introduced and describe briefly 
how your work has been affected. 
(continue on a separate sheet if necessary). 
4c- Please indicate the ways you consider your job has been modified by the 
computerisation:-
Made harder • 
Made easier • 
Become more interesting • 
Become less Interesting • 
More responsibility • 
Less responsibility • 
No difference • 
5. Now, please answer the following questions about your Trade Union and 
related issues. 
5a State the name of your union and the year you joined: 
Name Year 
5b Why did you join your union? 
(Please write your answer here: continue on a separate sheet if 
necessary) 
How important to you is your belonging to your union? [TICK ONLY ONE BOXJ 
r i 1 
Very important 1—' 
• « Quite important 
Moderately important 
Not very important 
No opinion 1—» 
In your opinion, does your union satisfy your expectations in terms of the 
reason(s) you have given In question 5b above? 
• ( G o to question 6a) 
•(State your reason(s) In 
. . w 5e below) 
n » 
Don't know «—1 (Go to question 6a) 
If your answer to question 5d is "No" please state your reason(s):-
Continue on a separate sheet if necessary 
Have the problems and outcome of the pay negotiations of the last 5 years 
affected your reason for remaining a member of your union? 
•(Please answer question 
6b) 
rV 
No *—')(Go to question 7) 
Don't Know <—') 
In what way? (Please write your answer here). 
Do you hold any local union or Trade Union Side Whitley position? 
Yes 
No 
• 
• 
If you have answered Yes to question 7. please continue with question 8 
onwards; otherwise, continue from question 13. 
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8. Which positioti(s) do you hold? 
Branch Chairman/President 
Branch Secretary 
Branch Treasurer 
appropriate box(es) 
• 
Branch Committee member-
Member of your Group/Section Executive Committee 
Member of• TU Side (Office Whitley) 
Other(s) (Please specify) 
n 
n 
D 
n 
(46) 
(60) 
(62) 
(64) 
9. 
(Branch 
Sees. 
only) 
Questions 9-11 Branch Secretaries only . 
Please answer the following questions about all or any of the pay 
compaigns listed. 
PAY CAMPAIGN 
(i) How many new members did you recruit in your 
branch/area during .these periods? 
(ii) How many members resigned from your branch/area 
(ill) How much support did your members give:-
A lot 
Poor 
None 
1981 1982 1983 
AAA* AAA* A A A A 
Please tick 
10. How old is your branch? appropriate box 
(Branch •» Sees. (i) Under 5 years 
only) •« (ii) 5-10 years 
(iii) 11-20 years • 3 
(iv) Over 20 years 
(67) 
(69) 
(70) 
392 
11. What Is the geographical (workplace) distribution of 
(Branch) your membership? 
Sees. 
only) (i) Within 1 mile 
(ii) Under 5 miles 
(iii) Under 10 miles 
(iv) Over 10 miles 
Please tick 
appropriate box 
(80 Cud 1) 
(71) 
12. Please give the following details about the union meetings you attended 
during the periods listed below:-
12a Which meetings did you attend? 
12b 
A.G.M. 
Meeting before Conference -
(Mandating meeting) 
Other (Please specify) 
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
( 1 H 3 ) 
(4H6) 
OM9) 
If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for 
doing so:-
CJOM14) U&H19) (20M24) 
(Tick no more than three boxes 
for each you have missed) 
They don't achieve anything— 
not Interested in subject of 
meeting-
meetings tend to be long and 
boring 
was not told meeting was being 
held 
domestic reasons-
leave/official duty 
difficult to travel to/ 
held at difficult time-
individual cannot influence 
decisions—— 
pressure of work-
AGM 
no meeting was he Id-
other (please specify)-
MANDATING 
MEETING 
SPECIAL 
MEETING 
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12c If you have left early from any of these meetings, please give your main 
reasons for doing so:-
had to go back, to work— 
had to attend to my private business-
got bored — 
other (please specify)-
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
(26H27) 
(2SM30) 
(31H33) 
(34W36) 
Please answer the following questions about strikes and overtime bans if 
you were a member of a Civil Service White Collar Union in the year(s) 
mentioned below:-
13a During the 1981 pay negotiations, at what stage were you prepared to 
accept the offer proposed by CSD/Treasury? 
before the selective strike-
after twc weeks of the strike-
half way through the strike— 
offer was never acceptable to me-
1981 (37) 
13b When a ballot was taken on the final offer, what did you do? 
vote for acceptance-
vote for rejection and escalation of industrial action-
abstain 
1981 (38) 
14. Referring to the following scale please indicate in the box against each 
reason in questions 14a, 14b, 14c, 16a, 16b, 16c, 16d, 18 & 19b, how 
important you felt the reason to be in your decision:-
5 Very important 
4 Quite important 
3 Moderately Important 
2 Not very important 
1 •*. No influence 
eg., in question 14a, if you felt your most important reason for accepting 
the offer was that you could not afford further loss of earnings, put 5 In 
box(c); if you felt your next reason, In your order of importance, was 
that the offer was good enough, put 4 in box(a) etc.... 
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14a If you voted for acceptance, please Indicate the strength of your reason 
with reference to the above scale:-
the offer was good enough-
escalation of the dispute would be futlle-
I could not afford further loss of earnings-
other (please specify) — 
1981 
(a) 
<b) 
<e> 
(d) 
(39) 
(4a; 
14b If you voted for rejection, please indicate the strength of your reason 
with reference to the above scale:-
felt the offer meant still lower living standards— 
a little more resistance would have forced a concession-
belief in the CCSU's* ability to succeed* 
other (please specify) 
1981 
U) <43 
(c) «4s: 
(d) 
14c- If you abstained, please indicate the strength of your reason with 
reference to the above scale:-
I felt the offer would not improve anyway-
I was fed up with the CCSU 
I was fed up with the employer-
I couldn't care less 
1981 
(a) « • 
(b) 
(C) <49 
(d) 
15. What was your reaction to the series of one half day official all out 
strikes during the perlod:-
(1) agreed and took action-
(ii) agreed but did not take action-
al!) disagreed but took action 
(lv) disagreed and took no action-
1981 
(51 
(53 
•Council of* Civil Service Unions 
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L6a. If you have ticked box 15 (t) please Indicate the strength of your reason 
with reference to the scale in question 14:-
to maintain union solidarity-
loyalty to my branch 
I must play my part 
I believe in our cause (right to a living wage> 
other (please specify) 
(d) 
16b* If you have ticked box 15 (ii) please indicate the strength of your reason 
with reference to the scale in question 14:-
one day/half day strike would not Influence the final outcome-
most members at my branch did not come out 
I could not afford the loss of pay •—• 
to avoid disciplinary action of my employers-
other (please specify) 
(»> (60) 
(b) 
(c> (62> 
W) 
(e) (64) 
16c. If you have ticked box 15 (ill) please indicate the strength of your 
reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-
to maintain union solidarity-
loyalty to my branch 
I was under pressure to conform-
other (please specify) 
(*) 
(b) (66) 
<«> 
(d) <6S) 
16d. If you have ticked box 15 (Iv) please indicate the strength of your reason 
with reference to the scale in question 14:-
claims were not justifiable In the economic circumstances-
I do not believe in strikes—: 
(»> 
(b) (70) 
(80 Card 2) 
other (please specify) 
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17. If an all-out Indefinite strike were called by. CCSU and endorsed by 
your union in support of pay claim 1981, 1982 or 1983 what would you have 
done? 
(i) stay out indefinitely-
(11) come out for a week or two then return to work-
(iii) ignore the strike call • 
1981 1982 1983 
(1X3) 
(4H6) 
(7H9) 
18. If you have ticked boxes in 17 (iii) please indicate the strength of your 
reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-
I do not believe In strikes-
I cannot afford to go on strike-
Strike would conflict with my job-
I do not believe in the union*s cause-
Members would not support the strike— 
te> < 1 0 > 
(b) 
W) 
(e) 04) 
19a. When the unions called a ban on overtime for an indefinite period, what 
did you do? 
(1) boycott overtime while the ban lasted-
(ii) boycott overtime for a short while 
(iii) ignore the ban altogether 
1981 
l 
2 
3 
( IB ) 
19b. If you have ticked box 19a- (iii) please indicate the strength of your 
reason with reference to the scale In question 14:-
I could not do without overtime-
I considered the ban Ineffective-
I did not agree with the union's cause-
toy work would suffer 
other (please specify)-
to < 1 6 > 
0>) 
(e) <18> 
(d) 
<e> (20) 
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20a Please indicate, by ticking one box below, your view on the value of 
resort by the CCSU to arbitration on pay matters: <21> 
Very valuable . 
Quite valuable 
Some value 
Little value . 
No value 
20b Comment on the view express above:-
2la Now please give us your views on the issues listed below:-
^'(Tick appropriate boxes for each issue) 
(a) 
How important to you are these 
issues? 
(b) 
How effectively does your union 
represent you on these issues? 
Not very 
important 
Fairly 
important 
Very 
important 
ISSUES Well Ade-
quately 
Poorly 
Pay 
Hours/Holidays/Leave 
Protecting jobs in 
your establishment 
and avoiding 
redundancy 
Career prospects 
Introduction of 
new technology 
Defending job 
security 
Working conditions 
Individual personal 
problems, eg trans-
fer, promotions etc 
(22) 
(24) 
(26) 
(28) 
Continued 
(30) 
(32) 
( a ) 
How important to you are these 
issues? 
(b) 
How effectively does your union 
represent you on these issues? 398 
Not very 
important 
Fairly 
important 
Very 
important 
ISSUES Well Ade-
quately 
Poorly 
Ensuring job 
satisfaction 
Disciplinary and 
grievance problems 
Securing early 
retirement 
Overall pension 
entitlement 
(42) 
(44) 
21b Please indicate your views on the following aspects in your work place:-
Very Good Good Fair Bad Very Bad 
Management 
Pay 
Working conditions 
Promotion prospects 
Trade Union facilities 
Union/Management relations 
(46) 
(48) 
(60) 
22. Relation between the CSD as employer and the Civil Service Unions has been 
less than satisfactory in recent years. This question is to assess the 
degree of passiveness or militancy on the part of individual members In 
view of the employer's tough stance. Since absolute confidentiality Is 
guaranteed, please answer this question regardless of what is politic 
What we need here is your own personal reaction. You may tick up to seven 
boxes but if you tick box 8, boxes 1-7 will not apply. 
Due to your union's Inability to negotiate successfully with your employer 
(including, where applicable, negotiations at branch level), which of the 
following personal actions have you taken? 
1. Work to rule 
2. Overtime ban 
3* Sabotage 
4. Sick absences 
5* Work with less or no enthusiasm 
6- Lateness 
_2. Actively looking for another job 
(52) 
(M) 
(66) 
(68) 
8. No action at all 
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23. The following questions relate to your accidents at work and associated 
absences. 
23a Please indicate how many accidents you have had in the past 5 years: 
• Accident involving 
personal injury 
Accident without 
personal injury 
(i) None (60) 
(ii) 1-9 
(iii) 10 and over (62) 
23b Please indicate the duration of absence (in total) necessitated by the 
injuries listed above: <63> 
(i) None 
(ii) 1-7 days 
(iii) 8-14 days 
(iv) 3-6 weeks 
(v) Over 6 weeks 
24. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the statements 
below by placing a tick ln the appropriate box:-
strongly 
agree 
agree un-
certain 
dis-
agree 
strongly 
disagree 
Members of senior grades feel that union 
activities conflict with their role as 
managers 
(64) 
Mergers between Civil Service unions are 
necessary to exert significant pressure 
on the employer 
It is inevitable that the number of 
people employed by the Civil Service 
will decline with the introduction of 
new technology 
(66) 
The Civil Service unions are right to 
try and protect jobs by banning overtime 
On key issues most members are prepared 
to support their unions (68) 
In the light of current unemployment the 
Civil Service unions policy of retire-
ment at 60 should be reviewed 
JZ3 
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strongly 
agree 
agree un-
certain 
dis-
agree 
strongly 
disagree 
Unless a satisfactory agreement on the 
introduction of new technology is 
reached, the unions should immediately 
start a policy of non co-operation 
If the Civil Service unions are unable 
to negotiate better pay it's no use 
continuing my membership 
Failure to secure better pay would 
seriously affect my attitude to work 
Bringing Inflation down to a very low 
single figure is at present most 
important for the country's economic 
recovery 
In the interest of economic common 
sense the power of Trade Unions should 
be checked 
New tougher laws to severely restrain 
picketting should be brought In 
As much of Britain's Civil Seivice as 
possible should be privatised. 
(70) 
(72) 
(74) 
(76) 
25. Finally please give us your views on the G.C.HQ issues. 
25a. Are you in favour of the decision to abolish trade unions at G.C.HQ? 
Yes • » 
(77) 
No 
Don't know 
25b. If you have answered 'No' to question 25a please answer this final 
question:-. 
Assuming a ballot in favour of an all out strike, would you come out in 
support of your GCHQ colleagues? (78) 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
PLEASE DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM. 
BEFORE YOU POST IT BACK TO US IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED COULD YOU READ IT THROUGH 
TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS. 
• . 
(Cud 3 60) 
Thank you very much for your help* 
APPENDIX 2 
X2 TEST FOR DATA ON TART.F.fi 27. 27h AND ?7rt 
INFLUENCE OF FAMILY COMMITMENT ON DECISION TO STRIKE 
Strike Decision Single 
Took action (1+3) 101 
Took no action (2+4) 11 41 7 59 
Total 112 301 49 462 
> » . ^ !i 
- E ) ^ 
E 
0 E O - E (0 - E ) S (O - E ) Z 
E 
101 97.7 3.3 10.9 0.11 
260 262.6 -2.6 6.7 0.03 
42 42.7 -0.7 0.5 0.01 
11 14.3 -3.3 10.9 0.76 
41 38.4 2.6 6.7 0.17 
7 6.3 0.7 0.5 0.08 
X 2 = 1.16 
Number of degrees of f reedoro:n=(c-l) (r-1) =2x1 = 2. 
The value of X^in this case is 1.16. With 2 degrees of 
freedom, the value of chi-square at 5 per cent level= 5.99. 
Therefore, it would seem that there was no significant 
difference between the three groups as far as decision to 
strike was concerned. Family commitment had no influence on 
their decision to take strike action. 
Married Divorced Total 
260 42 403 
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APPENDIX 3 
X2 TKST FOR DATA ON TABLE 3fir 
IMPORTANCE OF JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY TBRIIEfi 
Views Lower Grades Higher Grades TOTAL 
Not very important 5 20 25 
Fairly important 49 46 95 
Very important 233 131 364 
Total 
= = = = = = = = = = = = 
287 197 484 
X t f = 
E 
0 E 0 - E ( o - Er (0 - E ) 2 
E 
5 14.8 -9.8 96.04 6.5 
20 10.2 9.8 96.04 9.4 
49 56.3 -7.3 53.30 0.9 
46 38.7 7.3 53.30 1.4 
233 215.8 17.2 259.84 1.2 
131 148.2 -17.2 259.84 1.8 
X S = 21.2 
Number of degrees of freedom:n=(c-1)(r-1) =2x1 = 2. 
The value of X^ in this instance is 21.2. At 5 per cent 
confidence level and 2 degrees of freedom, the value of 
chi-square is 5.99. This confirms that the greater sense 
of security among the higher grades was more than could be 
explained by chance. The difference in the sense of security 
between the two groups was quite significant. 
APPENDIX 4 403 
XZ-TERT FOR DATA ON TABLE 63 STATEMENT ft; 
IF THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE BETTER 
PAY. IT'S NO USE CONTINUING MY MEMBERSHIP 
Lower Grades Higher Grades TOTAL 
Agreed 18 13 31 
Disagreed 257 178 435 
Totals 
~ — — — — — — 
275 — — — — — — — — — — — z 191 466 
««-S i l l 
E 
0 E 0 - E (0 - E) 2- (0 - E ) 2 
E 
18 18.3 -0.3 0.9 0.06 
13 12.7 0.3 0.9 0.07 
257 256.7 0.3 0.9 0.003 
178 178.3 0.3 0.9 0.005 
Xfc = 0.128 
Number of degrees of freedom:n=(c-l)(r-l)=l 
The value of X^is 0.128 and there is 1 degree of freedom. 
The value of chi-square at the 5 per cent level where n=l is 
3.84. Result of the chi-squared test therefore, indicates 
that there Is no significant difference between the views of 
both grades on the issue and corroborates the finding. 
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PART 1 INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 As indicated in our letter dated 11 January 1983, the prime 
objectives of the Council's claim are threefold; first, to 
begin the process of reversing the decline since 1980 in the 
living standards and relative pay levels of all civil servants; 
second, to alleviate the particularly adverse effects of this 
' deterioration in Civil Service pay on lower paid civil servants; 
and third, to reduce the working week. This memorandum is con-
cerned with the first two objectives and a separate paper 
will be produced on the third. 
1,2 The starting point for the Council's evidence on pay is the 1980 
pay settlement; i.e. the last time rates were set by comparison 
with outside pay levels. In taking 1960 as the baseline for our 
evidence, we have assumed that the 1980 Civil Service rates, with 
the exception of those settled by administrative action, were 
generally set at the correct level, in that civil servants were 
niether over nor under paid in comparison to their outside counter-
parts. In making this assumption, we are supported by the con-
clusions of the Megaw Inquiry into Civil Service pay, which, 
after considering the detailed statistical evidence contained 
within two separate, commissioned research papers, determined 
that, during the lifetime of Pay Research (1956 to 1980) , move-
ments in Civil Service earnings kept broadly in line with move-
ments in private sector earnings (CMND 8590, paragraphs 49 to 
55). The detailed evidence on these aspects is in Part 2, para-
graphs 2.1 to 2.3. 
1.3 However, since 1980, an examination of movements in various 
price and pay indicators shows a rapid deterioration in the 
living standards and relative pay position of civil servants. 
Between 1960 and 1982 , prices rose on average by 24.3 per cent, 
and earnings rose by 2 6.5 to 31.7 per cent, depending upon the 
particular measure used. During the sanse period, Civil Service 
pay rose by only 13.8 per cent. Taking account of projected 
measurements r.nd in order to restore fully the 1980 pay position 
of civil servants, we would be justified therefore in claiming 
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up to 25.6 per cent. Notwithstanding this, our aim in 1983 
is only partially to restore the 1980 pay position. Part 2, 
paragraphs 2.4 to 2.16, amplifies the above and shows the 
detailed evidence substantiating these figures. 
1.4 The decline in living standards of civil servants since 1980 
has had a particularly harsh effect on the lower paid and current 
statistics and other sources make it clear that the effective 
rate of inflation has been substantially higher for those on 
lower incomes. For this reason, all the Civil Service unions 
have decided, within the general aim of restoring some of the 
decline in Civil Service pay since 1980, to give priority in the 
claim to the lower paid and to seek £12 a week for all those 
earning up to and including £6,264 p.a., as well as a minimum 
wage of £85 a week. Part 3 of this memorandum explains the 
case for the E12 a week basic increase and Part 4 details the 
case for the £85 a week minimum wage. 
* 
1.5 Making progress in restoring some of the deterioration during 
1981 and 1982 in Civil Service pay does require that the 1983 
Civil Service pay increase matches at the very least the rate 
of increase of outside earnings during the current 1982/63 pay 
round and takes account of the true inflation rate. In Part 5, 
we give our views on the current developments in pay and prices 
which are relevant to the achievement of this objective. 
1.6 Finally, in Part 6, we draw attention to other factors relevant 
to the claim. First, we examine recruitment and retention 
(paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4) and we then turn to manpower and 
efficiency (paragraphs 6.5 to 6.8), We conclude this Part 
by drawing attention to the implications of the underspend 
(paragraphs 6.9 to 6.11), 
1 
PART 2 EXTERNAL COMPARISONS AND REAL PAY 407 
In this section of our evidence, the Council will show that 
increases in Civil Service pay would be necessary on 1 April 1983 
in order to fully restore Civil Service pay to its 1980 level, 
relative to external rates of pay and relative to prices. 
2.1 External Comparisons 
Although there has been no agreement on the recommendations 
of the Report of the Inquiry into Civil Service Pay and while 
the Treasury and the unions may have differences on the degree 
of importance to be attached to external comparisons, we note 
the Megaw Inquiry's conclusion that "the case for the use of 
comparisons in the collective bargaining process is therefore 
established" (CMND B590, paragraph 113) and the Inquiry's 
subsequent recommendation that "comparisons should be used in 
the determination of Civil Service pay ..." (Recommendation 93). 
Irrespective of what other factors either side may wish to bring 
into consideration, in our view a major factor in the negotiations 
on 1983 pay rates must therefore be external comparisons. 
2.2 Ideally, the Council would have preferred to base its claim 
on up-to-date evidence of the levels of remuneration for com-
parable jobs outside the Civil Service. Such evidence has, 
however, been denied us since the suspension of the National Pay 
Agreement on 21 October 1980. Our approach has been therefore 
to take as the base for our claim the Civil Service rates set 
in April 1980 - this being the last time rates were set with 
reference to external comparisons, apart from those settled by 
administrative action - and to compare movements in Civil 
Service pay since 1980 with movements in indicators of outside 
pay over the same period. 
2.3 In taking 1980 as the baseline for our evidence, we have assumed 
that the 1980 Civil Service rates generally reflected the middle 
or average rates paid to those in comparable .employment outside 
the Civil Service. We are supported in this assumption by 
the Megaw Inquiry's conclusion - drawn from two independent, 
commissioned research papers - that over the twenty-five years 
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of its existence, the pay Research system "operated ...in a 
way which succeeded in keeping Civil Service pay broadly in 
line with outside pay" (Paragraph 61). Specifically, the 
two research papers commissioned by Megaw suggested that from 1956 
to 1980 earnings for male civil servants may have advanced by 
between half (Layard) and one percentage point (Elliott), 
relative to private sector earnings (paragraph 53). In addition, 
it is clear that the broadly comparable rates of pay arrived 
at in 1980 have since been seriously undermined by the very 
low level of settlements in 1981 and 1982, compared with the 
general level of settlements outside. 
2.4 Pay Movements 1980 - 1983 
In presenting evidence of the decline since 1980 in the 
relative pay position of civil servants, we have proceeded 
as follows: First, using several different measures of outside 
pay, we assess actual movements in outside pay between 1980 and 
1982. Second, by applying the latest available figure for the 
rate of annual increase in the Department of Employment's 
Index of Average Earnings to the actual outside pay movement 
shown for 1980 to 1982, we project a range of estimates for 
total outside pay movements between 1980 and 1983. Third, we 
compare pur estimates of outside pay movements between 1960 
and 1983 with actual Civil Service pay movements between 1980 
and 1982, in order to calculate the increase in Civil Service 
pay required in 1983 to restore civil servants to their 1980 
relative pay position. 
2.5 Average Earnings Index: all employees seasonally adjusted 
The Department of Employment's monthly index of average earnings 
shows movements in total earnings - that is, basic pay plus 
overtime, bonuses, etc. - for manual and non-manual workers 
combined. Between April 1980 and April 1982, the average 
earnings index moved as follows: 
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Average Earnings Index 
April 1980 175.1 
April 1981 199.5 
April 1982 219.8 
Total increasePpr. 1980 - Apr. 1982 = 25.5%' 
New Earnings Survey 
As we have noted above the Average Earnings Index covers manual 
and non-manual employees combined and does not allow any 
differentiation to be made between them. However, 'in April 
of each year, the Department of Employment carried out a more 
extensive survey of the make-up and distribution of earnings, 
breaking down the results into manual and non-manual categories 
These results are published in the New Earnings Survey (NES) . 
Between April 1980 and April 1982, total earnings for male and 
female white-collar workers increased as follows: 
NES Non-Manual Average Gross Weekly Earnings 
Male (£) Female (£) 
April 1980 141.3 .82.7 
April 1981 163.1_. 96.7 
April 1982 178.9 . 104.9 
Total increase Apr.l9B0 - Apr. 1982 = Male 26.6% 
Female 26.8% 
7 Salary Surveys 
In addition to the Government's own figures on pay movements, 
information can also be obtained from various independent 
salary surveys. We refer to three of the most reputable salary 
surveys. 
(a) Reward Regional Surveys 410 
The Reward Salary and Cost of Living Report is published every 
March and September to provide up-to-date facts on salaries 
and trends for professional and executive staff. The information 
is based on material provided by over 600 companies nationwide, 
representing a wide range of industry and company size. 
Between 1980 and 1982, the Reward survey showed increases as 
follows: 
Percentage increase 
15.0 
11.2 
Total increase from Mar. 1980 - Mar.1982 = 27.9% 
(b) British Institute of Management 
In January of each year the British Institute of Management, 
in conjunction with Remuneration Economics Ltd. , undertake 
a "National Management Salary Survey", which in 1982 for example 
covered 26,097 executives, drawn from .324 companies. Between 
1980 and 1982, the BIM survey reports that total earnings for 
managers increased as follows: . 
BIM Survey of Executive Earnings 
Percentage increase 
January 1980-81 17.3 
January 1981-82 12.3 
Total increase from Jan.1980 - Jan.1982 = 31 .7% 
(c) Inbucon Salary Survey 
In July of each year, the Inbucon Salary Research Unit carried 
out a "Survey of executive salaries and fringe benefits". 
March 1980-81 
March 1981-82 
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In 1982 this survey covered 555 companies and 6,312 individual 
executives. 96 per*cent?of the.companies and 97 per cent of 
the executives came from the private sector with a heavy bias 
towards manufacturing industry. Median total earnings of 
executives in the Inbucon Survey rose as follows: 
Inbucon Survey of Executive. Earnings 
Percentage increase 
July 1980-81 13.1 
July 1981-82 13.0 
Total increase from July 1980 - July 1982 = 27.8% 
(d) Institute of Administrative Management 
The Institute publishes each year the results of its survey 
of "Office Salaries". Data is collected in March each year 
fromo/er 600 companies, covering roughly 40,000 employees and 
represents one of the most .comprehensive sources of information 
on salaries below management.level.. Data is presented for 
8 grades of work (A - H), covered by the Institute's grading 
scheme. The figures below represent the average of the increases 
reported in the median for each grade: 
Percentage increase 
March 1980-81 16.7 
March 1981-82 8.4 
Total increase Mar.1980 - Mar.1982 = 25.6% 
.8 From the evidence the Council has compiled, it is clear 
therefore that between 1980 and 1982 - when Civil Service 
pay rates rose on average by 13.8% - pay levels outside the Civil 
Service rose by between 26.5% and 31.7%, depending on the index 
used. In order to calculate the increase required in Civil 
Service pay on ) April 1963, we need to project forward to 
1983 the various indicators, of outside pay movements. To do 
this, we have used the latest estimate of the underlying trend 
in annual increases from the Department of Employment's Average 
Earnings Index - which shows 8.5% for November 1982. This 
procedure is followed for all indicators. 
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Pay Movements 1980 to 1983 (1980 *= 100) 
Actual Projected 
Average Earnings 
NES Non-Manual 
Earnings 
1980 1982 1983 (Projection factor) 
100 125.5 136.2 (1.085) 
Male 100 126.6 137.4 (1.085) 
Female 100 126.8 137.6 (1.085) 
Reward 100 127.9 138.8 •(1 . 085) 
BIM 100 131.7 142.9 (1.085) 
Inbucon 100 127.8 138.7 (1.085) 
IAM 100 126.5 137.3 (1.065) 
Civil Service 100 113.8 • _ — 
2.9 From the projected pay movements for 1980 to 1983, it is then 
possible to calculate the percentage increase required in Civil 
Service pay on 1 April 1983, in order to restore the 1980 
position relative to the various pay indicators. 
Percentage Increase Required In Civil Service Pay on 1.4.83 
to Restore 19 80 Position Relative to: 
Average Earnings 19.7 
NES Non-Manual Earnings 
Male 20.7 
Female 20.9 
Reward 22.3 
BIM 25.6 
Inbucon 21.9 
JAM 20.6 
2.10 Conclusion 413 
On this basis, the percentage increase required in Civil Service 
pay on 1 April 1983 in order to fully restore the 1980 relative * 
position is in the range of 19.7% to 25.6%. 
2.11 Real Value of Civil Service Pay 
Comparing movements in prices and Civil Service pay rates since 
April 1980, it is clear that there has been a substantial decline 
in the real value of Civil Service pay rates, with a particularly 
harsh effect on the lower paid (see Part 3 below). This section, 
therefore, only relates to the general position indicated by 
the RPI. 
2.12 Taking actual figures for the Department of Employment's Retail 
Price Index for 1980, 1981 and 1982 and projecting the RPI for-
ward to 1983, using the latest (December 1982) rate of annual 
increase in the RPI, produces a projected increase in the RPI 
of 31.0%. 
Retail Price Index 
March 1980 252.2 
March 1981 284.0 
March 1982 313.4 
March 1983 330.3 (estimated) 
Total increase between 1980 and 1983 = 31.0% 
Note: (1) The RPI for March is taken as it is the RPI operative 
at 1 April, the Civil Service pay settlement date. 
(ii) The March 1983 RPI is projected by multiplying the 
March 1982 RPI of 313.4 by 1.054, representing the 
December 1982 annual rate of increase in the RPI. 
2.13 Comparing the projected movement in the RPI of 31.0% between 
1980 and 1983 and the actual aggregate Civil Service pay increase 
of 13.8? between 1980 and 1982, a rise of 15.1% in Civil Service 
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pay rates on 1 April 1983 is necessary to restore the real 
value of Civil Service pay to its 1980 position. 
2.14 Whilst civil servants have suffered a dramatic decline in the 
real value of their pay, the same cannot be said for workers 
generally. Since the beginning of 1982, the trend has been for 
increases in average earnings to exceed the annual rate of 
inflation, as the table below makes very clear: 
•Annual'- Increase 
. Average ^ Earnings Annual Increase 
1982 (underlying trend) (%) in RPI (%) 
Jan 11 12 
Feb 10.75 11 
March 10.5 10 
April 10.25 9 
May 10.0 9 
June 9.5 9 
July 9.25 9 
Aug 9.0 8 
Sept 8.75 7 
Oct 8.75 7 
Nov 8.5 6 
2.15 There can be no basis therefore for the last year at least to 
claim that workers generally have experienced a decline in the 
real value of their total earnings. The same is true for the 
overall period since 1980. 
2.16 Conclusion on External Comparisons and Real Pay 
Between April 1980 and April 1983, Civil Service pay rates will 
have declined by between 19.7% and 25.6%, relative to outside 
pay levels. By 1 April 1983, notwithstanding any temporary 
drop in the inflation rate, the real value of Civil Service pay 
rates will have declined by 15.1% since April 1980. 
In our view, this fully justifies our claim for substantial 
percentage increases, providing, in particular, 10% up to 
£9,758 p.a. 
PART 3 THE BASIC INCREASE 416 
Introduction 
3.1 There are several factors which have convinced all Council 
unions (not just those representing the lowest paid grades) 
that priority must be given to the lowest paid grades whose 
needs are particularly acute. That is why the Council's claim 
is designed to give proportionately greater increases for the 
lowest paid Civil Service grades. 
3.2 Firstly, it is clear from official statistics and other sources 
that the effective rate of inflation in recent' years has been 
substantially higher for those on lower incomes. The Council 
attaches considerable importance to the need to relate pay 
increases broadly to movements in the cost of living. Other 
factors are also important but pay increases must take into 
account the movements in the real value of wages, and salaries. 
It follows that if the rate of inflation experienced by different 
income groups varies markedly, then the annual pay awards must 
take account of this fact and be structured accordingly- In 
the following paragraphs, we present evidence which demonstrates 
conclusively that the rate of inflation experienced by lower 
paid staff has been greater than the average indicated by the 
Retail Price Index and the Tax and Price Index. In common with 
the rest of the community, the widening of real differentials 
and the hardships involved, have created great feelings of 
resentment. 
3.3 Secondly, we draw attention to the effect of percentage 
increases within the Civil Service and the compounding effect 
of changes in the tax and national insurance structures during 
the past few years. In the past two years, Civil Service pay 
settlements have yielded broadly similar percentage increases 
for the grades covered by these settlements. In addition, 
changes in the tax and national insurance structures have 
favoured the high-paid and have borne harshly on the lowest 
paid. 
TABIC 1 
Pattarna of Expenditure -J/ariotlon With Household 
Incomo and Componj.tlont 1960 
Proportion of expenditure allocated toi 
Hous-
ing 
Fual 
light 
end 
power 
(iii) (iv) 
r ood Alcoholic drink and 
tobacco 
(w) 
Clothing 
and 
footwear. 
(vi) 
Household 
and other 
gooda 
(«ii) 
Transport 
and 
vehiclee 
(viii) 
Service) 
and 
niscail-
flnoout 
Sub-total 
of group* 
(1), (ii) 
end (iii) 
juseholda X5 5 23 8 8 15 15 XX 43 
jaahold income 
lholda with lnconnl 
-ha Xowaat 20* 23 XI 28 6 6 XI • ' 5 * XQ 62 
the aacond 20JC XB a 2S 8 7 14 XI 9 51 
tha third 20% xs 6 ! 24 a 14 15 10 45 
tha Tourth 20% 14 s : 23 a a 15 16 XX 42 
tha hlghsat 20% of tha 
Income dia tribution X3 4 20 7 9 16 17 14 37 
Sources X980 F.E.S. (TebXe 3) 
ToU 
all 
pane 
Qrc 
100 
100 
100 
10O 
100 
loO 
^ 1 
3 . 4 Thirdly, there is incontrovertible evidence that civil servants8 
as a group have suffered a relative decline in earnings since 
1980. We have provided details of this in paragraphs 2.4 to 
2.15 above. The Council does not and will not accept this 
development as a permanent shift in the relative pay position 
of civil servants; we are determined to restore our relative 
position to one more closely in line with the last occasion on 
which pay was determined by reference to comparable employees 
outside the Civil Service. The Council's claim, if accepted, 
will go some way towards restoring the relative pay position 
of - V ~ivi.l servants* But we think it ri^-ht that priority 
in restoring relative earnings should be given to the lowest 
paid. What is a difficulty for all civil servants, represents 
real hardship for those on low wages. 
3.5 Household Income and Patterns of Expenditure 
Inflation can be experienced in different degrees at different 
income levels because expenditure patterns are known to vary 
with household income.. So much is a matter of record and is 
charted annually in the Family Expenditure Survey produced by 
the Government Statistical Service. Table 1 below overleaf 
shows the variations in expenditure patterns revealed by the 
19B0 FES. 
Low income households spend proportionately more on housing 
(mainly rented), fuel, light and power and food. Table 1 shows 
that compared to the average income household, half as much 
again is spent in proportion on these three items alone. 
Compared to the highest income groups, low income families spend 
almost twice as much in proportion on these three items. In 
addition, although low income households spend proportionately 
less on transport and vehicles, they are more dependent upon 
(and their budgets more sensitive to changes in the cost of) 
public transport. 
3.6 Differential Inflation 
Regular statistics from the Department of Employment clearly 
demonstrate that there have been marked and dramatic differences 
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in the rates of increase of the various elements of the 
Retail Price Index- Table 2 below Illustrates the changes 
from 1 April 1980 up to 1 December 1982. 
Table 2 
Elements of Retail Price Index 1.4.80 - 1.1.83 
and Civil Service Pay 
Category Percentage Increase 
Fuel and Light 64.0 
Housing 43.0 
(of which, rents) (85.5) 
Services 32.6 
RPI Average 29.1 
Transport 27.6 
(of which Rail Fares) (54.7)* 
(Bus Fares) 38.3 
Food 19.5 
Civil Service Pay 13.8 
Consumer Durables 11.0 
Clothing 5.0 
Source: Department of Employment 
* mid-January 1982 estimate 
3.7 The implications of Tables 1 and 2 for low income households 
are obvious and stark. Taking a typical household as an example 
will illustrate the practical effects on household budgets. 
The following data shows elements of the spending pattern of a 
typical household in 1980 with an income of £70 - £80 a week, 
(in the area of overlap between the Clerical Assistant scale and 
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Category 1980 Expenditure % Inc. 
1.1.83 
Expenditure Diff. 
Housing (rent) £11.03 85.5 20.46 £9.43 
Fuel Light 
and Power 6.25 64.0 10.2-5 £4.00 
Food 19.19 19.5 22.93 £3.74 
Transport 7.62 27.6 9.72 £2.10 
(part total) 44. 09 63.36 £19.27 
Table 3 shows that in order to meet increased costs on these 
staple items (not the vhole household budget) , an increase 
of £19.27 (net) was required over the period 1.4.80 - 1.1.83. 
This implies a need to increase gross income by approximately 
£30 a week in order to continue consumption of these staple 
commodities at the (already basic) levels of 1980. 
3.8 The. average low paid worker has not quite managed to keep pace 
with this explosion in the cost of basic goods and commodities. 
Over the period 1.4.80 to 1.12.82, the average worker increased 
his/her earnings by 34.3%. For a worker earning £75 a week in 
April 19B0, earnings will have increased by approximately £26 
up to 1 December 1982. A civil servant earning £75 a week in 
1980, by contrast, has received approximately £10.50 a week gross 
the Clerical Office scale). The second column shows the per-
centage increase in the price of each category from 1.4.80 
to 1.1.83. The third column shows the expenditure required to 
maintain the same standard of expenditure throughout this 
period. 
Table 3 
Increased Expenditure 1.4.80 - 1.1.83 for a Typical 
Low Income Household (Income £70 - £80 pw in 1980) 
increase over the same period. Little more needs to be said 
about the impact on the living standards of a low paid civil 
servant. Although the above examples are hypothetical, they 
are far from unrealistic. Individual low paid civil servants 
may have fared better or worse, depending on personal circum-
stances. But for many of them, the above examples will be an 
accurate reflection of the struggle for financial survival over 
the last three years. 
.9 Reward Regional Surveys Data 
A similar picture emerges from the regular data produced by 
Reward Regional Surveys Ltd., which allows comparison of the 
increased cost of living for households with varying incomes 
and lifestyles. (The Reward methodology was fully described 
in the Council's Arbitration Case in 1982 (Appendix 7).) 
Appendix 8 of the Council's Arbitration Case gave details of 
the income required to onaintain the various "lifestyles" over 
the period 1980 -1982. Table 4 overleaf gives similar data 
for the period 1980 - 1983: an assumption is made about the 
annual rate of inflation for the year to May 1983 of 5.8% -
the current annual rate of increase.in the official TPI. 
(We have used the TPI to follow the Reward methodology) 
3.10 Table.4 shows that in order to maintain May.1980 , living standard 
increases ranging from 24.7% (council tenant), through 19% 
(average lower income household) , tapering down to roughly 
10% (middle and high income households) will be necessary in 
May 1983 for civil servants. The data corroborates, .inter alia, 
the example described in Table 3 and paragraphs 7 and 8. 
3.11 The Low Paid Price Index (LPPI) 
The Low Paid Price Index (LPPI) published jointly by CPSA and 
the Low Pay Unit is designed to measure the changes in the cost 
of living for a household whose income is around £90 per week 
in current terms. Although not an "official index", it is cal-
culated using data supplied by the Department of Employment • 
and weights derived from the GSS "Family Expenditure Survey". 
Table 4 422 
Income Required To'Walntaln Llvlnq Standerds (ray BO - Ray B3) 
festyle A Al a/ai * 
(avg) 
Bl B C D 
£ £ • £ £ £ £ £ 
:quireo incdhc 
L ) Hoy 1980 5287 6663 (5B60) 76UB 93B3 12160 15391 
2) Way 19B2 7093 BU93 (7510) 9386 11239 144B5 1B305 
3) Ray 1983 (eat) 7504 8562 (7946) 9930 11691 15325 19367 
NCREASC IN REQUIRED INCOnE 
4) Hay BO - Hay 83 2217 1B99 (20B6) 2322 250B 3165 3976 
NCREASE RECEIVED 
,5) (13.8?:) 730 919 (B09) 1050 1294 167B 2124 
SHORTFALL 
[i.a. Increase required 
at Way B3) 
(6) £ pa 1487 9B0 (1277) 1272 1214 
• 
14B7 165: 
(7) £ pw 2B.49 18.77 (24.46) 24,37 * 23.26 28.45 • - - 3 
(B) Base Salaries (1.4.82) 6017 7582 (6669) 865B .10677 13838 . 1751! 
(9) % Increase required 24.7 12.9 (19-1) 14.7 11.4 10.7 ID.6 
Source. 19B0 - B2 Reward Regional Surveys Ltd. 
19B3 Estimated annual Increase of 5.8£ 
* Weighted Average (A « weight of 3.5j Al = weight of 2.5) 
Hotenx 
(l) and (2) The income required on the given dates to support the particular standards 
of living A to D. 
(3) The estimated Income required to support the particular standards of living 
A to D e s B u m l n g e 5.B jC increase froa Ray 82 to nay 63* 
( 4 ) The difference "between (3) end (l). 
(5) Tho average increases received by ciy'il 'servants in 1981 and 1982. 
(6) and (7) The difference between (4) and (S) expressed in annual and weekly tares. 
(b) Thv i - B q u i t a d irrCo^Bb at Kay 1980 enhanced by average value of the 1981 fc.;d 
Livll btrvicc increases I.e. (l) plus (5). 
(9) The p s r c e n t B g e Increases required in 1983 to maintain 1980 living standards 
i.e. (6) se a % of (8). 
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The LPPI was fully described in the Council's Arbitration Case 
in 1982 (Appendix 5). 
12 On the basis of the latest available figures, the LPPI shows an 
increase from 1.4.80 to 1.1.282 of 35.0% - against 29.1% 
shown by the official RPI and 29.9% shown by the RPI "re-weighted" 
The rate of inflation for the low paid is therefore indicated 
at between 5 and 6 per cent ahead of the rate indicated by the 
official RPI for average and higher income households. For the 
reasons explained in the 1982 Arbitration Case, the LPPI is 
likely to understate the difference in inflation experienced 
by those on low incomes. 
.13 Low Incomes and Fiscal Policy 
The Low Paid Price Index takes no account of changes in fiscal 
policy, which inevitably affect living standards (i.e. there is 
no Low Paid "Tax and Price Index" to compare with the official 
TPI) . In order to make a comparison with the movement in the 
•TPI and with data from Reward Regional Surveys Ltd., some account 
has to be taken of the differential effects of recent fiscal 
policy on households and individuals at different income levels. 
These effects have been well documented by the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons using data 
supplied by the Treasury and Table 5 overleaf Is based on this 
Of f icialiinformation. 
3.14 The most marked effect of fiscal policy on family income has 
been the shift in favour of the very well off. But even at 
lower levels , the family on 75% of average earnings has experi-
enced an increase in tax and NI contributions, some 1.5 points 
greater than the family on average earnings and some 2.0 points 
greater than the family on twice average earnings. 
3.15 Conclusion 
The evidence from the Low Paid Price Index shows that the low 
paid have experienced a rate of inflation some 5 to 6% in excess 
of that indicated by the official Retail Price Index over the 
Table 5 42 
Proportion of Gross Family Income taken by Income tax and 
National Insurance (less Child Benefit) 3978/79 to 3982/83 
at Various Income Levels 
1979/80 3982/83 Diff. 
75% Averaqe Earnings 
Married Couple (no children) 24.1% 27.0% +2.9% 
Married Couple (2 children) 15.1 17.9 •I2..6 
Averaqe Earninqs -
Married Couple (no children) 28.0 29.9 +1.9 
Married Couple (2 children) 21.2 23.1 + 0.9 
2 x Averaqe Earninqs 
Married Couple (no children) 31.6 32.4 +0.8 
Married Couple (2 children) 28.0 29.0 . + 1.C 
5 x Average Earnings 
Married Couple (no children) 50.9 44.9 -6.0 
Married Couple (2 children) 49.2 43.5 -5.7 
Source: HM Treasury (Appendix 6 to 5th Report of Treasury & 
Civil Service Committee HC (1980-81): Apendix 5 
to 1st Report of T & CS Committee HC (1981-82): 
Hansard Written Answers 25.10.82 Cols 255-258) 
3.15 reference period. Evidence on fiscal trends indicates that in 
recent years the lowest income groups have been adversely affected 
to the extend of a further 1.5 to 2% compared to average and 
higher income groups. Compared to average and higher income group 
low earners have therefore suffered a relative decline in the 
region of 6.5 to 8% in real disposable income. 
3.16 Evidence from Reward Regional Surveys shows a very similar 
picture. Evidence from the Department of Employment (elements 
of H3J1) and the Government Statistical Service (Family Expendi-
ture Survey) helps us to understand the aggregate elfects shown 
by LPPI and Reward data. The Government and the Treasury, by 
their policies of strict cash limits on state industries (EFLs), 
the "Gas Tax" and forced increases in rents via the Rate 
Support Grant are chiefly responsible for the adverse price 
trends experienced by the lower paid. 
3.17 The Government, in its other role as employer, has sought 
(successfully) to restrain the increase in earnings of its 
employees below the average level of earnings growth across 
the whole economy. We provide clear evidence to show, that this 
1B the case. 
3.18 There have been two clear differential trends in prices and 
earnings in recent years. Firstly, the low paid, in all sectors 
of the economy, have suffered a relative decline in living 
standards. Secondly, civil servants (as a whole) have suffered 
a relative decline in earnings. Low paid civil servants have 
experienced both these trends. 
3.19 In the view of the Council, therefore, low paid civil servants 
must be given priority in negotiations over 1983 pay. The 
precise expression of that priority is a matter for judgement, 
taking into account the evidence available. We feel that the 
part of our claim providing for a basic increase of £12 a 
week is fully substantiated by the evidence presented above. 
If implemented, it would yield proportionately greater increases 
for the lowest paid and go some way towards restoring the 
relative earnings position of civil servants". 
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PART 4 £85 MINIMUM MAGE 
In our evidence to the Megaw Inquiry (Section H) we gave 
detailed arguments in support of action on low pay. The 
main arguments are two-fold. Firstly, that many rates of 
* 
pay are so low in the Civil Service that they are insufficient 
to support even a small household. Individual choices are 
restricted: people do not have the choice to set up independ-
ent households, get married, have children etc: they are 
trapped by low pay. 
2 Secondly, the relative value placed on certain types of 
work is too low. We believe that a minimum relationship 
should be established between low pay and average earnings. 
In the same way that Equal Pay for Women was a modification 
•of the "market" - now fully accepted but. poineered in the 
Civil Service - Government should.set an example by instituting 
a programme to set minimum standards in the Civil Service. 
.3 Relative Earnings 
The Council of Europe, of which the UK is a member state, 
includes in its Social Charter Article 4 which inter alia 
requires .member Governments 
"to recognise the right of workers to a remuneration 
such as will give them and their families a decent 
standard of living". 
The United Kingdom Government has agreed that this principle 
6hould apply in the UK. 
4.4 Interpretation of the Articles of the Social Charter is 
the responsibility of a "Committee of Independent Experts" 
appointed by ministers from each member state. After 
considerable debate and research the Committee concluded in 
1977 that the definition of a "decent standard of living" 
should be set at "a level of 68% of the national average wage". 
427 
4,5 The Committee also has the function of monitoring the 
compliance of member states with the provisions of the 
Charter. In its latest report (for 1978/79) the Committee 
noted of the UK practice:"Following the method established 
by the Committee, these salaries (examples from the DE New 
Earnings Survey) were below the 68% of the national average 
wage which seemed to be about £80 per week". The Committee 
went on to conclude that this position "could not be 
considered in conformity to this provision of the Charter". 
4.6 The various yardsticks which have been suggested as a 
minimum wage, including that of the Committee of Experts,are 
as follows: 
68% of national average (men and women) £92.76 
two-thirds of average 90.94 
lowest decile adult male earnings 69.70 
Source: New Earnings Survey, April 1982 
This data confirms that a minimum wage of around £90 per 
week (April 1982) is a reasonable measure of the requirement 
of the European Social Charter and closely conforms to other 
definitions which have been used in the UK. The Council 
believe that for reasons of cost and practical application 
progress towards this standard should be on a phased basis, 
as with the introduction .of Equal Pay. As a first step we 
believe that a minimum wage of £85 per week (at age 18+) 
would enable the Government to demonstrate to the Council 
of Europe that it takes its commitment to the European Social 
Charter seriously and that it is not merely seeking to use 
the Charter to create an illusion of a fair wage policy. 
"Needs" Criteria 
4.7 The Government by its decisions on the level of family income 
support establishes a publicly recognised "poverty line" -
the intention of the Social Security apparatus is to ensure 
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that incomes do not fall below these levels. The simplest 
of these indicators is the "qualifying level" for Family Incomes 
\ Supplement. Currently a family with two children receive FIS 
if their income is less, than £91.50 per week (not including 
Child Benefit). Even where such families claim FIS (and 50% 
do not, for whatever reason), they are scarcely any better off 
than if they were receiving short-term Supplementary Benefit. 
Indeed, if their housing costs are greater than the average 
council rent and rates or work expenses exceed £5.50 per week, 
they could be worse off than an equivalent family on 
Supplementary Benefit. 
4.8 It is simply not good enough to argue that individual needs 
are the province of the Social Security system. This "poverty 
trap"v:which^ can/mean vcivil servants .receiving ..less in net income 
than clients on the other side of the counter, is a function 
of three separate variables. The Supplementary Benefit 
Commission has summed up the problem as follows: 
"The real solution seems to lie not in reducing benefit 
to these families but in a generous level of family 
: support, a raising of tax thresholds for low-wage 
earners and higher levels of earnings!1. 
SBC-Annual Report 1975 
4.9 In recent years Governments have had a reasonable record on 
preserving the value of Child Benefit and raising tax 
thresholds. But at the same time this Government has 
deliberately sought to restrict the growth of incomes of its 
employees to below the rate of inflation. The result has been 
to push increasing numbers of civil servants into the poverty 
trap. The logic and coherence of these various policies is 
difficult to grasp. 
4.10 We consider that the case for a minimum wage is undeniable. We 
believe that full-time, fully-trained adult staff should 
have the right to a "decent remuneration". We support the aims 
of the European Social Charter and specifically the aim of 
a minimum wage at not less than 68% of average earnings. As 
a first step towards this target, there should be established 
in the Civil Service a minimum wage for ell those aged 18 
of over, of £85 per week. 
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than the Treasury's. We are not surprised at this, for, as 
indicated above, Treasury forecasts in this area have been 
shown consistently to be underestimates. 
i 
PART 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PAY AND PRICES 
\^ 
Introduction 
5.1 In the earlier part of this memorandum, we have drawn 
attention to both the real and the relative developments 
affecting Civil Service pay since the base-date of 1 April 
1980. The Civil Service has fallen badly behind during this 
period, as the evidence in Part 2 demonstrates. In order to 
bring Civil Service pay into line, it is necessary to 
provide for the shortfall and to match the current pay 
movements. At present, we only have experience of rather 
less thanihalf of the 1982/83 pay round. We have, therefore, 
. to rely on forecasts for the remainder of this pay round. 
! The Treasury's forecast (see paragraph 5.3 below) is, in our 
view, an underestimate. But Treasury forecasts have consist-
ently underestimated what has turned out to be the case. We 
have, therefore, reviewed all the authoritative.assessments 
| to make an accurate forecast of current pay developments 
| (paragraphs 5.3 to 5.15 below). 
• 5.2 In paragraph .5.16 , we review all the evidence on current 
i 
j trends in the cost-of-living. 
i 
(a) Forecasts of 1982/83 Earnings Increase 
5.3 The Treasury's forecast for 1982/83 is that pay settlements 
I will average between 5 to 5.5%, with average earnings rising 
by 6.5%. (Because of the impact of overtime, bonuses, shift 
i allowances and the like, estimates of earnings increases 
are usually 1 to 2% higher than increases in pay rates.) 
Most other forecasts of earnings increases are however higher 
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5.4 The House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee *ts 
of the view that the Treasury's forecasts are optimistic. 
Independent advice given to the Committee has led them to 
forecast settlements averaging 7%, with total earnings growth 
of 9%. (Reported in The Guardian 17.11.82) 
5.5 industrial Relations Review and Report in a statement on the 
bargaining outlook for 1983 takes the view that the Commons 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee's estimate is "much 
closer to reality". (Report No. 286, December 1982, p.3) 
Moreover the economic forecasts of the London Business School 
(LBS), the CBI and the National Institute for Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR) all project wages and salaries 
settlements higher than the Treasury's estimate of 5 to 5.5%. 
Forecast Annual Increase in 
Wages and Salaries in 1983 (%) 
LBS 6.9 
CBI €.2 
NIESR 7.0 
Source: Income Data Service Report 391 (December 1982) p. 27 
5.6 These forecasts of increases in wages and salaries of between 
6.2 and 7.0% are compatible with higher projected increases 
in earnings. The NIESR, for example, forecasts that average 
earnings will go up by 8.2% in 1982/83, as compared to the 
forecast rise in wages and salaries of 7.0% (IDS Report 391, 
December 1982, p. 27). Furthermore, IDS also point out that 
stockbrokers Lalng and Cruickshank estimate that average 
earnings will rise by 8.3% in 1983, as compared to a rise in 
wages and salaries of 7.4%. 
(b) Actual Earnings Increases so far in 1982/83 
5.7 We rely on three sources of information on actual earnings 
increases recorded so far in the 1982/83 pay round. First, 
we examine the CBI Databank which is published monthly. 
Before we analyse the latest CBI pay figures, two points 
need to be stressed. 
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5.8 First, the CBI Databank is confined solely to manufacturing 
industry, it does not include other sectors of the economy 
such as banking, finance and insurance, where settlements 
in recent years have been higher than in manufacturing. 
5.9 Second, the CBI Databank records the "estimated percentage 
increase in individual average earnings attributable to the 
settlement". It does not therefore take account of other 
sources of earnings such as incentive payments, bonuses, 
profit sharing schemes, or changed patterns of overtime 
working. The figures given in the CBI Databank thereby, give 
an underestimate of the rise in total earnings. 
5.10 The latest CBI Databank summary, issued on 19 January 1983, 
Is reproduced below. It shows that since 1 August 1982, 
64% of settlements in manufacturing industry have been in the 
range 5 to 8%, and 75% of settlements have been in the range 
5 to 10%. The mean level of settlement since 1 ^ August 1982 
has been 6.2% (CBI Press Release 19.1.83). 
5.11 Assuming that earnings increases are running about 1 to 2% 
higher than settlements on pay rates, then the CBI Databank 
figures are consistent with an increase in average earnings 
of between 7.2 and 8.2%- in the 1982/83 pay round in 
manufacturing industry. 
CBI Databank 19.1.83 
Estimated Percentage Increase in 
Individual Average Earnings Proportion of 
Attributable to Settlement Settlements (%) 
Under 3 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
9-10 
11-12 
Above 12 
(Source: CBI Press Release 19.1.83) 
.12 The Incomes Data Services (IDS)'pay Chart is also produced 
monthly. As with the CBI Databank some caution needs to be 
exercised in interpreting the figures contained within the 
IDS Pay Chart. First, unlike the CBI Databank the IDS Pay 
Chart does attempt to cover all sectors of the economy and 
is not therefore confined to manufacturing industry only. 
Second, the information given in the Pay Chart relates to the 
percentage increase awarded on the lowest adult rate. As 
with the CBI Databank the IDS Pay Chart does not therefore 
show increases in total earnings. 
5.13 The latest IDS Pay Chart is reproduced overleaf. It shows 
that since August 1982 the vast majority of pay settlements 
have fallen within the 5 to 8% range, with an average base-
rate increase of between 6 and 7%. Very few settlements 
have been below 5%. The IDS Pay Chart is therefore 
consistent with average earnings increases of between 7 and 
9% in the 1982/83 pay round. 
5,14 The Department of Employment Average Earnings Index (whole 
economy, seasonally adjusted) is published monthly, two 
months in arrears. The latest figures, issued on 19 January 
1983, show that from November 1981 to November 1982 average 
earnings rose by 8.3%, with an underlying trend in earnings 
* 
increases of 8.5%. (The underlying trend figure is a more 
trustworthy indicator as the actual year increase can be 
artificially raised or lowered because of delayed settlements 
and back-pay) . 
(c) Summary of Evidence on Earnings 
5.15 Discounting the Treasury's own forecast, a fair and cautious 
summary of the evidence on actual earnings increases so far, 
combined with an assessment of various economic forecasts 
of the final outturn in earnings increases for the 1982/83 
pay round, leads us to conclude that average earnings outside 
the Civil Service will rise by between 7 and 9% in the 1982/83 
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pay round. However, basic rates*comprise a much higher -
proportion of total earnings for civil servants than is 
the case for workers outside the Service. For example, 
according to the 1982 New Earnings Survey, the proportion 
of total earnings provided by basic rates was as follows: 
Percentage contribution to total 
earnings of basic rates 
Civil Service Whole 
Whitley Council Economy 
Male 95.3 85.7 
Female 98.6 94.8 
(Source: New Earnings Survey Tables 1,2 and 3) 
Given the much greater weight of basic pay rates as a component 
of total earnings within the Civil Service, this means that 
in order for civil servants to enjoy a total increase in pay 
on 1 April 1983 in excess of the increase in average outside 
earnings during the current 1982/83 pay round, Civil 
Service pay rates will have to increase by more than 7 to 9%. 
Movements in Prices 
5.16 In the context of movements in the RPI, two important points 
need to be emphasised. First, although the Council accepts 
that it is likely that inflation will fall at the beginning 
of 1983 at around 5%, we do not accept this fall in the 
inflation rate as anything but a temporary phenomenon. In 
our view, the fall in the inflation rate will disappear as 
the effects of the recent devaluation in Sterling, as well 
as other factors, combine to push the RPI in an upward 
direction. Even before the recent devaluation in Sterling, 
the consensus of 21 separate economic forecasts, reported in 
the Financial Times on 6 January 1983, was that the rate of 
inflation would begin to rise after the Spring of 1983 to 
an average expected rate of 6.4% by the end of 1983. Bearing 
in mind that the authoritative London Business School has 
already suggested that the decline in Sterling (which may 
veil continue as a result of the fall in oil prices) will 
add 2 percentage points to the inflation rate this year 
(1983) and 3.5 percentage points to what it would have 
been in 1984 (reported in the Times 17.1.83). It is clear 
from this that the inflation rate by the end of 1983 may 
therefore rise to a level of around 6.5%. 
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I Recruitment and Retention 
6.1 The Council takes the view that the best guide to market forces 
is relative pay levels. Given sufficient information on relative 
pay levels, there would be little or no need to seek out other 
measures of the supply and demand for labour such as data on 
recruitment and retention. 
6.2 In any case, as the Megaw Report recognised (paragraphs 208 to 
211), the available, data on recruitment is generally inadequate 
for the purposes of assessing trends in the; supply and demand 
for labour inside and outside the Civil Service. It is worth 
emphasising that Megaw recommended that evidence needed to be 
collected from within and outside the Civil Service (Recommendation 
29). According to Megaw, simply providing statistics on recruit-
ment and retention within the Civil Service alone is not enough. 
As Megaw comments: 
"It is difficult to.perceive whether a recruitment 
problem of a high wastage rate is.significant unless 
management and unions have a broad awareness of the 
experience of comparable employers of similar labour." 
(paragraph 209) 
6.3 In other words, recruitment and retention, in order to be a 
useful guide to market forces, has to be viewed relatively. 
However, as we have already noted, there are at present practical 
problems in obtaining properly comparable data on recruitment 
and retention. The Megaw Report, for example, points out that 
one of the main determinants of the number of applicants for 
a job is the method and cost of advertising (paragraph 210). 
In other woxfe, if the Civil Service advertises much more widely 
and/or in a more costly fashion than other employers, then the 
number of applications for a job may be as much to do with the 
method of advertising as with the overall attraction of a job 
in the Civil Service. 
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6.4 Although at present little detailed information is available 
on recruitment and retention outside the Civil Service, what 
limited information there is, suggests that the experience of 
outside organisations is broadly similar to the Civil Service. 
For example, the 1982 British Institute of Management's 
"National Management Salary Survey" comments: 
"Not surprisingly in the current economic climate, 
only 2.8% of organisations reported that they had 
experienced difficulties with retention. 
"The number of companies reporting difficulty 
with recruitment was 9.6% compared with 12.8% 
in 1981 and 20% in previous years. The main source 
of these difficulties is, as in recent years, the 
need for specialised skills in potential recruits." 
(p.62) 
• 
It is the Council's contention therefore that there can be no 
basis on recruitment and retention grounds for civil servants 
to continue to receive lower pay levels than their outside 
counterparts. 
II Manpower and Efficiency 
6.5 Reference has been made to "improvements in general efficiency" 
(Mr Le Cheminant's letter of 23 December 1982). It is the 
view of the Council that the Government has extracted in full 
measure what any organisation could reasonably expect of its 
workforce in this respect. Regardless of what might happen in 
1983/84, the developments of the last three to four years ought 
to be reflected in the employer's judgement of an appropriate 
pay increase. 
\ 
6.6 In its response to the Treasury and Civil Service Select 
Committee (CMND 8616), the Government made substantial claims 
of improved efficiency in the Civil Service. The Council and 
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the Treasury may disagree as to whether all these developments 
are truly improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, but, 
what is undeniable is that civil servants in most. Departments 
are under considerably increased pressure to carry out the work-
load, which has not reduced in commensurate terms. 
Civil Service manpower has been cut over the life of this 
Government by 11 per cent - a greater proportionate reduction 
than in the economy as a whole.. Taking the non-industrial 
Civil Service alone, the reduction in employment has been 
broadly the same as in the economy as a whole (B / 8.5%). 
Yet in the rest of the economy, employees have, on average, 
increased their standard of living, whilst real rates of pay 
for civil servants have been cut savagely, as.we have clearly 
demonstrated. in Part 2 of this memorandum. 
8 The Megaw Inquiry concluded that productivity bargaining as 
such should not be introduced .in the non-industrial Civil 
Service: that is also our firm view. But Megaw recommended 
that civil servants should "have the opportunity to gain 
collective recognition for major improvements.in efficiency". 
The Government is claiming major improvements in efficiency 
but, at the same time, it is.forcing the jay .of its employees 
ever lower relative to average earnings. To talk of "improve-
ments in general efficiency" .in the context of 1983/64 pay costs 
ten* to beg the .question. As a result of manpower and other 
policies in recent years,, the work pressure on. Civil Servants 
has increased substantially. Where is the recognition from 
the Government for these substantial changes? 
Ill Underspend 
6.9 In order to meet the Council's claim, additional funds will 
need to be made available over and above the proposed cash 
limits. But the evidence of the operation of cash limits 
clearly shows that there is systematic underspending which has 
occurred in every year in which the cash limit system has operate! 
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The scale of the increased funds to meet the Council claim 
will be sutstantially less therefore than would be suggested 
by a crude costing of the claim. 
10 For the last six years, underspending 'Sin the Civil Service on pay 
and general administrative expenses has averaged 4.9%. On 
an annual basis the figures are as follows: 
Overspend (+) or Underspend (-) % 
1976/77 -5.2 
1977/78 -5.4 
1978/79 -3.6 
1979/80 -4.2 
1980/B1 -3.9 
1981/82 -7.1 
Source: CMND 7295,7681, 5983, 8537, 8615 
Notes: (i) The figures for underspend are calculated 
by comparing cash limit provisions for all 
rates which were controlled by the Civil 
Service Department prior to its reorganisation, 
with actual outturn figures provided by the 
Treasury. 
(ii) The figures exclude the Ministry of Defence, 
as the cash limit vote for MoD includes armed 
forces1 pay as well as civilian pay. 
6.11 The Council; recognises that cash limits are made up of approxi-
mately 80% pay and 20% general administrative expenses and that 
the underspend may not be in equal proportion for each element. 
For example, we are aware that in October 1980, the Civil Service 
Department estimated that their then estimate of 4.5% underspend 
on pay and administrative expenses for 1979/80 broke down into 
2% attributable to administrative expenses and 2.5% attributable 
to pay alone. Whilst this means that underspend on pay alone 
is likely to be less than the total 4.9% average figure for pay 
and administrative expenses combined, a substantial portion of 
the regularly occurring underspend must nevertheless be attribut-
able to pay alone. If, for example, underspend on pay and general 
administrative expenses were to iollow the 1979/80 division 4 4 1 
(45.4% administrative expenses, 55.5% pay), then the average 
underspend on pay alone over the last six financial years would 
be 2.7%. 
PX*T 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 The evidence produced in this memorandum provides an over-
whelming substantiation of the Council's claim. We have shown 
In Part 2 how Civil Service pay has declined since 1980, in 
both real end relative terms. In Parts 3 and 4, we have demon-
strated the particularly harsh effects of the pay decline of • 
price increases on the lower paid and .provided a compelling 
case for a minimum wage. . Part 5 has identified the current 
trends in pay and prices and in Part 6, we have adduced the 
other factors which we feel are relevant to "meaningful 
negotiations" in 19 83. 
7.2 In conclusion, we remind the Treasury of the following assurance 
from Kr Le Cheminant's letter of 23 December 1982: 
"First, you asked us whether there would be room 
for genuine negotiations about pay with the CCSU 
next year. The answer is an unconditional yes. 
We Intend the negotiations to be genuine and to 
conduct them with the aim of reaching an agreed 
settlement." 
The evidence we have put forward provides the basis for genuine 
negotiations and, in our view, should lead to an early agreed 
settlement. 
To : Section, Branch and Area Committee Secretaries 
( 1 per Branch) 
Dear Colleague, 
PAY 1983 - SUPPORTING EVIDENCE (HOURS) 
Please find attached one copy of the above document, which has now been 
formally submitted to the Treasury. It should be used as part of a speaker's 
brief for any discussions with Branch membership during the coming weeks. 
Yours sincerely 
GERRY GILLMAN 
General Secretary 
End. 
443' 1983 PAY CLAIM: SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR CLAIM FOR 
REDUCTION IN HOURS OF WORK 1 
Introduction: 
1.1 The supporting evidence contained in the present memorandum 
concerns the Council's claim that there should be a 
reduction in net hours worked by civil servants in the 
provinces from 37 to 35 and by civil servants in London 
from 36 to 35* Much of this evidence can be considered 
as supplementing the evidence we presented when last 
claiming a reduction of hours in 1980. We would like the , 
Official Side therefore to consider this memorandum in 
conjunction with the evidence presented in 1980, 
1.2 In Part 2 of this memorandum, we argue that when hours 
were last reduced, following the 1964 arbitration tribunal, 
the claim made by the National Staff Side was based on 
the trends which were then identifiable. We also present 
evidence on the movement that has taken place since the 
award. 
1.3 In Part 3, we provide evidence to show that there has been 
a significant trend towards a reduction in hours since 
the national engineering agreement in 1979. Since then, 
the majority of manual workers have benefitted from 
agreements reducing the normal working week by one or more 
hours. There is clear evidence that this response to the 
current high levels of unemployment and to the long-term 
trend of reduced employment opportunities caused by the 
introduction of new technology will continue in the future. 
There are examples of groups of workers who have already 
negotiated a second reduction in hours since 1979. Other 
groups who have not yet achieved a first reduction are 
* . Ir. referring to 35 hours net, we wish to reserve the position 
of grades not conditioned to the current 36/37 hours, which \ 
will need to be dealt with separately but for whom we would 
want to claim a reduction of 1 hour in London and 2 hours 
elsewhere. 
including a claim for shorter hours as a key element of 
negotiations in this year's pay round. We also examine 
the response of non-manual workers to the changes that have 
taken place. Although the evidence is less comprehensive 
than for manuals, it is clear that there have been move-
ments in non-manual hours. A substantial number of 
agreements have been reached for non-manual workers to 
work 35 hours or less a week. 
1.4 In Part 4, we explain why Official Side "full cost" estimates 
of a reduction in hours are misleading. First, we point out 
that the low level of enhancements to basic pay in the Civil 
Service means that the flow-through effect on' earnings is 
very limited when compared to groups where shift and over-
time working are more widespread. Second, we argue that 
the Official Side's costings overstate the effect on 
manpower of a reduction in hours. Even if their costings 
were correct, the Government itself has argued that there 
have been substantial improvements in productivity in recent 
years. We believe that these benefits should be shared by 
staff. 
1.5 In conclusion, we argue that given the time which has 
elapsed since the 1964 arbitration award and the evidence 
of reduced hours in outside employment, ^t is time for the 
Official Side to respond positively and realistically to 
our claim for shorter hours. 
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2.1 In compiling this claim, we have looked at the evidence pre-
sented to, and the award of, the Civil Service Arbitration 
Tribunal in 1964. The Staff Side claim for a reduction in hours 
was based upon the need for Civil Service office staff to share 
in the general movement towards a shorter working week. The 
Tribunal, after giving "careful consideration" to the sub-
missions made on behalf of the two parties, made an award which 
reduced working hours. There is once again substantial evidence 
of a trend in hours reductions which has not been reflected in 
Civil Service conditions. 
2.2 The Staff Side quoted Ministry of Labour statistics on large-
scale reductions in hours of work which had taken place for 
industrial workers since 1956 and referred to figures by the 
Institute of Office Management which indicated that similar 
movements had taken place for non-manual workers. We said 
that "it would be quite unfair for the Civil Service to have 
to wait until the whole of outside employment had achieved a 
reduction of hours before it could secure any improvement". 
We also argued that staff should share in the benefits of 
improved productivity. 
2.3 Since 1964 the trend towards reduced hours in ,outside employment 
has continued. In 1979 the Institute of Administrative 
• Management (previously the Institute of Office Management) 
produced Its latest report on hours for office staff. This 
shoved that in 1978 54% of establishments were working less than 
37 hours, a rise of 27% since 1963. Figures taken from I0M/IAM 
reports since 1961 are presented in the table below. (This table 
is reproduced from our 1980 evidence.) This clearly demonstrates 
the trend towards shorter hours in outside employment. It also 
illustrates that in 1978 35% of establishments were working 
less than 36 hours per week. 
1964 Arbitration Case 
Table 1 
Hours 'of work of office staff 1961-1978 
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Percentage of Establishments Working 
Hours 1961 1963 1972 1978 * 
Under 35 2 (2) 2 (2) 8 (B) 4 (4) 
36 6 (C) 10 (12) 24 (32) 31 (35) 
37 10 (ID) 15 (27) 16 (48) 19 (54) 
38 40 (58) 44 (71) 45 (93) 37 (91) 
39 23 (81) 19 (90) 5 (98) 4 (95) 
40 7 (88) 5 (95) 
40 and over 12 (100) 5 (100) 2 (100) 5 (100) * 
* Cumulative totals in brackets 
(Source: I0M/IAM reports) 
2.4 Our 1980 submission also pointed to the fact that PRU evidence 
for 1980 showed that the mode of outside settlements in the 
Clerical, Secretarial, Data Processing and Administrative 
(Middle and Higher) grades was 35 hours net per week. The major 
surveys .-showed that 35 hours or less were worked in 27% of 
outside ^ organisations and less-than 37 hours in 45%. 
2.5 We would argue therefore both that the Staff Side's arguments 
on trends which were used in 1964 and the subsequent long-term 
movements in outside industry provide a basic case for hours 
improvement. In 1979 a major impetus was given to hours reduction 
by the engineering agreement to reduce hours from 40 to 39. 
In Part 3 we turn to more recent trends following that agreement. 
j 
PART 3 
Recent Movements in Hours of Work 
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3.1 In its 1980 submission the Council quoted from a recent 
IDS Report which stated that appoximately 5 xni.llion manual 
workers were covered by agreements to shorten the working week. 
Most of those agreements had been reached in the one year 
that had elapsed since the engineering workers had, in 
September 1979, negotiated a one hour reduction in the 
working week. 
3.2 The trend which we noted in 1980 has continued and the pace 
at which change has taken place has remained rapid. 
Estimates of the number of workers who have now been affected 
by agreements in the last four years to reduce working hours 
varyi but they range from 6% million mentioned in the 
latest TUC progress report on the campaign for reduced 
•working time (No. 9, January 1983) to 8% million mentioned 
in a recent Industrial Relations Review and Report 
(IRRR 287, January 1983). It is estimated by the TUC 
that some two-thirds of the manual work-force have achieved 
reductions in hours in this period. 
3.3 While the majority of the agreements reached to reduce 
working hours for manual worker's have taken the form of a 
one hour reduction to 39 hours this is not generally seen 
as an established norm. In a report at the beginning of 1982 
. - by the independent Incomes Data Services (IDS Report 368, 
January 1982) the following assessment was made: 
"Our own view, based on discussions with a large number 
of employers during the past year, is that the 37% hour 
week for manual workers will have become quite common 
by 1983. Few of the employers we have talked to on this 
subject view the 39 hour week as anything other than a 
transitional step". 
In a study commissioned by the Department of Employment 
(Research Paper No. 38, Shorter Working Time Through National 
Agreements) it was argued that, while no firm conclusions 
could be.reached on future trends in hours, "one factor could 
be the expectations of management and unions about future devel-
opments'. Here the survey's evidence was rather strong, since 
the great majority believed that further reductions were 
inevitable within the next five years, and many spoke of a 
trend towards a 35-hour-week". 
4 In Annex A to this memorandum, we provide a list of settlements 
involving cuts in working hours agreed since October 1981, 
taken from a recent issue of Industrial Relations Review and 
Report (SRR 287, 11 January 1983). While most of the agreements 
are for cuts to 39 hours, a number show( cuts below that level. 
The list however is not fully comprehensive. Many reductions 
for smaller firms are not reported to IRRR. The Department of 
Employment Research Paper (see above) found that: 
" In the engineering industry, the proportion of 
establishments with hours below the 'norm' stipulated 
by their industry agreement appeared to have doubled 
between 1979 (when the norm was 40 hours) and 1981/82 . 
(when the norm was 39 hours) . At the time of the 
survey, those below the norm establishments constituted 
22 per cent of the engineering sample". 
* Also some agreements for larger groups of workers are not recorded 
because they were reached before 'October 1981. Gas workers 
have had their hours reduced to 38 3/4, British"Telecom engineers 
to 37*5, nurses to 37"s, electricity supply workers to 37 and day 
workers at British Nuclear Fuels to 37. On London Transport, 
both bus workers and underground workers have agreements to 
reduce their*hours to 38. 
3.5 An indication of the pace at which change in working hours is 
continuing is provided by the latest two fortnightly issues 
•of IRRR (IRRR 288 and 289). In the first of these, six agreements 
to reduce hours were reported, including a two hour reduction at 
ESSO to 38, a half-hour reduction at Shulton cosmetics to 35", and 
a 1 l?our" reduction for studio artists and related employees to 35. 
A seventh agreement for Littlewoods Mail Order staff 4 4 9 
involved a commitment to negotiate a reduction from the 
present 36% hours in 1983. In the latest issue; a further 
six agreements to reduce hours are reported. They include 
a reduction from the current 39 hours to 38 hours at Boots 
and an examination of ways of bringing about a 2% hour 
reduction (to 37% hours) in the flour-milling industry. 
Most of the available evidence on hours reduction relates 
to manual workers, but what evidence is available points 
to a response in non-manual areas of employment. We have . 
already quoted from the study commissioned by the Department 
of .Eirployn-snt on working hours. In this it was decided 
to investigate the 'knock-on1 effects from the national 
agreements on working hours for manual workers to local 
agreements on working hours for white collar staff. The 
conclusion was that: 
"The survey in fact identified widespread reductions 
in the hours of white collar employees, most 
pronounced in the industry with the strongest white 
collar unions, engineering. There, no less than 
36 per cent of establishments were granting shorter 
hours to their staff in 1981/82. There appears to 
be little room for doubt that reductions in hours 
are spreading to white collar groups, presumably to 
resist the reduction in differentials which the 
national industry agreements imply." (DE Research 
Paper No. 38) 
} Further evidence of the spread of shorter hours to non-manual 
workers has been collected by the Transport and General 
Workers Union. Annex B lists 2O0 firms which have agreed 
hours for general office staff of less than 37. The 
majority of these in fact involve agreement to work 35 hours 
of less. The list which was prepared in .July 1981 was not, . 
even at that time, claimed to be exhaustive. A separate 
study by the Labour Research Department at the end of the 
1981/82 pay round (LRD Book of Wage Rates, Hours and 
Holidays 1982) found that approximately one million non-manua|o 
workers out of a total of about 5 million included in the 
survey worked normal hours of 35 or less. 
We have already drawn attention to the latest I AM figures 
(which relate to 1978) and the 1980 PRU evidence. These 
figures are corroborated by research done by the Hay 
organisation for the Megaw Inquiry. In paragraph 1.31 
of their research study on Methods of Determining Pay 
(Cmnd 8590-1 Volume 2) , they say that normal working hours 
have fallen in the last few years and this is reflected 
in their figures reproduced below. The finance sector 
is a particularly significant competitor with the Civil 
Service for administrative and clerical staff. 
TABLE 2: Hours of Work of Office Staff, 1981 
% of organisations 
Industrial & Financial 
Services 
Under 35 1 16 
35 18 75 
Between 35 and 37 15 .5 
37 14 
37*3 " 37 2 
Between 37*j and 40 5 1 
40 4 - . " 
Over 40 6 1 
Source: Inquiry into Civil Service Pay, Volume 2.. 
9 We believe that superimposed on long-term trends towards 
shorter hours for office staff there has been a recent 
rapid movement towards shorter hours in the economy generally. 
This started with the engineering agreement and had its 
initial Impact on manual workers. There is now increasing 
evidence that non-manual workers are responding to this 
reduction in differentials. We would argue that this 
situation represents a parallel to that which gave rise 
to the arbitration award in 1964 and that current non-
manual agreements already support a reduction in hours for 
the non-industrial Civil Service. 
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PART 4 
The Cost of Introducing Shorter Hours 
\ 4.1 In evidence to the 1964 Arbitration Tribunal, it was the Staff 
Side's view "that hours of work and annual leave were separate 
factors in the conditions of service which needed to be looked 
at separately from time to time". It is still the Council's 
strongly held view that the costs of introducing the shorter 
working vee\ should not be traded off against the cost of 
increases in rates of pay in any one year. We therefore reject 
the manner in which the Official Side presented costings of the 
Council's claim at the meeting to discuss pay on Friday, 
11 February 1983. Having said this, we believe the "full-
cost" estimates for the hours claim presented at that meeting 
were an exaggeration. 
4.2 The cost of introducing a shorter working week can be divided 
into two parts - an earnings cost and a manpower cost. The 
first of these is a tangible cost which finds expression in 
an increase in the total earnings of the person whose hours 
have been reduced. The second is intangible and depends on the 
extent to which the reduction in hours offsets efficiency measures 
and the effects of the introduction of new technology. 
• 4.3 The extent to which earnings are affected by changes in hours 
depends on how much of pay is .made up of enhancements to basic 
pay. With a low level of enhancements, changes in the basic 
hourly rate consequent on a change in hours have little effect, 
whereas with a high level the effects can be quite significant. 
An examination of the ratio of enhancements to basic pay using 
figures from the 1982 New Earnings Survey shows that civil 
servants on average have a very low level of enhancements. The 
ratio of overtime, shift and bonus payments to basic pay is 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 453 
Enhancements as a percentage of basic pay - April 19B2 
All full-time men 16.7% 
full-time men - manual 31.3% 
full-time men - non-manual 6.2% 
Full-time men - Civil Service NWC 4.9% 
(Source: NES 1982) 
It is clear from these figures and the above argument that the 
tangible cost of reducing civil servants' hours would be 
negligible. 
The less tangible cost relates to additional manpower. The 
question that has to be considered is how many additional staff 
the Government would take on if our claim was conceded. There 
are two points that the Council would like the Official Side to 
consider in this respect. The first is that the reductions in 
hours following the 1964 CSAT award had no noticeable effect on 
manpower trends. Between April 1964 and April 1966, which 
covers the period during which the changes took place, the 
number of non-industrial civil servants increased by 3,3%. This 
can be compared with an increase -between April 1962 and April 
1964, the period immediately preceding the reduction in hours, 
of 5.0% These movements are represented in the diagram in 
Annex C taken from the 1971 issue of Civil Service statistics. 
In this, the years 1963 to 1966 appear as a lull in a period 
of growth in Civil Service numbers. Secondly, the Government's 
interpretation of last year's award on leave was that this did 
not lead to an increase in the cost of the' overall award. 
Yet the qualitative effects on manpower of an increase in leave 
and a reduction in hours are the same. 
.5 The Council believes that a cost of 5% on the hours part of the 
claim is far in excess of the real cost of conceding the claim. 
However, even if the cost were as high as the Official Side claim, 
it would less than offset the reductions which have taken place 
in manpower since 1979. Figures taken from 'Staff in Post' are 4 5 4-
set out below. 
1.4.79 
1.4.60 
1.4.81 
1.4.82 
1.4.83 
Non Industrial 
565,815 
547,655 
539,919 
527,972 
513,600 (estimated) 
Total Industrial 
& Non Industrial 
732,000 
705,067 
689,602 
666,362 
652,000 (estimated) 
The reduction in non-rindustrial staff between 1979 and 1983 is 
9.2%. This represents almost twice the number of jobs which 
would be created if the hours reduction were implemented on a 
"full-cost'* basis. 
4.6 Since the ending of pay research in 1980, outside gains in 
productivity have not been reflected in Civil Service conditions. 
At the same time, there have been substantial productivity gains, 
partly due to technological changes, within the Service. Civil 
servants believe that they are entitled to share the benefits 
resulting from productivity with management and the public, 
in the same way as employees outside. 
PART S 
Conclusion 
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5.1 It is now nearly 20 years since Civil Service hours were reduced. 
During that time outside movements have continued downwards 
and we now consider that the evidence is sufficiently strong 
to warrant a reduction to 35 hours, both in London and outside. 
5.2 The Official Side have attempted to put a crude cost to our 
claim. We reject both the arguments which lie behind full 
costing and the calculation itself. There is not likely to be 
a large effect on earnings; and past experience has not shown 
a full impact on manpower. On the other hand, the Civil Service 
has in recent years suffered manpower reductions which would more 
than cover any increased demand for manpower, even on the crude 
basis adopted by the Official Side. 
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ANNEX A (Source: IRRR 287) 
C u t s in working h o u r s a g r e e d s i n c e O c t o b e r 1 9 8 1 
Public sector 
c 
Negotiating group 
perative 0 
date b 
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| PABB61 
13 6? 40-38% Deleted Irom 1.1.B2 40Vj 
hours gross a week including 
hall hour paid breaks New 
Shilt patterns, including extra 
test days I United Kingdom Atomic 
I Energy Authority 
J -manuals (4700) PABB 61 
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17 82 40-39 
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J PABB 58 
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] (100.000) PABB 65 
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1.11 82 
111 62 
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40 39 
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40-39 
 Civil Sen/ice 
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J PABB 72 
1.183 40-39 
• 
1 Private sector industry agreements 
I Glass Container NJlC 
j -manua's(11.500)PABB56 
9 9 81 40-39 Workers on lour, set. Ihree shift 
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hours and are paid overtime tor 
an weekly hours Over 39 Exhibition industry 
- manuals (3500) PABB 51. 
PABB 71 
510 81 
2 4 84 
5187 
• 3B-37 . 
37-36 
3635 
One hour less and no tea-
breaks on Wednesday 
One hour less on Tuesday 
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- manuals (4500) PABB 59 
1.11 81 40-39 Inline with Engineering 
agreement 
Piani*.i*t industry 
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Engineering construc'ion 
NX 
Tar^ asnOOOOiPABBS 
2 11 81 
0 
4039 New r.ai ^ona' a g'eerrienl 
sen-no, ne-A- standard working 
ween 
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Additional comments 
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hours v.oi»eo m excess ol 40 a 
week. Independent Shipyards 
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14 82 40 39 Folows 19E1 commilment. 
Gi aphic tepioduciort 
- C' all wo" *ers PABB 63 
hi, 12 36 35 
Sciapmt;a" inojsiry JIC 
- menu's (10 000) PABB 72 
3 6 6? 40 39 F olbws 195 j commitment 
Independent B'Oedcesting 
Authority 
- sialf and rr-snua's (1300) 
PABB 73 
5.7 62 36 35 
C2S! s^onc and concrete 
NJ1C 
- manja's (17.000) PABB 70 
1B8? 
Retail Food Wapes Council 
-ie:a;,s:aii (520000) 
PABB 60 
4.10 B2 
Fir.a»move &1 cut from 40 hours 
in 19B0. p£r«ot ha:monisa!ron 
policy 
40 35 
40-39 Overtime p-eTiia only apply 1o 
hojfs v.-o>td in excess of 40 a 
week Retail Nor.-lood Wages 
Council 
- ietaii stall (660.000) 
PABB60 
4 10 B2 40-39 Simi!a'OverliiTie provisions 
(lne*c*sBb'£ tiauo; »:ade.hojis 
cu' 1icn-<?lo40asfrom 
4 1062.and 4010 39 from 
4 4 83) 
Retail Mi/i-pte Shoe 
- retail stall (29.000) PABB 64 
4.1082 4039 in Une with Wages Councils 
Buton Manufacture 
- mar.ua's (SOX) PABB 53 
4 10 B2 4039 
Road Passenpe: Transport 
NJC 
- manjals (26 000) PABB 59 
- ciali wo:*e?s PABB 63 
1 1182 
V1182 
40-39 
40-39 
E ach day no* 7 his 4B mins 
Local negotiations on 
implementation to inc'ude 
review o! working p;ectices 
Pnva:e ceTie'.iies 
- manyati PABB 72 
4 1182 40-39 In lint with ihe test ol Ihe 
inrjjstry 
Redactor >es industry 
- manna's (6CO0) PAB3 69 
1 12 B? 40 39 40-hou! piOO'j^ hOh le'pEtS 10 
continue 
'458 
• 
Negotiating group 
operative 0 
date t 
Id and new 
2sit hours 4 dditionsl comments 
Icyland Vehicles 
- manuals (7500) PABB 52 
• stall (BOO) PABB 56 
111 Bl 
111 Bi 
40 39 t 
t 
3716-37 ' 
« 
^Dn'ilionot'AfcShinp -uf ' lme a*. 
he end ol each hall shili 
l-hojr l e d J C t o n l o T cancel 
tali see IR-RR273 
Bl CB-I 
- manual (60 000) PABB 53 
1 11 Bi 40 39 : 
< 
>nii!ai 'fducl'ons io- 40-hout 
>tall 
j James Hoft-den 
- manna1* (500) PABB 52 
i i i 81 4 0 3 9 ' 
Davyloewy 
j - manuals PABB 55 
1.11 81 40 39 
1 Jones & Shipman 
1 - manuals (600) PABB 57 
1.11.61 40 39 
! JHFenner 
1 - manuals (420) PABB 5B 
1.11.81 4 0 3 9 
j Solex 
I - manua 's PABB 72 
1.11 81 4 0 3 9 
| tifotd 
I - process 6 c«at PABB 57 
1.11 81 40 39 
1 "Thomas Cook 
1 • s:ati(3?0D)PABB55 
1.11 Bl 37-/7-37 
1 - manual (is 500) PABB 61 
23 11 81 4039 f itdsy day shit; cut b y en hour 
and its: b-'tak e^n->.ated 
F .acholthE lojt night shilis cut 
by i5minjies 
I Burroughs Machines 
1 -manuals (550) 
1 PABB 57 
5 1 2 8 V 4 0 3 9 Changes lo woikinp practices 
lo improve flexibility 
I Rolls-Royce -Scotland 
1 - manuals (4500) 
J PABB 58 
Dec 19B1 
and 
Jan 19B2 
40-39 36 minutes oil Fiidey afternoon 
and sis nvnjtes oil Monday to 
Thu'Sday • 
I Baxter Butchers 
1 - manuals PABB 58 . 
1 1 82 4039 HGV divers' guaranteed v.-eek 
cut Irom 50 lo 49 hours. 
I Renault 
1 - d^t'ibutionwo'KerslBO) 
1 PABB 59 
1.1 82 4039 ShoteneC working hojrs on 
Friday 
I Toshiba-Plymouth 
I - manuals (300) 
PABB 63 
1.1.82 •40-39 Vfr day ott each monih -
no^matiyfiiday. 
I Reed Decorative Products 
1 - manua's 0050) FABB 63 
1.1 8? 39 37 h Piodjctivi'.y chanpes including 
contirijous machine tunning 
thiouph m c a ' breaks 
I Tank deign*. 
I -df>vFis(6Q0)PABB67 
1 1 82 40-39 
0 
Negotiating group 
peralive 
date 
)ld and new 
>asie hours A drjitional comments I 
Moto> vehicle retail and repair 
NJC 
- manua's (370.000) PABB 57 
b 12 82 4 0 3 9 
Tin printing industry * 
- manuals (?0O0) PABB 74 
>D12B2 
16 4.84 
40-39 E 
39-37 Vt i 
\ 
)>scuss ons on avoiding J 
ncreased costs by improving 1 
jroduct'vi'.y and efficiency. 1 
Cutlery Trade 
- manuals (4500) PABB 61 
1 VB3 40-39 
Environmental Cngineenrg 
NJC 
- stall (30.000) PABB 58 
1.1 B3 3 7 - 3 6 ^ 
Dairy Trade 
1 -manuals (90.000) 
V I .83 40-39 
1 Muihv.aii Sack manufacture 
1 -manuals (8000) 
1.V83 40-39 
1 Paper and Board manufacture 
1 -Cayv.Drkers (27.000) 
1 -sh.ttworke:sPABB6i 
1.1 B3 1823 hrs pa 
to 
1770 rvs pa 
1914 his pa 
to 
1667 hrs pa 
Adopl.on ol annual hours I 
s>stem and changes to working 
p*actices 1 
1 Power CaD'e Jointers NJlC 
1 - manuals (400) PABB 67 
11 83 40-39 S-joject to agreement to o'lset 1 
costs 1 
J Unlicensed Places ol 
1 Refreshment WC 
1 -rclailstaH(i30.000) 
1 PABB 65 
3-1.63 40-39 
1 Retail Meal JiC 
1 -retail stall (JO.OOO) PABB 64 
4 4.83 40-39 
1 Surg:cal Dressing NJlC 
1 - operatives (4000) PABB 72 
9 5 83 40-39 
* 
1 Paper Box Manufacture 
1 - manuals (B0O0) 
[June 198 3 4039 
I Individual companies 
1 Glaxo Operations 
I- manuals (7600) PABB 51 
July 19B 1 40-39 SeetR-RR209 1 
I Wilkinson Transport 
I - manuals \\350) PABB 53 
27 7 61 40.-36V-
1 GECTe'ecorrmunications 
1 - tnan u ai s iJ900) 
| PABB 62 
3010 8 1 40-39 Vi-hour oil Thursday and Friday 
- abo'.tion ol Thursday and 
Fhdaytea biea'-sand clocking-
onco-<essions 
Negotiating group Operative dale 
I Old and new 
basic hours I Additional comments 
Atlas E>pfess 
-manuals PABB 72 
V I 82 
45-42V4 j Guaranteed week cut from 45 
Ito 42 Vi hours (4Q hours bas>c 
plus ?vv hours o.eMime). 
w»!h no toss cl pay - subject 
toincieased p'oc-ctiv-ty and 
controiieo tea-breaks 
Cadbun/Typhpo 
- manuals (6000) 
PABB 51 
4.1 B2 4 0 3 9 
Cadbury Boumvitte 
- cratt workers (300) PABB 70 
- manuals (3700) PABB 64 
4 1 82 
25 4 82 
40-39 
40-39 
Graltan Warehouses 
- distribution and office stall 
(4000) PABB 74 
11.1.82 37-36 .1 Brought lorward from June 
1962 . 
Recki:! and Coiman 
- manuals (900) 
PABB 57 
5,4 82 39-38 I Extra ros'ered day oil every tour 
1 weeks 
Co-operative Wholesale 
Society 
- greengioce-sPABB 70 
- egg packers PABB 70 
3 5 82 
3 5 8 2 
40-39 
40-39 
Legate Gene: ai 
- weekly paid siatl PABB 68 
10 5B2 39-3B I Overl.rr* th:es .^D>d lor 
lengineeiing s'aff cut hom 40 to 
4i hours a week 
Fo-d 
- manuals (52 000) PABB 57. 
PABB 56 
1.6 82 40-39 (Simitar (eduction tor works-
1 related siafl. But new 39-hour 
stall to be recruited on lower 
scales Iromi.1.83 
May & Baker - Dagenham 
- manua's IB50) 
1.7 82 40-37 Vi I In line with stall hours. New shit; 
[arrangements S>mi!ar move al 
Norwich plant 
Granada 
- television engineers 
PABB 77 
July 1982 40-39 
Un.royal 
-manua's (570) PABB 65 
23 7 82 4 0 3 9 
Talbot 
-manuals (4500) PABB 63 
7.8 82 40-39 j Abolition ol washing lime 
Caierp'ilar Tractor 
- m a r k ' s (650) PABB 77 
168 62 39-3?'6 |Changes\osh'ift pa'.tems. 
Bulon Manufacturing 
-Cfalt workc'S PABB 57 
1.9 82 40-39 I Postponed Irom 1.981 -
1 temporary I0p an hour 
[compensatory supplement. 
Shu-Son GB 
Taru3S(l30»PABBW 
6 9 82 37-36 I %-hour o!I Moncay lo Thursoay 
461 
Kr-goiblinp 
Dpeiftlivr >ld and new 
bzsic hours Attdiliornl commrnU 
trtiie woods 
- rclai' stall (16.700) PABB 65 
4 10 82 4039 
Mobil Oil 
- dnve.'! and depot y.orke>s 
(500) PABB 68 
' 1 1 B3 40 39 19B1 commitment 
Mob'!Refineries - Ceylon 
- manual (600) PABB 69 
1 VB3 40 37^ 19B1 compliment 
Stlve> 
- manuals (2000) PABB 72 
1.1 83 40-39 Implementation Determined at 
local leve- - subject io "the need 
lo contain additional cosls" 
Esso-Fawley 
- menus1* (1*00) PABB 74 
1.1.83 393B Subject lo satijtacloi}' operation 
ol the ptodjcWiiy a g » e e m e m 
Manor Caterers 
- retail stall (100D) PABB 71 
3.1.83 4039 Implementation subject lo IOCBI 
negotiations 
Scottish 6 Newcestte 
-manuals (6000) PABB 77 
April 1983 40-39 
Rownnee Mackintosh 
-manuals PABB 70 
May19E3 4039 Follow 19B1 commitment 
Beipei 
-TT.anuE-s («50) PABB 64 
1 12B3 39-37 Deadline to: 1«nat pan o' 
h2imonisa*«on ptopramme -
includes changes to v.-oikmg 
practices 
CO.-iPAl.US WHU l.'OR.lftl WORKING WEEKS OF LESS TKM 37 KO'JRS 462 
R . C . Abercro^ibie 
Ademson Green and C o . L t d . 
A e r o n a u t i c a l and General Ins t ruments L td 
Aero Zip F a s t e n e r s 
Albany E n g i n e e r i n g C o . L t d . 
A l l i e d B r e w e r i e s Ltd {Burton on T r e n t ) 
Ambrose Shard? ow and Co. 
At.ent E n g i n e e r i n g C o . L t d . 
Angus F i r e Armour 
A n s e l l s Brewery Ltd 
•Sartiic Systems 
T h o s . Barber and Sons 
Bess C h a r r i n g t c n Ltd(Burton on T r e n t ) 
VVA Group of Companies and K i n t e x 
Beckir.an I n s t r u m e n t s 
b e r r y V i r g i n s Ltd 
iSUkedale - NSE Ltd 
B o v r i l 
Bouyers Ltd 
Bradbury W i l k i n s o n and Co. 
Brauley and C o . 
B r a d l e y and Graven Ltd 
Br idge Foundry ( F ) 
B r i t i s h Engines Ltd 
B r i t i s h Oxygen C o . L t d . 
. B r i t i s h Ropes 
Will iam Broady and Son Ltd 
Brockway E n g i n e e r i n g Ltd 
B . I . R . S i l v e r t o w n Ltd (Burton on T r e n t ) 
Burman and S o n s L td 
'Cambrian C a s t i n g s 
Campbell 5sherwood 
Cavenha-Ti Foods l t d ( S . West 
Chisvick and Wright Ltd 
Chloride L o r i v a l Ltd 
CUrkson I n t e r n a t i o n a l Tools 
Co:TV7,ercial. Union 
3 5 
3 5 
.35 
3 5 
3 5 
3 5 
3 5 
3 5 
35.S0.Tiins 
3 5 
3 5 
35 
35 
35 
3 5 ] 
3 5 
3 5 
36 
3 5 
35 
3 5 
3 5 
35 
34 
3 5 
3 3 ? 
35 
3 5 
* i 
35 
• 35 
35 
35 
35 
3 ^ KO: B r a n c h e s 3 5 
Container Bases Lid . 35 
C o r p o r a t e L a b o r a t o r i e s ! ! o r d e r l y fclSRA) 35 
• 
David C r e b t r c e end Son 35 
C I S A n l e r n e s 3 5 
Customs C o l l s Lid 35 
John Dele Ltd 35 
The D e l t a K e t a l Co. 35 
Denys F i s h e r Toys 35 
D i s t i l l e r s C o . L t d . 35 
Dowty Mining Equipment ( F ) 3 4 . 5 5 
Duncan Low Ltd 35 
Edge and Sons Ltd 35 
Edwards VAC Components 35 
Engineer ing Development Ltd 35 
Engineer ing Tech. S e r v i c e s 35 
EPE Co ( 'Ham) Ltd . 35 
F l e t c h e r S u t c l i f f e end Wild 35 
Fel>.ib1e D r i v e r s ( G i b i a n s ) 35 
F l o a t e x S e p a r a t i o n s Ltd 35 
Galloway Mechanical S e r v i c e s 35 
General Desca l ing Ltd 35 
Govan S h i p b u i l d e r s 35 
Grampian Engineering Co. 35 
Gregson and C o . L t d . 35 
Hanson and Edwards Ltd 35 
Harding C r o s w e l l e r 35 
John H a s t l e and Co.Ltd 35 
Haynian and P a r t n e r s 35 
Hockley Chemical Co.Ltd ( F ) 35 
O.F. Holland 35 
C D . Holmes 35 
Holset E n g i n e e r i n g L t d . 35 
Industry S e r v i c e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l . . 35 
I n s t i t u t e f o r I n d u s t r i a l Research and 
Standards 35 
fcic.iard Johnson and Nephew ( S t e e l ) L t d 35 
Vtip-.as C. Keay Ltd 35 
Allan Kcnr?dy and Co.Ltd 35 
463 
Kenyan R e f r i g e r a t i o n and A i r 
C o n d i t i o n i n g 
l a n d o r e F o u n d r i e s and Eng. Works 
lawside Eng. and Foundry 
Lion Foundry Co.Ltd 
Lionweld Ltd 
Liptak B r a d l e y L t d . 
London B r i c k C o . L t d . 
L o r i v a l L t d . 
L y l e B a r c l a y 
Chas . McNeil Ltd 
Major Equipment Co.Ltd. 
Marston, Thompson and Evershed L t d . 
Medway P o r t s Authority 
Metal foducts Group 
Middlesex Tool and Gauge 
Midland E l e c t r i c Co.Ltd. 
MIL ( B o t t l e s Div) ( F ) 
MIL (Heath Town) ( F ) 
Miles P.edfern Ltd 
Mintex Ltd 
Modern I n d u s t r i a l V e n t i l a t i o n and Oven 
Mono C o n t a i n e r s L t d . 
Mono PutTips ( E n g . ) L t d 
Katior.al Cash R e g i s t e r 
Keckar Mater E-ngineering 
Keedham B r o s , end Brown 
Newhorr-e - V e r i t a s ( formerly s t o v e s ) 
Korvoorf S t e e l Equipment 
O'Connor and Davies Ltd 
OLAU(UK)Ltd (Sheerness ) 
Vlli Oesigns 
Feeuody Ltd 
Fenham Ltd 
P i r e l l i Ltd (Bon Trent ) 
HX. P o r t e r Co.(GB)Ltd 
P o r t e r l a c a s t r i e . i 
P o r v a i r Ltd 
Pov;der Couplings L t d . 
Rank Leak Whariedale L t d . 
Redpath Pearson 
Rtnold Ltd 
R o b e r t s and E i r t h Ltd 
Royal L i v e r Fr iendly S o c i e t y 
S a f t (UK)Ltd. 
A. S c h r a d e r s Son 
S c h r e i b e r F r u n i t u r e L t d . 
S c o t t i s h Computer S e r v i c e s L t d , 
S c o t t i s h F i l n Council 
S c o t t i s h and Newcastle B r e w e r i e s L t d . 
S e l e c t i o n T r u s t 
Shandon Southern Ins t rument ( F ) 
Oohn Smiths T a d c a s t e r Brewery Co. 
Solon Housing Ass. 
S p i l l e r s French Bakers L t d . (NE) 
S t e e l e y (MFG)Ltd. 
Stoves Ltd 
S t r e e t Crane Co.Ltd . 
S t u r t e v a n t Engineering C o . L t d . 
Sun V e n t i l a t i o n C o . L t d . 
Sunblest (Glasgow)Ltd. 
Tate and Lyle T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s 
• Taylor and Challen 
Therm s a v e Eng. L t d . 
Towler and Son Ltd . 
Truman L t d . 
John Weddington L t d . 
A.E. W a l l e r 
Waters and Robson L t d . 
V'atney Mann Ltd . 
Weston Hydraulics L t d . ( F ) 
Ve$twood I 'ajor Group 
C. W h i t t a k e r and C o . L t d . 
Sequel Williams Thames Terminal L t d . 
Woollen Blanket T r a d e , Witney 
UoodbDume C o n s t r u c t i o n 
W I W Development and D e s i g n s ( F ) 
Delta' Meltal Co .Ltd (Rod D i v i s i o n ) 
S c h r a d e r A u t o n o t i v e ftoducts L t d . 
bi.i^son Lawreocs Ltd (iiO) Glasgow 
Simpson Lawrence Ltd H i l l i n g t o n E s t a t e 
P l e s s e y Ltd 
KCR Dundee 
Veedor Root L t d . , Dundee 
General r i o t ers ( S c o t l a n d ) L t d 
Brook Motors L td 
Humberside Shipbui lding and S h i p r e p a i r 
engineer ing C o . L t d . 
S i s s o n s E n g i n e e r i n g Ltd Derbyshire 
R i v e r Don S t a n d i n g s Ltd S h e f f ^ d 
Mallard L t d . 
1M1 Paxr.an 
K i r k s t e l l F o r g e Engineering Co. . 
Godfrey Holn.es Ltd 
Hunting Engineer ing Ltd. ( F e d e r a t e d ) 
fundi tor Ltd 
Dowty Mining Equipment Hucknall 
A n t a r t e x , C o a t b r i d g e 
AA 
Terry Barnes 
Bass Charr ington North Ltd 
Thos. bolton F r o g h a l l 
fondina , HalJ f a x -
-Clarkson I n t l . Tools Walsall 
Delsons Birmingham 
Delta Rods - Extruded Metals Y.'.Bronwich 
• Dobscn Hydraul ics Colwick 
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35 
35 . 
3&| 
35 
35 
362 
36 
35 
35 
3 i 
3 6 ^ 
35 
»i 
35 
35 
36 
« j 
"36J 
•4 
35 
36 | 
3 & J 
35 
36/40 
36} 
36 \/A0 
35 
A 
36} 
EoVart Chainbel t Derby 
F i r t h F u r n i s h i n g s HtckmonoVike 
Fundi tor Wexbley 
G o l e m Foucard and Son 
35.55ir.ins 
35/40 
3o^ 
36 
Hunting Eng.AT.pthill 
I m p e r i a l . T o b a c c o 
J e y e s t T h e t f o r d 
Kenton U t i l i t i e s Oarrow 
Lucas 
Donald McPherfon Bury 
•Horatio f lyer Vauxhall 
NCR Dundee 
New Day Furnishing S t o r e s S t o c k p o r t 
Pearson-Machine Tools L t d . Walker 
P l e s s e y SMand 
S u n b l e s t Aberdeen 
S c h r i e b e r F u r n i t u r e Harlow 
S u t t o n s B a k e r i e s Coventry 
V i c t o r F r o d u c t s Wallsend 
RHM B a k e r i e s 

